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Chapter 1
Hermeneutics of return and return as hermeneutics 
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time. (from T. S. Eliot's “Little Gidding” (1949 [1942]), V l.26-29)
The truth of a “return” does not lie in an absolute geography or an absolute history but rather through
windows into a composition of reality that can never be seized even as it energizes the imagination
into densities and transparencies that release other proportion or windows or doors within the protean
imagination. (Wilson Harris, quoted in Mihailovic-Dickman 1994: no pagination)1
The  above-quoted  lines  from the  fifth  and  last  section  of  T.  S.  Eliot's  “Little  Gidding”
beautifully introduce the object of this work: odysseys, homecomings, or journeys of return
where the points of departure and the points of arrival simultaneously coincide and differ.
Literary  figurations  of  lifelong  exiles  and  never-ceasing  explorations  of  the  terrains  of
language, literature and history – as these journeys emerge in Eliot's poem – they give shape
to the imaginary, discrepant homes from which they start and in which they also end. 
The words of the Guyanese writer, poet and essayist Wilson Harris that provide the
second epigraph above trace the same motif of the returning exile’s differing, dissonant vision
of home, but in a different way. Both Eliot and Harris attribute a specific cognitive value to
the motif of return. For both poets, the journey home is a journey that forces an alienated,
travelling self to go along a circular path of repatriation through expatriation, a path in which
this self acquires, in its estrangement, a new capacity of seeing. For both poets, the journey
home thus takes self-knowledge as its ultimate goal, although without implying conceptions
1
Extract from a “Letter to the Editor” of the volume Return in Post-Colonial Writing. A Cultural Labyrinth 
dated 23.12.1992 ( Mihailovic-Dickman 1994)
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of identity and belonging as stable. Yet, while for Eliot the truth of a return resides in the very
possibility of ending the journey – “Little Gidding” is the last of the Four Quartets, the final
poem  of  a  cycle,  and  its  main  concerns  are  precisely  how  to  end,  the  possibility  of
redemption,  and the idea that the writer  may eventually find his place within history and
tradition (cf. Cooper 2008) – for Harris the truth of a return resides in the kaleidoscopic vision
that multiplies and diffracts the home to which the travelling self will come back. Harris'
words are charged with the historical experience of a people whose idea of home is haunted
by the memory of the deprivation of an original homeland. The uprootings, dispossessions,
and forced migrations together with the violent  encounters and the turbulent processes of
hybridization which gave shape to the Caribbean make  home a most complex, composite,
even disturbing concept, a concept which, nevertheless, emerges as crucial in the process of
articulating collective and individual identities with which Caribbean literature engages. More
than the arrival per se, Harris emphasizes the lifelong exile which forces travellers to conduct
never-ending explorations and which also protracts  itself  beyond the very possibility of a
return.  Indeed,  for  Harris,  any return  involves  a  different  form of  exile,  another  form of
alienation from the self, the eerie experience of “know[ing] the place for the first time” (Eliot
V  l.29)  which is  given not  by the acquisition of experience,  but  by the fragmentation of
experience and vision. 
This study will engage with precisely the question of how, in contemporary Anglo-
Caribbean literature, the intersections and reciprocal transformations of the themes of home,
exile,  and return envisaged in  Wilson Harris'  words are  expedient  for the construction of
hybrid, post-colonial and post-modern poetics of identity. The word “poetics”, from the Greek
verb poiein, “to make”, is used in this context to highlight how literature may function as a
weapon of intervention upon reality,  how it  may serve as  a  privileged site  to  renegotiate
processes of production and articulation of hybrid subjectivities,  of cultural  and linguistic
translation, as well as of cultural exchange. This study will engage with literature as a “way of
worldmaking”, to use Nelson Goodman's formulation (cf. Goodman 1988), that is, as a way of
bringing into being what Harris, in the above quoted lines, calls “a composition of reality that
can never be seized” as well “the imagination [energized] into densities and transparencies
that release other proportion or windows or doors within the protean imagination”. According
to Harris'  lines – lines condensing very well the preoccupations underlying the search for
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home that  characterizes  the  artistic  endeavours  of  many Caribbean  writers  –  there  is  no
absolute geography or history of home which precedes the artist's vision. It is the artist's task
to articulate a vision of the return home against whose dissonance and polymorphous quality
collective and individual Caribbean identities may be positioned, and the trauma of history,
the  controversial  legacies  of  a  past  of  uprooting,  colonialism and slavery,  as  well  as  the
spectres of European cultural hegemony may be renegotiated. 
Harris' idea that the “truth of a return” may be attained by looking through windows
that open onto “a composition of reality” which, in turn, opens onto “other windows or doors
within the protean imagination” is the inspiration for the three, interconnected main theses
around  which  this  interrogation  of  an  Anglo-Caribbean  poetics  of  identity  has  been
constructed. First, the return is never a direct act, but it is always mediated. The self can come
home only by taking a detour, by traversing the space of the other, a space in which the other
functions as a mediator (as a “window”, as Harris puts it) of the vision of home. Secondly, the
issue of the return is expedient for a meta-reflection on the way the return is conveyed in
literature. The idea of windows leading through to other windows evokes the image of a self-
reflexive chain, of a literature talking about literature talking about literature. The issue at
stake in Caribbean homecoming journeys is a reflection on literature as the very instrument of
vision through which the return is attained. Thirdly, the self – which is significantly absent
from Harris' quote – does not pre-exist the vision of home, but comes into being together with
the articulation of this vision. The self takes shape through an act of positioning within a
“composition of reality” which is always changing, always transforming itself, always in the
process of becoming. 
The first of these three theses – i.e. that the return is always mediated – introduces the
issue of the  other as a crucial point in this analysis of Anglo-Caribbean returns. The aspect
privileged by a Caribbean poetics of return to be scrutinised here is that of exile and return as
relational  activities,  as  activities  that  force  the  individual  to  explore  the  fragile,  unstable
boundaries between selfhood and otherness. The journey home is in fact a journey toward
knowledge of the self through a continuous interrogation of the other. In a cultural area like
the Caribbean, where so many different cultures converge and collude, the space of home
emerges as a space explicitly and inevitably shaped by the presence of the other. Reading
Eliot's claim that to “arrive where we started” (V l.28) means to “know the place for the first
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time” (V l.29) against the backdrop of the Caribbean experience requires acknowledgement of
the fact that the claim of possessing the space of the self is impossible, as this space is always-
already a space that can come into being only in relation to somewhere else: to the Africa of
the deported slaves whose descendants constitute the majority of the Caribbean population, to
the Asia of the indentured labourers who replaced them in the plantations after the abolition of
slavery, to the Europe of the colonizers, to the Americas for which the Caribbean represents a
sort of geographical and cultural bridge to the Old World. To discover home, consequently,
means to be ready to engage in a quest for the other which takes as its destination cultural
spaces which are linked to the Caribbean by an intertwined history of uneven, often conflicted
relationships. 
To traverse the space of the other in order to come home also means, conversely, to
explore the space where the self is perceived and represented as an other. It means to explore
how home and self have been produced through multiple, discursive inscriptions of otherness.
To mediate a return home within the kaleidoscopic composition of windows mentioned by
Harris  also means to assume the othering gaze that  centuries of colonization and cultural
hegemonies have imposed on Caribbean selves, in a way that is mimicking and deconstructive
at the same time. There are certainly manifold cultural influences that should be taken into
consideration while addressing Caribbean literature. Yet, as signalled by the juxtaposition of
some lines by T. S. Eliot with Wilson Harris' passage that opens this chapters, the present
study  will  be  concerned  more  specifically  with  the  particular  relationship  that  links  the
Caribbean to  the literary tradition it  has inherited from its  former colonizers.  Indeed,  the
controversial  relationship  to  European  cultural  and  literary  tradition  has  been  a  constant
preoccupation  throughout  the  development  of  Caribbean  literature.  The  choice  and  the
necessity to resort to European literary models and genres, as well as the impossibility of
disregarding a  canon which  has  been used  in  the  colonial  educational  system for  hidden
ideological purposes which have profoundly acted upon the perceptual framework of colonial
people, has been thematized and dealt with numerous times, even by those intellectuals, such
as Edward Kamau Brathwaite, who throughout their own career have advocated a rediscovery
and acknowledgement  of  the  African  component  of  Caribbeanness  (cf.  Brathwaite  1984).
Caribbean literature shares, in this sense, the “continuity of preoccupations throughout the
historical  process  initiated  by  European  imperial  aggression”  which,  according  to  Bill
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Ashcroft,  Gareth  Griffith  and  Helen  Tiffin,  who  coined  the  very  term  “post-colonial”,
characterizes  “all  the  cultures  affected  by  the  imperial  process  from  the  moment  of
colonization to the present days” (1989: 2).
Transforming the European othering gaze into one in which it is possible to enter a
space  of  return  calls  for  a  reciprocity  which  undermines  and  subverts  the  duality  of  the
relationship  of  colonizer/  colonized,  cultural  producer/  cultural  receiver.  In  this  sense,
Caribbean homecomings are comparable to the particular voyage of hybridization through the
space of the other which Edward Said in Culture and Imperialism (1994) calls the voyage in.
The term “voyage in” designates the movement of many Third World intellectuals, writers,
and thinkers to the metropolis as well as their successful integration there. An inversion of
narratives depicting journeys to the interior of Africa and to the most obscure parts of the self
undertaken in the name of colonialism, such as Joseph Conrad's  Heart of Darkness, Said's
phrasing suggests that the way in which the exiled intellectual can write back to the centre (cf.
Ashcroft 1989) by traversing back and forth a liminal space separating the First and Third
Worlds. The  voyage in is a journey of self-discovery, but self-discovery of a very peculiar
kind.  It is a journey outside the self,  a journey aimed at  exploring how the self has been
constituted in a relation to the other and at the same time at re-configuring this very relation
by  occupying  the  very  space  of  the  other.  It  is,  to  put  it  another  way,  a  journey  of
transformation and metamorphosis, in which the spaces of the self and of the other cross and
mingle. To undertake a voyage in means to embark on a journey of hybridization, a journey
which may have as its target the places traditionally considered  as the only centres of cultural
and literary production, but which in fact disrupts the Third World's history of passivity and
makes it an active producer and contributor to the production of culture: 
The voyage in, then, constitutes an especially interesting variety of hybrid cultural work. And that
it exists at all is a sign of adversarial internationalization in an age of continued imperial structures.
No longer does the logos dwell  exclusively,  as  it  were,  in London and Paris.  No longer does
history run unilaterally, as Hegel believed, from east to west, or from south to north, becoming
more sophisticated and developed, less primitive and backward as it goes. Instead, the weapons of
criticism have  become  part  of  the  historical  legacy  of  empire,  in  which  the  separations  and
exclusions of 'divide and rule' are erased and surprising new configurations spring up. (1994: 295) 
The semantic field that Said uses to describe the voyage in is, significantly, that of war and
struggle:  he  speaks  of  “adversarial  internationalization  in  an  age  of  continued  imperial
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structures”  and  of  “weapons  of  criticism”  (ibid).  As  the  history  of  colonialism  shows,
hybridization is not a peaceful process. Encounters between cultures usually entail a struggle
for power and assertion, antagonism and violence. Coming home in a culture that is at the
same time alien and familiar is certainly not a peaceful enterprise, and requires an attitude of
criticism and resistance.
Most importantly, what connects Caribbean journeys of return with Said's concept of
the voyage in is that their space – as is suggested in the second thesis which introduces this
study – is not just the physical space in which the migration of the intellectual takes place, but
also, and above all, the space of the text. The whole of Said's work may be read as a voyage in
to  the  space  of  the  Western  intellectual  and  literary  tradition,  a  voyage  aimed  at  the
simultaneous  retrieval  and  transformation  of  that  very  tradition.  With  his  concept  of
contrapuntal  reading  –  a  word  which  Said  borrowed  from  music,  where  the  word
“counterpoint”  designates  the  technique  of  setting,  writing,  or  playing  a  melody  in
conjunction  with  another  –  he  configures  a  possibility  of  reading  the  canonical  texts  of
English literature by taking into account intertwined histories and perspectives, developing
“an awareness of both the metropolitan history that is narrated and of the other stories against
which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts” (Said 1994: 51), and enabling
a reading of the text that involves adopting the perspectives both of the colonized and of the
colonizer, both with and at the same time against the presence/ absence of colonial references
throughout the text.  Said's  critical  project is  relevant and ethically compelling also for its
capacity  to  turn  the  marginality  of  the  colonial  experience  into  an  angle  of  vision  and
visibility  from which  the  privileged  Western  outlook  that  informs  many well-established
academic disciplines and branches of knowledge is de-naturalized and de-centred. 
By the same token, the journeys of return that are taken into consideration in this study
engage with the possibility of developing and performing a hybrid, multi-voiced Caribbean
hermeneutics that draws on the Western literary tradition. The site of the return in the voyages
discussed here is often not just a geographical space, but is also embodied in artistic and
linguistic  artefacts,  works  of  art  and  texts  that  have  entered  the  canon  of  the  European
tradition.  Coming  home  means  enacting  a  resemanticisation  which  disrupts  the  assumed
centrality  of  European  perspectives  and  to  reconstitute  the  marginality  of  Caribbean
experience as a  new way of seeing and being seen.  Casting European artefacts  against  a
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Caribbean experience means to perform an act of displacement, of translation, of struggle
over meaning. The process of reception becomes a process of re-siting: reading European
literature from the Caribbean means to read a literature that has migrated and that with this
migration has changed in most interesting ways. Post-colonial re-readings which lie at the
basis  of Caribbean journey of return place the artefacts  with which they engage within a
complex inter-textual  and cross-cultural  process,  they enrich and revivify them through a
deconstructive process which triggers off creative, ethically compelling rewritings of stories
which have entered the canon of European art and literature. 
T. S. Eliot's modernism has certainly exerted a significant influence on  the ways in
which Caribbean homecomings engage in a meta-reflection on the necessity of coming to
terms  with  the  problem  of  taking  one's  place  in  a  shared  literary  tradition.  Caribbean
homecomings often follow in reverse the path by which tradition has been constituted and
legitimized through the exclusion of the other, in order to let the other emerge in ways that
destabilize and put into question the issue of tradition itself. As Eliot famously wrote in his
essay on “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919), tradition is defined as the “ideal order”
in which literature finds its meaning and its sense of historical belonging (1960: 50). This
order is certainly not stable, as it can be modified with the introduction of a new work of art.
Yet every writer who wishes to enter the perfect order of tradition, in Eliot's view, “must
inevitably be judged by the standards of the past” (1960: 50); they must, to put it differently,
pay their  due  to  the  greatest  writers  of  the  past  whose  works  are  always  simultaneously
present in each literary endeavour that follows them. When Caribbean journeys of return take
literary tradition as a point of departure and arrival they certainly do so in a way that disrupts
the ideal order imagined by Eliot's conceptualization of tradition. As tradition is implicitly
white,  European  and  mostly  masculine  (whenever  Eliot  refers  to  the  artist,  he  uses  the
personal pronoun “he”), Caribbean writers find themselves in the uncomfortable position of
seeking inclusion in a space which has served as an instrument of exclusion. 
In order to make a literary tradition their home, Caribbean writers have to disrupt the
perfect circle described by Eliot by exposing precisely what it hides; that is, the issue of the
unaccommodating,  often  disturbing  presence  of  the  other.  Caribbean  homecoming  cannot
ignore the fact that literature has been deeply involved in the process of othering that has
discursively marginalized the Caribbean, transforming it into a place outside history. A short
12
analysis of the following lines from the fifth section of  “Little Gidding” will outline some of
the main interrogatives which the Caribbean literature of return takes up from modernism and
re-elaborates in the light of a post-colonial, post-modern experience: 
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning. 
The end is where we start from. And every phrase 
And Sentence that is right (where every word is at home, 
Taking its place to support the others,
The word neither different nor ostentatious,
An easy commerce of the old and the new,
The common word exact without vulgarity,
The formal word precise but not pedantic,
The complete consort dancing together)
Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a beginning,
Every poem is an epitaph. And any action 
is a step to the block, to the fire, down the sea's throat
Or to an illegible stone: and that is where we start. 
We die with the dying:
See, they depart, and we go with them. 
We are born with the dead:
See, they return and bring us with them.
The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew-tree
Are of equal duration. A people without history 
Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern 
Of timeless moments. [...] (Eliot, V l.1-22)
These lines anticipate at least three of the meta-reflections with which the Caribbean literature
of return engages. Firstly, they deal with a meta-reflection on how literature is embedded in a
conception of history and on how, at the same time, it contributes to the very constitution of
this conception of history. Secondly, they position the text within a chain of other texts in a
way which contributes to sustaining and illuminating not just the single poem, but the whole
tradition in which this poem is embedded. Finally, they assert the word as the central element
onto which the whole chain of literary tradition is grounded. 
The  issue  of  the  mutual  intersections  of  literature  and history  presents  itself  as  a
central issue in the Caribbean literature of homecoming in terms of the problematic way in
which the Caribbean has been excluded and marginalized by history as a writing enterprise.
Negotiating a return home in Anglo-Caribbean literature is not just a matter of acknowledging
that one belongs within the flux of time and history, but it rather implies configuring literature
as a site for the development of a counter-discourse on history. If, as Eliot suggests, the truth
of a literary return consists in the capacity to see the past simultaneously with the present, the
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problem that comes to the fore in Caribbean homecomings is that of the impossible retrieval
of histories which the European discursive, written appropriations of history contributed to
obliterating.  The  mostly  unwritten  memories  of  the  histories  of  the  native  Caribbean
populations who were massacred after the arrival of the Europeans, or of the histories of the
Africans enslaved, deported and forced to forget their native lands, or of the histories of the
millions of people who died at sea, usually enter history books only as marginal episodes
dissolved in the greater project of modernity. Eliot's lines, “A people without history/ is not
redeemed from time, for history is a pattern/ Of timeless moments” (V  l.20-22) are all the
more compelling because of their paradoxical pertinence to Caribbean experience. The very
fact that Eliot envisages the possibility of being “a people without history” (V l.20) reveals
history as a discourse of exclusion, a discourse controlled by those who have the power to
determine what history is. Being without history, in fact, means to have been deprived of the
possibility of writing history; that is, of controlling the process through which history is given
shape.  The redemption from time that  literature  promises  is  a  redemption  that  Caribbean
writers may look for by following the path described by Eliot, i.e. that of the discovery of the
past within the present, of being able “to die with the dying” (V l.15) as well as to be “born
with them” (V l.17), but in order to do so they first have to deal with writing as an instrument
of historical exclusion and silencing. 
Secondly, Eliot's meta-reflection on the fact that no literary text can exist on its own
also emerges as a central theme in the Caribbean homecomings scrutinised in this study. What
comes to the fore in Eliot's lines is the idea of the dependence of each literary performance on
the literature which came before and to that which will follow: every sentence leans on what
has been written before, and “every poem is an epitaph” (V l.12) to the poetry that has not
been written yet. Caribbean writers carry this reflection even further. They cannot ignore the
fact that literature cannot be isolated from the social, historical and political context in which
it has come into being and that it is inevitably connected to a variety of discourses (political,
economical, social, and so on) going beyond the space of the literary text. Caribbean texts
which explicitly position themselves against the backdrop of past literature cannot ignore how
literary texts are  often tainted by the hidden process of “worlding” – that  is,  an othering
process  which  attempts  to  disguise  its  own  workings  so  as  to  naturalize  and  legitimate
Western  dominance  at  the  expense  of  Third  World  experience  an  awareness  of  both  the
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metropolitan history that is narrated and of the other stories against which (and together with
which) the dominating discourse act – which Gayatri Spivak has described as a by-product of
many literary works arising in a context deeply permeated with the discourses of imperialism
(cf. Spivak 1985).  
Thirdly, Eliot's “Little Gidding” also anticipates Caribbean homecomings in so far as it
puts the word at the centre of its meta-reflection of literature and tradition. For Eliot, a return
is accomplished when “every word is at home,/ Taking its place to support the others” (V l.4-
5).  Language is  the  very bricks   from which literature is  constructed,  its  most  basic  and
fundamental part. At the same time, literature is a privileged site for reflecting on language, as
well as on how human experiences take shape and are ordered in language. Yet the idea that
language may be at home figures in Caribbean literature in a most paradoxical way. Coming
home by traversing an extraneous literature and culture means, above all, to come home in a
language that is also  other. This study is based on the premise that language is an external,
trans-personal, and historically connoted phenomenon. If a language is a bearer of a culture, a
language that has been imposed as a means of domination and control cannot but openly show
the  taint  of  power,  the  signs  of  its  history  of  violence,  and the  mark  of  its  foreignness.
Choosing English as a language in which to configure a journey of return  – a choice which
many writers consider the only viable one – inevitably requires engaging with English as a
foreign language, as a language which is also a carrier of alien experiences and that must
therefore be appropriated and revitalized through the vernacular experience of the Caribbean. 
The third main thesis of this work, which is inextricably linked to these considerations
on language as the central experience on which Caribbean literature reflects, asserts that the
subjects of the homecoming analysed here take shape precisely by undertaking a journey
through language. Caribbean homecomings are journeys of subjectivation – to use a word
which will figure prominently in the following chapters – in which language emerges as the
very site through which the homecoming subjects come into being. 
The starting point of this reading of Caribbean figurations of exile and homecoming is
the idea that poetry, literature and language go beyond the individual experience of the artist
or of the single speaker. When, in “Little Gidding”,  Eliot stresses the centrality of the word,
he stresses the priority of poetry as an impersonal medium rather than as an instrument at the
service of the personality of the individual writer. Eliot formulates the aim for the writing of
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poetry in the following terms: 
to write poetry which should be essentially poetry, with nothing poetic about it, poetry standing naked
in its bare bones, or poetry so transparent that we should not see the poetry, but that which we are
meant to see through the poetry, poetry so transparent that in reading it we are intent on what the poem
points at,  and on not  the poetry,  this  seems to me the thing to try for.  To get  beyond poetry, as
Beethoven, in his later works, strove to get beyond music. (quoted in Cooper 2008: 145).2
For Eliot, the word is the fundamental instrument that poetry works through in order to reach
an intensity that goes beyond personal experiences and emotions. Indeed, Eliot claims, “[t]he
poet has not a ‘personality’ to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and
not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected
ways” (1960: 56). While in Eliot's view an artist has to extinguish his own personality in order
to become a medium that goes beyond the individual self – “[w]hat happens to the artist is a
continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable”
(Eliot 1960: 52-53) – for Caribbean writers the impersonality of the medium precedes the
very possibility of articulating the personality of the individual artist. Drawing on the theories
of subjectivity of the French philosophers Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault and on the
materialist philosophy of language that the French Marxist Jean-Jacques Lecercle bases on
them, this study will engage with how the very coming into being of an awareness of both the
metropolitan history that is narrated and of the other stories against which (and together with
which) the dominating discourse act Caribbean, hybrid subjects occurs precisely through the
medium of language. Impersonality – the exterior, shared, trans-personal quality that language
and literature have – is fundamental for the process of becoming-subject that homecoming
journeys represent and enact.
Claiming that language is an external, material and shared medium does not imply that
language is  impermeable to  individual  contributions,  however.  A language is  not  a  stable
system – as maintained by the fetishized conceptions of language and linguistic standards that
are often connected to the global diffusion of English as a lingua franca (cf. Lecercle 2006) –
but  rather  a  phenomenon  in  a  continuous  state  of  variation,  prone  to  being  transformed
through the single performances of its speakers, through its vernacular appropriations, and
through continual acts of displacement. To come home in language, this study argues, means
2 Extract from an unpublished lecture on “English Letter Writers” (primarly Keats and Laurence), which was 
delivered in New Haven, Conn., during the winter of 1933. 
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to exert a torsion on language, to become nomads in language, to embrace language as a form
of radical exile which can only be traversed in ways that are never secure or stable. 
The  following  chapter,  which  has  been  conceived  as  a  general  discussion  of  the
broader literary, cultural and theoretical terrain, draws on a definition of what is meant by
impersonality of language, writing and literature in order to cast light on exile as the condition
in which Caribbean homecoming journeys assume their meaning and sense. Using the word
“exile”, in fact, not only involves talking about the representation of the real-life experience
of forcibly leaving one's home, as in the diasporas that have shaped the demographic asset of
the  Caribbean,  or  as  in  the  migratory waves  that  have  concerned many people  from the
Caribbean, as well as many artists and intellectuals. Exile is an extremely polysemic word
which includes also the epistemological conditions in which Caribbean homecoming journeys
are embedded. Dealing with exile in the Caribbean also means to be able to see the self by
adopting the  external  perspective  of  the other  –  for  example by using a  language that  is
blatantly marked by the presence of the other.
The title of the theoretical chapter – “Looking for the other in language, literature and
culture” – reveals that its main concern will be with the first and the second theses on which
this study is based. The third thesis, on the journeys of return as journeys of subjectivation,
will  be anticipated,  but  dealt  with in  more detailed ways  in the subsequent  chapter,  with
reference to the specific literary figurations of return produced in each individual work. The
chapter, to put it another way, will deal with the literary journey home as a journey of self-
discovery which cannot leave aside the issue of the other, as well as an investigation of how
self and other are produced through language, writing and literature. These meta-reflections
on language, writing and literature as a site of otherness are certainly not only a peculiarity of
Anglo-Carribbean  literature.  Nonetheless,  in  this  specific,  post-colonial  context,  they  are
inextricably  linked  to  the  role  that  writing  has  played  as  an  instrument  of  separation,
classification, and mapping; cultural operations that have supported the colonial enterprise, as
well the forms of exclusion from subjectivity that have been performed against Caribbean
colonized people on the basis of their ethnicity. 
Michel  de  Certeau's  reflections  on  The  Writing  of  History will  introduce  some
considerations  on  writing  as  a  practice  that  is  never  at  home,  always  installed  in  the
impossible  unity  of  reality  and  representation.  The  work  of  the  French  philosopher  will
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introduce the question of how the other is produced in writing as an object of knowledge with
the same gesture that marginalizes it and transforms it in ways that may be functional to the
expansion of a system of power. Besides this, it will also introduce the question of how the
other always threatens to elude the borders of representation and to reappear in the form of
what has been repressed and hidden. Coming into being as selves in the Caribbean means to
traverse  the  multiple  inscriptions  of  otherness  that  European  writing  has  imposed  on  its
colonial space of expansion. As a consequence, the theoretical chapter will address how the
issue of exile is  textualized – that  is,  how the text  deconstructs processes of othering by
making them visible, and by undermining the representation of self, home and identity that
the literary texts taken into consideration convey. 
The theoretical chapter will  also provide a brief contextualization of how the term
“exile” has figured in literary and critical discourses on the Caribbean, dwelling in particular
on the work of two Caribbean writers and essayists who have elected exile as a fundamental
constituent of Caribbean identity. The first of them is the Barbadian writer George Lamming
who, in The Pleasures of Exile (1960), discussed subjectivity not as an innate condition but as
something  produced through  language,  thus  anticipating  at  least  a  decade  earlier  Louis
Althusser's theory of ideology and state apparatuses as well as its most recent appropriation
by  Althusser's  student  Jean-Jacques  Lecercle.  This  chapter  will  show  how  Lamming's
influential reading of Shakespeare's The Tempest defines the language that the colonizer has
imposed on the colonized as a site of exile, and how it is precisely  language that makes the
colonial into a colonial subject. Yet, Lamming is able to re-semanticize the word “exile” and
to transform it from a signifier for exclusion into a signifier for a different, “transformative
juncture” (Pouchet Paquet 1992: xiv) between colonized and colonizer, the latter of which,
Lamming claims, also finds himself, unaware, in a condition of exile in language. Language,
once  it  becomes  a  shared  experience  between both  parties  involved in  this  struggle  over
subjectivity, becomes the site in which new, joined possibilities for identity may come into
being, new connections and new forms of mutual exchange may be envisaged. The works of
the  Martinican poet,  novelist  and theorist  Edouard  Glissant  and of  the  Cuban intellectual
Antonio Benítez-Rojo multiply and diffract Lamming’s idea of the transformative juncture
with the other  replacing the duality of the relationship between colonizer/colonized with the
Deleuzian  concept  of  the  rhizome.  “Relation”  is  a  term with  which  Glissant  denotes  the
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rhizomatic, multiple relations that connect the Caribbean to the rest of the world, connections
through which the text comes into being in the form of surfaces connecting to other surfaces,
discourses connected to other discourses,  within a machine of sense by which continuous
processes  of  territorialization  and deterritorialization  determine  endless  transformations  of
sense.  Glissant's  Poetics  of  Relation and  Benítez-Rojo  The  Repeating  Island will  be
considered alongside Deleuze's discourse on Minority Literature, and will allow us to account
for  how  the  transformation  of  language  and  literature  that  Caribbean  journeys  of  return
perform may be read in terms of a “becoming-minor” (cf. Deleuze 1986).
Following the Deleuzian perspective outlined in the first chapter, the analysis of V. S.
Naipaul's novel The Enigma of Arrival will concentrate on how an autobiographical narrator
constructs his own self, as well as his own vision of home, through positioning the self within
an ever-changing reality.  The journey of  a  Caribbean writer  who has  elected the  English
countryside as his home will be read as a journey in which he makes England his home by
putting himself within a series of mediated representations of the landscape,  i.e. of literary
texts and works of art. The novel thematizes the very act of textual and artistic interpretation
as the means through which the self accesses the possibility of writing. The circular structure
of The Enigma of Arrival complements the multiple processes of revision and interpretation
that  the  narrator  superimposes  in  order  to  represent  his  self  as  something  in  continuous
transformation. 
The second novel,  David Dabydeen's  A Harlot's  Progress,  also follows a narrative
structure in  which a fictitious  autobiographical  subject  constructs  his  self  within a  highly
mediated  reality  and yet,  unlike  Naipaul's  novel,  it  figures  homecoming in  language and
writing  as  an  impossibility.  A parody  of  eighteenth-century  slave  narratives,  the  novel
explores how a hybrid subject may interrogate and undermine the structures of subjectivation
which inform his epoch. A central theme of the novel is the idea of language as a means
through which the protagonist is transformed into a subject and, because of his black skin,
simultaneously excluded from any claim to subjectivity. His attempt to narrate and to come
home is a struggle against the word of a well-intentioned abolitionist who represents the way
power tries to force the story of the young man into an accommodating narrative structure
which, nonetheless, is perceived by the latter as a further form of oppression.
The work of a feminist poet and novelist dealing with the issue of return from the
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point of view of body and affect will be addressed in the chapter that follows. While Marlene
NourbeSe Philips'  collection  of  poetry  She  Tries  Her  Tongue,  Her  Silence  Softly  Breaks,
investigates  how language colonizes  and alienates  a  gendered,  racialized  body,  her  novel
Looking for Livingstone, an Odyssey of Silence investigates silence as a means for reunion
with the lost ancestors. The novel introduces an extended metaphor of pre-colonial Africa as
the sexualized body of the narrating voice, who travels “to the interior” (ibid.) in order to
discover her ancestors as well as her true self. The odysseys among imaginary African tribes
turn into a  search for the explorer  Dr.  Livingstone,  who is  accused both of  silencing the
African and of stealing their silence. This chapter will deal with the contradictions and the
paradoxes involved in the representation of a search for an essence which, in fact, cannot
leave aside the issue of the other. 
Finally, the last analysis will deal with the most ambitious literary work ever produced
in the Caribbean, Derek Walcott's epic of return,  Omeros. In  Omeros the issue of return is
expedient for re-mediating a poetic mode for narrating the history of the Caribbean island of
Saint Lucia. This poetic mode will  be discussed as a mode which subsumes, absorbs and
annuls the different ways in which the history of the Caribbean has been told before, fostering
a confrontation with a variety of traditions and geographical areas in a way that shows a lot of
continuities and similarities with Glissant's “Poetics of Relation”. A heteroglot, polymorphous
work, Omeros is a hybrid appropriation of a variety of texts – from the Homeric epic poems,
to Dante's Comedy, to the classics of English and American literature, among them works by
Eliot, Joyce, and Melville – as well as of a variety of extra-literary discourses on history,
ethnicity,  and  media  representations.  The  poem strives  to  inhabit,  in  different  ways,  the
utterances performed about, for and against the Caribbean. Besides, Walcott's poetic rendition
of history will be discussed as a poetics of immanence which, deeply influenced by Eliot's
modernism,  celebrates  the  possibility  of  seeing,  within  a  single  moment,  the  multiple
connections of past, present and future.
The  texts  have  been  chosen  for  their  meta-reflections  on  language  as  a  site  of
homecoming and as a site for subjectivation. While Naipaul's  The Enigma of Arrival deals
with language as a locus of mediation and, as the chapter will explain, of provisional self-
translation onto an elusive, foreign landscape, David Dabydeen's novel  A Harlot's Progress
depicts  language as  an unequal,  fallacious  medium of  exchange between foreign cultures
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whose relation is based on mutual conflict and untranslatability. Marlene NourbeSe Philips
deals with the issue of language as body and affect, while Derek Walcott perceives language
as  heteroglossia,  as  a  multiplicity  of  different,  superimposed utterances.  In  each of  these
works,  language  transforms  and  is  transformed;  literature  emerges  as  a  site  not  only  of
reflection on those reciprocal transformations, but also as the very place in which they come
into being. 
The  title  of  this  study,  “(Be)coming  Home”,  emphasizes  precisely  the  idea  of
transformation that the theme of return entails. The expression “(Be)Coming Home” indicates
that home is not simply something with a fixed position that can be reached  but always also
something involving transformation. The transformation is not only of the place, but of the
self, in what Harris, in the epitaph above, terms an act of “protean imagination”. Home is thus
a concept in continuous movement, a place to dwell, but also a place of exile. Coming home
never results in an arrival or in the conclusion of a journey towards subjectivity, but rather in
the discrepant circularity of the experience of “knowing the place for the first time” (Eliot V
l.29). 
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Chapter 2
Looking for the other in language, literature and culture
Thou shall leave each thing
Belov'd most dearly: this is the first shaft
Shot from the bow of exile. Thou shalt prove
How salt the savour is of other's bread,
How hard the passage to descend and climb
By other's stairs [..] (Paradiso XVII, l.55-60)
It  is  a  feeling  of  deepest  grief  and  affliction  which  emerges  from the  famous  tercets  of
Paradiso XVII, in which Cacciaguida degli Elisei prophesies Dante's exile. No more than a
year and a half after his imaginary journey through the three realms of the afterlife, Dante
would be forced by his political opponents to leave his beloved Florence forever and, together
with his family, would have to spend the rest of his life far away from the place where he was
born and to which he had committed himself since his youth.3 The words pronounced by the
soul of Cacciaguida, the ancestor whom Dante meets in the fifth Sphere of Heaven among the
Warriors of the faith, translate in an astonishingly concrete and corporeal way the feeling of
intolerable pain caused by separation from the homeland. Exile is compared to a “bow” (l.56)
unrelentingly shooting shafts destined to tear apart the flesh of the poet. The site of the poet's
suffering is, in fact, not just his soul, but first and foremost his body. If the first shaft fired by
exile – the parting with what the poet loved most dearly – may already seem cruel enough to
3
Dante's journey through Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradiso is imagined to take place on the Easter week in the
year 1300, the year of the climax of Dante's political career as well as of the first Jubilee year proclaimed by
Pope Boniface VIII. Dante, a White Guelph opposing the interference of the Pope in the internal affairs of
Florence, was exiled from his city in 1302, after a  coup d'état organized by the Black Guelphs with the
assistance of Charles of Valois, brother of King Philip IV of France, and the complicity of Pope Boniface.
Deprived of his home, his wealth and of his objects of affection, Dante was left with a death threat hanging
over his head if he ever decided to cross the borders of the city. For further information cf. Lansing 2010.
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endure, other arrows – the many humiliations suffered by having to live among strangers –
will directly pierce Dante's organs. It is as if the poet, by mentioning the salty taste of other
people's bread and the fatigue of descending and climbing other people's stairs, were giving a
description of a somatized psychological distress. The unbearable burden of exile is translated
into the metaphors of a bitter  taste in his  mouth and of a pain in his chest coming from
climbing the steep, alien stairways. 
“Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience”, wrote the
American-Palestinian critic Edward Said in an essay titled precisely “Reflections on Exile”
(2001: 137). Inded, exile is a territory of non-belonging stretching between the impossibility
of identifying with the old homeland and the impossibility of identifying with a new one. If
identities  are  built  around  nets  of  relations,  the  sudden  and  abrupt  cutting  of  all  ties  –
emotional, national, cultural, political, economical, and so on – endangers the very possibility
of action that a person may have constructed throughout his or her life. One of the cruellest
facts about exile is that the separation between an individual and a territory also threatens a
complete loss of sense and meaning. If Dante's values strictly depended on the position he
occupied within his city, it is easier to understand how the punishment that his enemies had
prepared for him was a punishment aimed at stripping him off his dignity, to annihilate him to
the point that all his future achievements would be forever overshadowed by his exile. 
A starting point for the reflections on exile conveyed in this chapter can be found in a
question that Edward Said asked in the above quoted essay: “But if true exile is a condition of
terminal loss, why has it been transformed so easily into a potent, even enriching, motif of
modern culture?” (2001: 137). Said refers to “modern” culture without really specifying the
temporal limits of what he considers to be “modern”.4 The adjective “modern” refers, in this
essay, to a time which he defines as “spiritually orphaned and alienated, the age of anxiety
and estrangement”  (ibid.).  From  his  perspective,  representatives  of  modernity  include
Nietzsche and Freud but also, for example, the intellectuals who escaped from the Second
4 The word “modernity”, as the Italian scholar Maria Cristina Fumagalli notes, has been used in many different
ways: “A number of possible beginnings have been suggested: the Roman or the Imperial break, Descartes'
cogito, the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, Galileo, the emergence of capitalism, Luther, German
idealism,  the  ‘conquest’ of  the Americas”  (Fumagalli  2009:  1).  Simon Gikandi,  author of  an influential
monograph  on  Caribbean  literature,  uses  the  word  “modernity”  and  “modernism”  interchangeably  (cf.
Gikandi 1992).  Dealing with modernity from a Caribbean experience means to deal,  most of all,  with a
variety of discourses from which the Caribbean is partially excluded and which Caribbean literature and art
strive to go beyond. 
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World War in Europe and took refuge in the United States. Exile in this context figures mostly
as an individual experience, as the experience of artists as wanderers across cultures who flee
the horrors and the barbarism of their own society to become interpreters of a widespread
unease. Exile connotes the capacity to acquire a trans-national and cross-cultural vision, a
capacity which Said is prone to attribute also to exiles in ages preceding his acceptation of the
word “modern”. Dante's exile, in this sense, participates in this individualist, almost heroic,
connotation. It is precisely the bewilderment brought in by his exile which endows the poet
with the vision necessary for his greatest poetic enterprise, the  Comedia. It is exile which
allows Dante to see through the social and political unrest of his time, as well as beyond the
localism of his own love of his native soil, and to produce his masterpiece.
This study, instead, engages with a different kind of “modern” exiles, exiles that are
not just lived, individual experiences but rather a collective trauma which has settled itself in
the collective memories and in the discourses of identity of Caribbean people. Asking Said's
question with reference to the Caribbean implies, in fact, stretching and twisting the word
“modern” to include an area which, as the Italian scholar Maria Cristina Fumagalli argues, is
both  excluded from and  beyond modernity (cf. Fumagalli 2009). It is excluded in the sense
that European and Western discourses of modernity have petrified it and configured it as their
other. A necessary cog in the machine of progress  –  with its plantations of sugar, cotton and
tobacco, the Caribbean provided Europe with the riches that allowed the latter to transform
itself into an industrial and capitalist economy5 – the Caribbean nonetheless remains outside
the discourses of progress as a place of perpetual backwardness and primitivism. Yet, it is
5 The prominence  of  the  Caribbean  in  the  passage  from a  mercantilist  to  a  capitalist  economy has  been
highlighted by many scholars and historians of the region (cf. Fumagalli 2009). As C.R.L. James reminds us,
the sole island of San Domingo, at the time of French Revolution, was the most wealthy colony in the whole
world (1982: 45 ff.). Antonio Benítez-Rojo describes the economic role of the Caribbean in the modern age
as  follows: “Let's  be  realistic:  the  Atlantic  is  the  Atlantic  (with all  its  port  cities)  because  it  was  once
engendered by the copulation of Europe – that insatiable solar bull – with the Caribbean archipelago; the
Atlantic  is  today the  Atlantic  (the  navel  of  capitalism)  because  Europe,  in  its  mercantilistic  laboratory,
conceived the project of inseminating the Caribbean womb with the blood of Africa; the Atlantic is today the
Atlantic (NATO, World Bank, New York Stock Exchange, European Economic Community, etc.) because it
was the painfully delivered child of the Caribbean, whose vagina was stretched between continental clamps,
between the encomienda of Indian and the slaveholding plantation, between the servitude of the coolie and
the discrimination toward the criollo, between commercial monopoly and piracy, between the runaway slave
settlement and the governor's palace; all Europe pulling on the forceps to help at the birth of the Atlantic:
Columbus, Cabral, Cortés, de Soto, Hawikins, Drake, Hein, Rodney, Surcouf... after the blood and salt salt
[repetition of salt correct?] water spurts, quickly sew up torn flesh and apply the antiseptic tinctures, the
gauze and the surgical  plaster;  then the febrile  wait  through the foaming of a scar:  suppurating, always
suppurating” (Benítez-Rojo 1996:5).
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beyond modernity in the sense that the whole cultural area has been an extraordinary hotbed
of accelerated globalization which has anticipated in many interesting ways phenomena such
as trans-nationalism, syncretism, and cross-culturalization. Caribbean culture is, in this sense,
extraordinarily  multi-lingual,  hybrid  and  composite.  From  its  dissonant  perspective,  the
writing  produced  in  the  area  shows  an  amazing,  cross-cultural  awareness  of  the  many
contradictions ingrained in discourses of modernity, the way power informs them, as well as
their  constructedness  and  limitations  in  a  way which  may be  defined  post-modern  ante-
litteram.  
What  differentiates  Caribbean  exiles  from the  sort  of  exiles  described  by Said  is,
above all, a matter of scale. Caribbean modernity began with a diaspora of a multiplicity of
people  from their original homelands – African, Asian, European. Exile is consequently not
just  an experience of individuals stripped of their  familiar,  social  and territorial  ties.  It  is
rather an experience shared by millions of people, an experience of a time past, but at the
same time an experience which, following the pattern of a trauma, has been repeating itself
indefinitely. 
Exile  thus  includes  and  replaces  two  other  words  which  are  sometimes  used  in
connection with Caribbean literature –  diaspora and  migration – in order to highlight the
continuity and interconnection of these two experiences. The many waves of migration from
the Caribbean started as early as the late eighteenth century and have incessantly continued
until the present day –  Alexandra Bronfman thus speaks of “transnational citizenship” (2007:
38). These waves of migration seem to repeat and displace the spatial disjunction in which the
culture of the Caribbean has its origins. Accordingly, the influential work of Simon Gikandi,
author of the monograph on Caribbean Literature  Writing in Limbo (1992), also reads the
movement  of  artists,  writers  and  intellectuals  who  left  their  native  Caribbean  islands  to
produce what Gikandi considers “the most important documents in the Caribbean tradition:
Aimé Cesaire's Cahier, Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, C. R. L. James's The Black
Jacobins, V. S. Naipaul's A House for Mr Biswas, and George Lamming's In the Castle of My
Skin” (Gikandi 1992: 33). 
What this study is concerned with is the textualization of these experiences of exile;
that  is,  how they enter  literary  constructions  of  identity  through  singular  and  discrepant
perspectives to (re)construct the elusive space of home. The object of this chapter, differently
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put, is to explore how exile can be transformed from a real experience of dispossession and a
discourse of collective disempowerment into a positive foundation for a literary construction
of Caribbean identity. Caribbean writers leave their homeland not to pursue a pointless flight
from reality, or to find abroad the truth of an origin which history has taken away from them.
The flight becomes a search for truth which finds its realization not in the reconstruction of a
bond with the territory but rather in an uprooting of the self carried to its extremes. By the
same token, literary flights from home are searches for truth aimed at deconstructing fixed
ideals  of  home,  selfhood  and  identity.  “Exile”  –  a  term which  in  the  Caribbean  is  also
inevitably connected to some the most dehumanizing experiences in history the barbarism of
slavery, as well as colonialism and its aftermath of political instability and totalitarianisms – is
appropriated to serve new notions of humanism, becoming a constitutive part  of the very
concept of “home”. Indeed, in the journeys described in the following chapter, exile figures as
a site of critical engagement, of resignification and reconfigurations of identity, as well of the
transformation of the very concept of home. It  is transformed into a significant cognitive
instrument, a privileged, cross-cultural point of view on the world. 
Fictions of exile and home as separated geographical and cultural spaces are, in fact, at
odds  with  the  Caribbean’s  history  of  migration  and  hybridization.  Exile  and
return,“déracinement and  enracinement”, as the American scholar Michael J. Dash argues,
have been two of the major themes which traverse the literary production of the whole region
since the very dawn of Caribbean writing (1997: 451). “Indeed”, Dash claims, “it could be
argued that the existential  experience of exile and the essentialist  temptation of home are
inscribed more generally within a thematics of the quest for identity in all Caribbean culture”
(ibid). Dash claims that exile was introduced in Caribbean literature as the negative pole in a
dialectical,  mediative  exercise  from  which  new  conceptions  of  home  and  identity  may
emerge:  “Exile and the lure of home, fall, and redemption enable the individual to confront
the insecurities left  in the wake of slavery,  colonization,  assimilation,  and in more recent
times, totalitarian politics” (1997: 451).At the root of this literary dialectics between exile and
return is the idea of the artificiality of the conditions of being forced away from a 'real' native
land – an artificiality equally thematized in the work of writers of African,  European and
Asian descent – as well as the failure of the creation of new, national discourses or unitarian
models of national identity. Exile entered Caribbean literature in the form of a disruptive and
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threatening  alterity,  a  territory  of  non-belonging,  which  prevents  self-realization  within  a
community.6 The threat connected with the word “exile” is that of never gaining access to
one’s identity, of being forever relegated to the space of non-being. From this perspective, the
word “exile” refers to a dangerous stage to be overcome. Yet the fact that Dash ascribes this
conception of exile to a dialectics anticipates the fact that its opposition to home would soon
give way to more complex and sophisticated forms of interaction. The opposition between
home as  being and exile  as  non-being was soon to replaced with multiple  figurations  of
processes  of  becoming which intersect  and combine both  poles.  It  is  for  this  reason that
dealing with exile, as a matter of fact, not only means dealing with the precondition in which
the Caribbean journeys of return are embedded, but also with their point of arrival. Exile is
the condition of the never-ending exploration which allows, to quote Eliot's “Little Gidding”
once more, “[..] to arrive where we started/ and know the place for the first time” (V, l.28-29).
Talking about textualizations of exile does not just mean to deal with exile just as a
theme, but rather to understand how it is internalized, as an epistemological condition, into the
very practice of writing. Discourses on exile are conveyed, in the literary texts addressed here,
in the reflections on the way exile permeates the very relationship of Caribbean writers to
language, literature and culture. Exile and return, as asserted in the previous chapter, function
to the outline and develop meta-discourses  on literature and on language,  as  well  on the
legacies that colonialism left them with. Exile figures in the texts addressed in the following
chapters precisely as the awareness of the impossibility of concealing the issue of the other
which  informs  the  access  of  Caribbean  writers,  from their  historicized,  post-colonial  and
hybrid perspective, to writing. Accordingly, the following sections of this chapter will engage
6 The initially negative connotation of the word exile, Dash claims, should be regarded also as the result of the
great influence of Romanticism and of the ideal of nationhood, patriotism and belonging developed in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe. These considerations seem to Dash particularly pertinent with
regard to the writing produced in Haiti, the first nation in the Caribbean (and the second in the Americas) to
gain  independence,  in  1804,  in  the  wake  of  the  French  Revolution.  Similar  notions  of  community and
belonging are, nonetheless, easily noticeable in the first writings produced in the Anglophone Caribbean, for
example in the first slave narratives produced by West Indian slaves and popularized on the European market,
as well as in the works of vehement criticism that rose up against James Anthony Froude's The English in the
West Indies, or the Bow of Ulysses (1887). For instance, John Jacob Thomas' Froudacity: West Indian Fables
by James Anthony Froude (1889), a remarkable work that lays bare all the inaccuracies of Froude's insulting,
racist arguments against the establishment of self-governement in the British West Indies, is also very much
embedded in romantic ideals of patriotism (Tomasi 1999: 929). Besides, the same detrimental conception of
exile as being opposed to the plenitude of home converged in the Pan-Africanist movements which caught on
in the area starting from the early twentieth century thanks to figures like the Jamaican publisher, journalist
and entrepreneur Marcus Garvey and to religious movements such as  Rastafarianism. 
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with a definition and a contextualization of the word “exile” in Caribbean literature, and this
will constitute the premise on which the readings of homecoming journeys in the following
chapters will be based. 
Starting  from this  premise,  this  chapter  will  deal  with  how  the  space  of  exile  is
transformed from a space of separation between self and other into a space of “transformative
juncture” (Pouchet Paquet 1992: xiv). As the title of this chapter suggests, the main site of this
analysis of exile will be language, writing and literature. Therefore, while dealing with exile,
this chapter will introduce some of the key concepts which will account for the specificity of
the literary discourse for fostering for reconfiguring the very issues of home and identity. The
work of Michel de Certeau will allow us to understand how exile permeates these practices;
how,  in  other  words,  the  language,  writing  and  literature  are  practices  of  production  of
otherness which are at the same time troubled by the very elusiveness of otherness. After that,
a reading of George Lamming's collection of essays The Pleasures of Exile (1992 [1960]) will
provide some insights into how Caribbean figurations of exile undermine the fragility of the
borders between self and other, and will allow us to conceptualize exile as both alienation and
reconnection.  The chapter will then introduce the work of  Édouard Glissant and Antonio
Benítez-Rojo,  who embed the  discourse  of  exile  as  reconnection  and transformation  in  a
perspective which multiples  and diffracts  the duality of  colonizer  and colonized,  self  and
other. In particular, Glissant concept of “Relation” will make it possible to reconfigure the
concept  of  intertextuality  and  tradition  which  Eliot's  “Little  Gidding”  anticipated  in  the
previous chapter. 
Exile as epistemology of the other
Writing is born from and deals with the acknowledged doubt of an explicit division, in sum, of the
impossibility of one's own place. It  articulates an act that is constantly a beginning: the subject is
never authorized by a place, it could never install itself in an unalterable cogito, it remains a stranger
to itself and forever deprived of an ontological ground, and therefore it always comes up short or in
excess, always the debtor of a death, indebted with respect to the disappearance of a genealogical and
territorial “substance” linked to a name that cannot be owned. (De Certeau 1988 [1975]: 327)
Engaging  with  exile  means  engaging  with  an  extremely  polysemic  term,  the  common
semantic trait of the many meanings it assumes in its different contexts of usage highlighted
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here being the trait of “otherness”. Exile is an inescapable constituent of Caribbean culture,
the component of otherness which is never completely dissolved in the hybrid condition of
Caribbean subjects.  Edward  Said defined exile as a “discontinuous state of being” (2001:
140),  a  condition  which  implies  being  neither  totally  removed  from  one's  roots,  nor
completely assimilated to a new context. This consideration is the starting point of an ethical
interrogation on the border between self and other, the blurring of which becomes the site of a
resemanticization of the very issue of home and identity. 
Heterologies is the term that Michel de Certeau coined to refer to a “science of the
other”  (Giard  1991:  217),  an  unfinished  project  that  the  French  philosopher  carried  on
throughout his life and whose field of investigation crosses the boundaries of a variety of
disciplines, approaches, methodologies and theories. Addressing the issue of the other opens a
variety of questions on representation, discourse and even on identity formation stretching
across the individual and the collective. The word “science” may perhaps not best define the
complexity and the range of de Certeau's interrogations – he himself preferred to use the term
heterologies in the plural rather than in the singular, highlighting the fact that the word “other”
eludes any possible unity of conceptualization. More than a science, heterologies emerge as a
set of counter-discourses aimed at unveiling the different forms and locations that otherness
may  take:  as  the  real  which  escapes  representation,  as  the  repressed  that  returns  and
destabilizes discourse,  but  also,  as de Certeau's  collaborator  Luce Giard claims,  as  “God,
other men in other societies, or that alterity in oneself against whom the most painful battles
are played out” (1991: 213). Indeed, de Certeau addressed the way alterity is hidden and
located even in the self, in what Freud described as the self-dividedness of subjectivity (cf.
Freud’s topographical division of the psyche in Freud 1999) or in the constitution of the ego
as always-already alienated from itself, as in Lacan's L-scheme (cf. Lacan 2002).
De  Certeau's  heterologies  find  a  most  significant  affinity  and  continuity  in  the
literature  and  reflections  on  literature  which  have  developed  over  recent  decades  in  the
Caribbean. Indeed, the New World, which the French scholar had chosen as a paradigmatic
example to describe the functioning of the writing of history, has become the site of a series of
multifarious  interrogations,  re-significations  and  re-inscriptions  of  otherness.  Indeed,  the
inadequacy of representation and the disorienting reality of otherness appear as a central issue
in  the  literature  produced  in  the  Caribbean  to  the  point  that  the  Caribbean  has  been
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increasingly read as a cultural area in which the post-colonial intersects with the post-modern
in  most  interesting  ways.  The  relationship  with  writing  as  a  product  of  a  Eurocentric
modernity is recurrently addressed and thematized as something that Caribbean intellectuals
cannot set aside, but which they deal with in such a way that, according to Michael J. Dash,
one of the most prominent voices in the field of French Caribbean studies, they may be seen
as  “natural  deconstructionist[s]  who  praise[..]  latency,  formlessness  and  plurality”  (2002:
335).  Dash  reads  the  highly  self-reflexive  quality  of  Caribbean  writing  as  a  strategy  of
resistance to the discursive annihilation of otherness, a way of showing “the futility of all
attempts to construct total systems, to assert the powers of the structuring subject” (ibid.). In
this sense writing openly deals with what de Certeau called “the acknowledged doubt of an
explicit division” (de Certeau 1988 [1975]: 327) between the word and the world, as well as
between the self and the other, in order to “demonstrat[e] the opacity and inexhaustibility of a
world that resists systematic construction or transcendent meaning” (Dash 2002: 335).
Images of disjointed space and unstable territoriality abound in Michel de Certeau's
exploration of how the presence of the  other informs and unsettles writing.  The epigraph
which introduced this section is about precisely how writing is a practice that is not only
based in, but also constantly haunted by, the way difference has fractured the space of Western
thought, language, and subjectivity. Writing, for de Certeau, is never at home, never rooted in
an unequivocal unity of thought and being. “The acknowledged doubt of an explicit division”
(1988: 327) from which writing is born and which writing can never really get rid of becomes
the site  of  an ethical  and epistemological  interrogation which takes this  very rupture and
perturbation  as  its  mark  and  which  aims  at  constructing  non-fetishized  horizons  of
intelligibility delineating the other. 
In The Writing of History (1988 [1975]), de Certeau concentrates on historiography as
a field of analysis that is particularly significant in the way that it puts together in oxymoronic
and paradoxical ways two opposing fields – history and writing, the  real and  discourse –
whose juncture,  following  the  Lacanian  perspective  which  de  Certeau  assumes,  can  only
come into being in the form of a lack. The French philosopher and historian discusses and
analyses historiography as a highly heterogeneous and fragmentary discourse that takes many
different forms and approaches. Yet, all these “heteronomous variants” (1988: 3) emerge as
practices  of  spatial  separation,  dwelling  in  different  ways  in  the  cleavage  between  a  the
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written word and the world. If the writing of history is necessarily unable to articulate the real,
its aim will be to produce “autonomous linguistic artifacts”, necessarily separated from but
able to act upon and transform the things from which they have been distinguished (1988:
xxvi).
The separation between a  will to write and a  written body (or a  body to be written)
which lies at the heart of historiography, as well as of most scientific discourses which have
developed  within  a  Eurocentric  tradition,  is  interpreted  by  de  Certeau  as  a  practice  of
othering. Writing creates its others in order to make them intelligible. Yet, their intelligibility
is attained only in the form of what discourse has repressed and which can only be known in
that to which they have been opposed and that from which they have been separated. “A labor
of death and a labor against death” (1988: 5): with this formula de Certeau recapitulates the
paradoxicality of a discourse that repeats and affirms its separation from the object that it
wants  to  know while  at  the  same time  claiming  for  itself  the  privilege  of  restating  and
recovering  it  in  the  form of  a  knowledge on the  basis  of  which  a  course  of  action  may
subsequently be taken. Therefore, to write about the past is made possible through a gesture
which cuts off the past from the present, which silences the past and then tries to interpret its
opacity by displacing it to the site in which the historiographical discourse is produced and
legitimized. The same may be said about the many others  – “the savage, the past, the people,
the insane,  the child,  the Third World” (de Certeau 1988: xxvi)  –  produced not only by
historiography, but also by its cognates explicitly named by the French scholars (psychiatry,
pedagogy, ethnology, etc), as well as in the many discourses which these writing inform. 
It  is  an  allegory  of  colonialism  which,  in  The  Writing  of  History, introduces  the
othering potential of writing. The book opens with a reproduction of an allegorical drawing
by Jan van der Straet representing Amerigo Vespucci's landing in America. The drawing sets
up the image of the Italian explorer – armed with the weapon of knowledge and religion and
backed by the vessels which will bring back to Europe the treasures of the New World – and
the indigenous America – against a nude woman, “unnamed presence of difference, a body
which awakens within a space of exotic flora and fauna” (1988: xxv). The gesture through
which the presumed subject of knowledge demarcates his separation between himself and the
body to be written is a gesture that makes the nude woman of Van de Straet's drawing come
into being – indeed she awakens and stretches towards Vespucci as if the encounter with the
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explorer had suddenly aroused her to consciousness for the first time – in the form of an
already exiled and estranged self. It is thus a twofold act of estrangement that enables the
colonizer to manage the potential threat of the unknown and to reconstruct this unknown in
ways that may be conducive to his own expansion. Not only the subject who provisionally
occupies the position of knowing – or sujet-supposé-savoir, as de Certeau, drawing on Lacan's
terminology, calls it in the original French version (1975: 10) – separates himself from the
written object of knowledge, but this object is produced as already alienated from itself. De
Certeau interprets this drawing as a figuration of what he calls écriture conquérante (1975: 3),
or “writing that conquers” (1988: xxv), a writing which invades the body of the other and
turns it into a white page onto which the desire of the colonizer and the discourse of power
may be inscribed. The écriture conquérante, de Certeau claims, “will transform the space of
the other into a field of expansion for a system of production” (1988: xxvi) – an expression
which, applied to the specific geographical and cultural area of the New World addressed in
this study, certainly recalls the impressive quickness with which this process of transformation
took  place:  the  genocide  of  the  Caribs,  the  Arawak and the  Taino tribes,  as  well  as  the
introduction of the plantation system which made the Caribbean one of the most central cogs
in what the Cuban intellectual Antonio Benítez-Rojo described as the machine of Atlantic
capitalism, were perfected within no more than fifty years of Columbus's 'discovery'. 
The term “exile” recalls  and displaces  the alienation of the Caribbean self  that  de
Certeau had attributed to the work of écriture conquerant. As the Guyanese writer Jan Carew
wrote in an influential article published on Journal of Black Studies in 1978, the estrangement
performed  through  writing  becomes  the  epistemological  condition  in  which  the  work  of
Caribbean  writers  is  unavoidably  embedded  (“the  Caribbean  writer  today  is  a  creature
between limbo and nothingness, exile at home and homelessness at home, between the people
on the one hand and the  creole and the colonizer  on the  other”,  Carew 1978:  453). The
argument  that  Carew  presents  to  support  his  interpretation  of  the  role  of  the  Caribbean
intellectual concerns the way writing itself was introduced to the region in the form of an act
of  linguistic  and  cultural  dispossession.  Carew  claims  that  the  Caribbean  has  been
transformed into a space of exile with a primordial, linguistic act of robbing of which the very
name “America”  is  the  first,  significant  sign.  “America”,  argues  Carew,  was not  a  name
invented to pay homage to the Italian explorer Vespucci, but rather an already existing name
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used by local, pre-Columbian people. As evidence of that, Carew refers to an Amerindian
tribe  who are  nowadays  still  known as  Los  Amerriques,  as  well  to  a  mountain  range  in
Nicaragua called Sierra Amerrique. The fact that Vespucci changed his own first name from
Alberico to Amerigo and pretended to impose it onto a “virgin land” (Carew 1978: 456) is
part of a self-aware fiction of discovery which finds its on legitimization precisely in writing.
Carew compares the “intense, humorless, turgid, occasionally poetic writing of Columbus”
(1978: 455), who was not aware of the range of his own “discovery”, to the more self-aware
writing of Vespucci: 
Vespucci, on the other hand, composing his Quatuor Navigationes (c. 1504-1505) [Marcou, 1888: 12]
in Portugal did not write in the white heat of his experiences. He gave us an elegant, retrospective, and
very persuasive view, and he was never averse to plagiarism if the accounts of other people's voyage
could enhance his own. Vespucci invented a colonizer's America, and the reality that is ours never
recovered from this literary assault and the distortion he inflicted upon it. The fiction of a “virgin
land” inhabited by savages,  at once a racist one and a contradiction, remains with us to this day.
(Carew 1978: 456)
Vespucci's fiction of discovery and his renaming, a highly self-aware act which significantly
took place in Europe after the discoverer's return – it was therefore clearly separated in time
and space from the actual voyage, differently from what Van de Straet's drawing may suggest
–  was  consciously  aimed  at  expropriating the  indigenous  people  of  their  capability  of
producing name. “To rob people or countries of their names is to set in motion a psychic
disturbance which can in turn create a permanent crisis of identity”, claims Carew (1978: 457-
58), and this disturbance has become constitutive of today's “indigenous writing”, a writing
issued from “a mosaic of cultural  fragments – Amerindian,  African,  European,  Asian”,  in
which the European fragment “is brought into a sharper focus, but it remains a fragment”
(Carew, 1978: 454).
The separation between the self and the other, the sujet-supposé-savoir and the corps
su,  emerges  from de  Certeau's  studies,  nonetheless,  as  a  most  provisional  construct.  De
Certeau's  écriture  conquérant fabricates  the  illusion  that  the  other  may be  contained and
comprehended though writing, and yet “the other is increasingly revealed as fantasmatic, and
tantalizingly recedes as we get closer to it” (Terdiman 1992: 6). It is not possible to fetishize
the  other  or  cancel  its  presence  by  erecting  a  linguistic  monument  to  it,  as  the
historiographical discourse is meant to do. The separation from which writing issues does not
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put writing on a solid foundation, and certainly does not root it in a stable ontology. On the
contrary, writing is a continuous gesture of appropriation which has to repeat itself and affirm
a territoriality which is never fixed or stable. The “dealing with” the “implicit division” from
which writing issues (de Certeau 1988: 327) can never be completed , as the other always
threatens  to  reappear  and  re-present  itself,  troubling  and  unsettling  the  discursive
representations that are meant to contain and know it. 
Simon Gikandi, who repeatedly refers to Carew's article in his monograph Writing in
Limbo,  remarks that  “Caribbean literature and culture are  haunted by the presence of the
‘discoverer’ and the historical moment he inaugurates'” (1992: 1). The figure of the discoverer
is also all the more haunting in so far as, like Lacan's  Nom du Père, it is the contradictory
locus of a forced, necessary identification as well of the prohibition of this very identification.
A short extract from the section “The Cracked Mother” of Edward Kamau Brathwaite's poem
“Limbo” is adduced as an epigraph to Gikandi's monograph to illustrate the double bind that
links Caribbean cultural production to the figure of the discoverer: 
My mother said I'd be alone
and when I cried (she said)
I'd be Columbus of my ships
and sail the garden round
the tears that fells into my hand (Brathwaite I, 1.1-5)
Brathwaite is introduced by Gikandi as a poet who, although engaging in a search for new
modes of expression and representation that might revalue ancestral sources from Africa, is
highly conscious of the impossibility for Caribbean intellectuals of rejecting the inscription of
discovery tout court. “In this context, it was perhaps inevitable that the mother of the poetic
speaker in Brathwaite's poem [...] would sooner or later invoke the name of Columbus in her
attempts to show her son ways of navigating a Caribbean world that Europe had tried to
refashion in its own image”, Gikandi argues. The lyric “I” who is struggling to assert himself
– his being left alone may indeed suggest his rupture of the imaginary bond that links him to
the figure of the mother – has to confront himself with the haunting presence of this putative
father of his continent, and at the same time with the fears and anxiety that this confrontation
implies. Columbus is an absence, a linguistic position that the “I” has to occupy to navigate
across this garden, but also the threat of an imminent death – the poems later mentions the
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“black silk sails” of the three caravels navigation on “the horizon of my fear” (I, l.8) and the
slaughter brought by other adventurers in the New World (“Pirates in smiling ships, they'd rob
the world I ruled/ and not a trick I brought would bribe their cruel slaughter/ for still the black
silk walked towards me on water”, I l.13-14).
The verb “haunt” as it is used by Gikandi is also a particularly meaningful semantic
choice in that it foregrounds the predicament implied by the prefix “post” in both the word
“post-colonial”  and  “post-modern”,  i.e.  the  impossibility  of  completely  overcoming  the
paradigms of which these two discourses configure themselves as 'going beyond'. The gesture
of estrangement implicit in writing has overdetermined the Caribbean's coming into being
within  a  globalized  modernity  in  ways  which  cannot  be  simply  dismissed,  forgotten  or
replaced. Any attempt to recompose through writing the fracture created by what de Certeau
called écriture conquérante is always-already tainted with the paradox of displacing and re-
affirming this very fracture. Gikandi thus claims that “because the colonized subject has also
been entrapped in a colonial hermeneutics – previously, knowledge was only possible 'under
Western  eyes'  –  self-understanding  in  the  projected  decolonized  culture  demands  the
appropriation of exile as a form of meta-commentary on the colonial condition itself” (1992:
38). With the reference to “meta-commentary”, a concept which he draws from the work of
the American Marxist Fredric Jameson, Gikandi claims that the only way of overcoming the
condition  of  exile  that  writing  has  brought  about  in  the  Caribbean  is  to  radicalise  it,  to
comment on it, and to expose it. Caribbean intellectuals have to endorse their epistemological
exile and comment on it in order to justify their own position within writing, as well as to
dismantle any possible idea that this exile may be rooted in a Parmenidian conception of
identity between thought and being. 
The haunting quality of the figure of the discoverer and of the inscription of discovery
emerges as even more significant insofar as it allows us to understand how exile moves from
the field of the production of space to enter the very field of the production of subjects. The
cultural significance of the gesture of colonial inscriptions reverberates, in fact, also on the
very  self-perception  of  colonial  subjects.  De  Certeau's  claim  that  “the  subject  is  never
authorized by a place, it could never install itself in an unalterable cogito” (1988: 327) locates
the exile of writing at the very heart of Freudian and Lacanian conceptions of subjectivity.
Exile,  to  put  it  differently,  is  internalized  as  a  psychical  disjunction,  inscribed  in  a
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phenomenological scheme of perception in which the relation to otherness becomes central
and constitutive.
Frantz  Fanon,  a  Martinican  philosopher,  psychiatrist  and  revolutionary,  borrowed
precisely  this  idea  of  psychic  exile  to  account  for  how  the  otherness  inscribed  by  the
introjection performed by the discoverer's gaze acts upon the self-perception of black people.
In Black Skin, White Masks (1967 [1952]), Fanon draws on phenomenological claims to argue
that  “[c]onsciousness  of  the  body  is  solely  a  negating  activity.  It  is  a  third-person
consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (1967: 109).
The movements that a body performs in space are the result of a mental schema of perception
in which the body is perceived as outside-itself, in the middle of a spatial and temporal world.
What Fanon calls “third-person consciousness” (ibid.) – the idea that the self occupies both
the place of the “I”  and that  of an external  observer  through which it  can coordinate  its
movement within a space – becomes a consciousness of the self in a third place as this schema
of corporeal perception is juxtaposed to the othering gaze that is cast upon black people in a
white-dominated context. It is a casual encounter with a little boy afraid of blackness which
starts a reflection of how the gaze of the white introduces a further level of estrangement onto
the body of a black person:  
My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white
winter day. The Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look a nigger, it's cold, the nigger
is shivering, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid
of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the handsome
little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little boy throws
himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger is going to eat me up”. (Fanon 1967 [1952]: 112-
113). 
The use of free indirect speech that Fanon displays in this passage elegantly signals the way in
which the othering gaze of the child is indistinguishable from the perception of the self that
the black man has internalized. This is the historical and cultural schema which black people
introject with the white man's gaze, the gaze of the discoverer, a gaze always-already charged
with the idea that “black” is an indelible mark of difference, a signifier of inferiority through
which black people learn to see themselves.
It is a literary work which first engaged with the effort to rework the estranging gaze
of the other and reconstitute the estranged body and estranged self. Aimé Cesaire, the poet
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who, with his Cahier d'un retour au pays natal (1939), performed what has been emphatically
defined as “the archetypical and definitive moment of return in the poetry of the Caribbean”
(Frazer 1994: 7). Perhaps the words “definitive” and “archetypical” are out of step with a
work that is extremely open and multi-layered, although the  Cahier certainly represented a
key moment in the reflection on writing and alterity which subsequent generations of poets,
writers and intellectuals have had to confront.7 The way this poem left a mark upon Caribbean
literature was through opening up the concepts of “exile” and “home”. Césaire's Cahier d'un
retour  au  pays  natal,  a  forty-page-long  poem arising  from the  poet’s  experience  of  the
realization of his own alienation as a black person amid other people in Paris, describes return
not as a reunion with the self based on an ontological foundation but rather as a complex and
precarious process of transformation. 
Michael Dash defines the Cahier as an attempt at the reconstitution of a dismembered
body through an act of re-membering that does not imply a fixed identification with a past,
irretrievable idea of a pan-African original identity, but rather a constitutive process that takes
the displacement of the subject as its starting point. More than a physical return, and a real re-
conjunction with the self (and his Caribbean island as well as the Africa of his origin), the
poem seems to convey “a discovery of a new consciousness that unites opposites and suggests
unceasing metamorphosis” (Dash 1997: 452). The return to Martinique is, in this sense, a far
cry  from a  return  to  an  original  pays  natal.  Rather,  it  re-configures  Martinique  and  the
Caribbean within the flux of a continuous relationality, a relationality that makes the  retour
(return) a process of constant detour through the space of the other. Indeed, although Césaire
is  considered  as  the  founding  father  of  négritude  –  a  highly  influential  movement  of
francophone intellectuals revolving around the idea that a shared black heritage of members
of  the  black  diaspora  would  prove  the  best  cultural  weapon  against  European  cultural
hegemony – his  Cahier already takes him much further than the essentialist ideology with
7 Although the influence  of  Césaire's  Cahier  was enormous in  the francophone Caribbean,  Robert  Frazer
concentrates on the influence of Césaire in the anglophone Caribbean, in particular in the work of Derek
Walcott and Edward Kamau Brathwaite. Frazer calls the  Cahier  “definitive” for two reasons: “The first is
that, though the Cahier [italics?] calls itself a journal of return, the return envisaged is less a physical event
than an act of commitment, a reordering of priorities, a convulsion and revulsion of the will. Summoning up
distant Martinique in the eye of the mind while physically still in Paris, Césaire takes the island to himself:
‘J'accepte, j'accepte tout cela’. The second reason is this: that what Césaire is accepting is not simply his own
island but all that has happened to it, hence to himself. The poem records no literal return, but a mental return
to the origins.” (1994: 7). 
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which  négritude is  associated.8 As  the  British  scholar  Jane  Hiddleston  puts  it,  Césaire
dissolves what may be thought of as the specificity of négritude and “describes negritude as
an  opening  out  and  a  gesture  of  contact  with  otherness”  (2010:  90),  an  active  process
described through a number of neologisms created by the author to define the transformation
that this contact with otherness entails. 
It  is  undeniable  that  the  Cahier should  be  considered  a  milestone  for  the  way it
influenced a variety of literary works and also paved the way for the cultural and literary
debates that followed. The transformation of language that Césaire performed in his poetry
certainly inspired the reflections on language as exile which the Barbadian writer  George
Lamming  produced  in  his  essay  The  Pleasures  of  Exile,  while  Césaire's  idea  of  the
interconnectedness of different cultural and geographical spaces highly influenced Glissant's
Poetics of Relation. The following two sections will engage with precisely the ways in which
Lamming, Glissant and Benítez-Rojo re-elaborated Césaire's poetic figuration of the return to
construct a literary theory of exile and return as interrelated spaces, and with how the issue of
the search for the other in language, literature and culture is embedded in their analysis.
Language as a space of exile and reconnection: George Lamming's  The Pleasures of Exile
The study of exile and of the way exile contributes to the construction of subjectivities is at
the heart of the literary and theoretical work of George Lamming. A writer who observed and
analysed exile from a colonial point of view, in his work Lamming put forward the idea of
subjectivity  itself  as  something  produced,  not  innate,  and  highlighted  the  importance  of
8 Jane Hiddleston highlights how the movement of négritude was born as a reaction against the universalizing
rethorics  that  France  after  World  War  I  was  trying  to  impose  on  to  its  colonies,  at  the  same  time
discriminating against and particularizing African identity. Négritude, the movement founded by Césaire and
Leopold  Senghor,  had  thus  as  its  aim to  propose  another,  universalized  way of  thinking  about  African
identity. Césaire, whose poetic endeavour already make him at odds with the finalities of the movement that
he had contributed to found, commented on négritude as follows in an interview with Lilyan Kestlewood:
“It's an obvious fact: negritude has brought dangers. It has tended to become a school, to become a church, to
become a theory, an ideology. I am in favor of negritude seen as a literary phenomenon, and as a personal
ethic, but I am against building an ideology on negritude […]. If negritude means a kind of prophecy, well
then  no,  because  I  strongly believe  there's  a  class  struggle,  for  example,  and  there  are  other  elements,
philosophical elements, that certainly determine us. I absolutely refuse any sort of confused, idyllic Pan-
Africanism […]. As a result, although, I don't reject negritude, I look on it with an extremely critical eye.
Critical,  that's  basically  what  I  mean:  lucidity  and  discernment,  not  confusedly  mixing  everything.  In
addition, my conception of negritude is not biological, it's cultural and historical. I think there is always a
certain danger in basing something on the black blood in our veins, the three drops of black blood” (quoted in
Clifford 1988: 178).
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language  in  the  process  through  which  subjects  come  into  being,  anticipating  in  most
interesting ways, from his historicized and localized experience, the theories that would be
later developed by Louis Althusser, Michel Foucalt and, in most recent years, Jean-Jacques
Lecercle.  One of the most remarkable aspects of Lamming’s work is  the way he did not
consider exile as the experience of colonial people only, but rather an experience differently
shared by colonizer and colonized, as well as a site for the redefinition of the power relations
among  all  agents  involved  in  colonialism.  The  apex  of  his  intellectual  engagement  was
reached between the  mid  nineteen-fifties  and the  late  sixties,  precisely at  the  moment  of
culmination of the process towards independence of many British ex-colonies. Years before
the  field  of  study which  was  later  to  come to  prominence  in  academia  as  “post-colonial
studies”, Lamming raised some of the fundamental questions on the cultural, linguistic and
literary  legacy  which  colonialism  would  indelibly  leave  on  the  societies  affected  by  it,
producing some of the most brilliant post-colonial (ante-litteram) re-readings of European and
American literary classics, and anticipating reflections on cultural hybridity. 
The Pleasure of Exile (1960) is the paradoxical, oxymoronic title that Lamming gave
to “a work of self-inquiry and cultural assessment”, as Barbara Pouchet Paquet defined it in
the  “Foreword”  to  the  1992 edition  (1992:  vii),  in  which  the  personal  experience  of  the
author's own migration to England, his own cultural alienation and estranged perception of the
self are the starting points for a variety of reflections on colonialism, politics, language and
literature.  A collection  of  writings  spanning  across  different  genres  –  autobiographical
accounts, literary criticism, cultural, historical and political essays – The  Pleasures of Exile
displaces the meaning of the word “exile” from the individual condition of the writer to a
collective,  generalized experience embracing, in different ways,  all  the agents involved in
colonialism. Lamming progressively dismantles the idea that the form that exile takes against
the  backdrop  of  colonization  is  an  experience  that  belongs  to  the  colonized  alone:  “For
colonization is a reciprocal process. To be a colonial is to be a man in a certain relation; and
this  relation  is  an example  of  exile” (Lamming 1992:  156).  By inscribing  exile  within a
relationship  characterized  by  reciprocity,  Lamming  deconstructs  and  reconfigures  the  rift
between sujet-supposé-savoir and corps su which de Certeau figures as the basis of écriture
conquerant, and makes the provisional quality of this rift itself the very site of a different
involvement with the other. 
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Lamming's famous claim that “[t]he pleasure and paradox of my own exile is that I
belong wherever I am” (1992: 50) implies that while colonialism may have forever disrupted
the (imaginary) communion that linked individuals to their original home and community, it
has also allowed them to walk the different paths of becoming that may emerge through a
relationship to the other, whatever form this other may take. To foreground his involvement
with the other, and to present himself as a privileged interpreter of a precise historical moment
(the book was written against the backdrop of the beginning of a process of decolonization in
many British-Caribbean countries), Lamming introduces the ‘I’ which controls the narration
as both a personal and a collective  ‘I’, already constituted within a net of relations, among
which the ‘you’ of the reader also plays a significant role: 
This  book is  based upon facts  of  experience,  and it  is  intended as  an introduction to  a  dialogue
between you  and me.  I  am the  whole  world  of  my accumulated  experience,  vast  area  of  which
probably remain unexplored. You are the other, according to your way of seeing me in relation to
yourself. There will be no chairman. Magic is permissible. Indeed, any method of presentation may be
used. There is one exception. Don't tell lies. From time to time, the truth may go into hiding; but don't
tell lies.  
We have met before. Four centuries separate our first meeting when Prospero was graced with
the role of thief, merchant, and man of God. Our hero was 'the right worshipful and valiant knight sir
John Haukins, sometimes treasurer of her Majesties navie Roial'; and it is his first Voyage in search of
human merchandise. (Lamming 1992: 12)
By defining the ‘I’ as the “whole word of my accumulating experience, vast areas of which
probably  remains  unexplored”,  Lamming  implies  that  the  experiences  of  exile  that  he
describes  in  his  book  do  not  only  relate  to  his  own  personal  experience  and  the  actual
occurrences of his life. His analysis of colonialism is based on a provisional position he may
take  within  a  shared,  collective  experience  –  the  experience  of  language,  as  it  will  later
emerge from the text – and this positioning is highly dependent on the role that the ‘you’ may
take. The  ‘I’ of Lamming's multivoiced text is not a unifying entity, but rather, as Barbara
Pouchet  Paquet  puts  it,  a  “plurality  of  texts,  generating  a  multiplicity  of  meanings  that
determines the text's shifting value in and out of time as method and document of cultural and
intellectual history” (1992: ix). The  ‘you’ on whom the narrator relies and with whom he
starts  an  imaginary  dialogue  is  not  defined,  thus  embracing  a  variety  of  possibilities  for
identification (“you are the other, according to your way of seeing me in relation to yourself”,
1992: 12). By leaving this ‘you’ undefined, Lamming implicitly invites his readers, whatever
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their perspective or their relationship to colonialism may be, to join him in his process of
constructing of the meaning of his analysis of exile, as well as to supplement his discussion of
colonialism and de-colonization with their own experience and point of view. The “dialogue
between you and me” (ibid.) remains open until the end, indicating the instability of both
language and exile. 
In this  perspective,  the reference to Shakespeare's  The Tempest – the re-reading of
which occupies vast sections of the book  – does not reassert the dualistic identification of
Prospero with the colonizer and Caliban as the colonized which had characterized previous
readings of the play.9 The Tempest is interpreted as a scene in which the theatre of colonialism
unfolds itself, and in which the roles of master and slave depend on the contingency and the
dialectics of their relationship.  Prospero is introduced as someone who has made the first
encounter between the ‘I’ and the ‘you’  possible, but neither the ‘I’  nor the ‘you’  can be said
to identify with the magician and Duke of Milan, or his servant Caliban. Instead, they are
both,  somehow,  a  product  of  the  master-slave  dialectics  issued from their  relationship,  a
9 Despite the relative dearth of attention in the years following its writing, since the 19 th century The Tempest
has attracted the attention of numerous intellectuals concerned with the representation of power conveyed in
the play, particularly in the subplot of Caliban's attempted rebellion against his master Prospero, as well as to
read it as an allegory of colonialism. Indeed, the problematic representation of power and alterity conveyed in
The Tempest has made Shakespeare's last play into one of the most discussed, analysed and even re-written
works in the whole Shakespearean corpus. Among the re-readings and rewritings preceding Lamming's The
Pleasures of Exile, perhaps it is worth mentioning the imaginary sequel to Caliban's story Caliban. Suite de
“La Tempête”, written by the French political philosopher Ernest Renan, who imagined that Caliban, instead
of remaining on his island after Prospero's departure, follows his master and, exposed to proper language and
thought, becomes a symbol for the progress of man in democracy. Marxist re-readings of the play started
being produced in Latin America as early as the 1930, with the work of the Argentinian Philosopher Aníbal
Norberto Ponce (1898-1938), who identified Caliban with the exploited masses, and who, in many significant
ways anticipated the famous re-reading published by Roberto Fernández Retamar in 1970. 
It is, nonetheless, the deeply controversial analysis of colonialism produced by Octave Mennoni in Prospero
and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (1950) that mostly influenced Lamming's own work. Mannoni
suggested that the relationship of dependence established between colonized and colonizer was not the result
of the circumstances of colonization, but rather already implied in the very structure of both colonizer's and
colonized's societies. In Mannoni's view – a view which he developed during his stay in Malaysia, and which
was later sharply criticized because his complete ignorance of local culture had led him to a series of gross
misunderstandings (cf. Philip Mason's foreword to the English translation of 1956, as well as Mannoni's
admission of errors in the “Author's Note to the Second Edition” of 1964) – societies may be divided into
static  societies,  which  are  characterized  by a  high  level  of  dependence  (like  Caliban)  and  competitive
societies, characterized by an insatiable need to expand themselves beyond their borders (like Prospero). This
is  why they are  prone  to  accept  colonization  as  part  of  their  own social  pattern.  Mannoni  claims  that
colonization positively inserts itself into a social order already characterized by a series of ties when the
colonizer replaced the old bonds to old divinities or ancestors with a bond of a different kind. Mannoni reads
the failure of this replacement as a cause for the failure of colonial orders, as well as for the series of armed
revolts that in those years were causing bloodshed in many colonial countries.  Mannoni compared those
revolts to Caliban's association with Trinculo and Stephano, i.e. as a search for a new bond of dependence
which, nonetheless, may turn out to be completely inadequate. 
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dialectics in which the roles are open to future possibilities. 
The special value that Lamming assigns to Shakespeare's play concerns the fact that
“[t]he Tempest is a drama which grows and matures from the seeds of exile and paradox”
(1992: 95)  and that exile is  something shared between the master Prospero and the slave
Caliban.10 Prospero is the exiled Duke of Milan who, together with his daughter Miranda, has
taken refuge on a small, semi-deserted island somewhere in the Mediterranean11 following the
usurpation of his throne by his brother Antonio. Yet, while in exile, Prospero uses his magic to
make himself at home, to  force the two other inhabitants of the island – the deformed Caliban
and the airy spirit Ariel – to submit to his power and to assume control of the island in a way
that replicates in the limited space of the island the function of command which he already
had in his Dukedom. Caliban, conversely, is an exile in his own home. The son of the witch
Sycorax, the previous ruler of the island,12 he was born on the island but deprived of his own
right of succession by Prospero's magic and then forced to work as a slave for his newly-
acquired master. 
Exile, nonetheless, is not only the condition in which the play unfolds but also its very
conclusion. Caliban and Prospero's return home are proffered as a possible conclusion, but
whether or not Prospero should see Milan again is left at the discretion of the audience, who,
with their prayers,  may or may not help the magician who has given up all his charms.13 By
10 Little relevance is given to the character of Miranda and her own personal exile in Lamming's re-reading of
Shakespeare's play. As Pouchet Paquet notes, “[d]espite the complexity of the text, resistance and liberation
are an exclusively male enterprise in The Pleasures of Exile. The autobiographical framework generates a self
-conscious, self-celebrating male paradigm that goes unchallenged in the text. [..] Miranda shares Caliban's
creative potential to the degree to which she shares his innocence and ignorance of Prospero's magic, though
their difference in status turns their common experience into an oppositional space” (1992: xxii).
11 The tempest to which the title refers takes place as the ship on which Alonso, the king of Naples who had
helped Prospero's brother Antonio to usurp the throne, approaches the island where Prospero is living with
his daughter Miranda. That the island should be located in the Mediterranean is suggested by the fact that
Alonso was on a return trip from the wedding of his daughter with the king of Tunis. Yet that the tempest
may actually have been inspired by the colonial enterprise that had begun in the Renaissance is a fact that
George Lamming seems to take as granted.  The Tempest  might as well be imagined to take place in the
Caribbean Sea rather than in the Mediterranean,  as  the assonance of the word “Caliban” with the word
“Carib” - the name of one of the people who inhabited the Caribbean before its discovery – suggests. (See
also Retamar 1989 [1971])
12 Sycorax is not a native of the island, but rather an exile herself, forced to leave Algier, who gives birth to her
son Caliban on the island in which The Tempest is set. In this sense, Caliban's fate also resembles that of the
African deported to  the West  Indies.  The legitimacy of  his  claim,  “This  island is  mine  by Sycorax my
mother” is not a claim issued from the natural possession of an island legitimized through a dynasty of rulers.
It rather follows the condition of external circumstances. 
13 Cf. the epilogue to  The Tempest: “Please you, draw near./  Now my charms are all o'erthrown, /And what
strength I have's mine own, /Which is most faint: now, 'tis true,/ I must be here confined by you,/ Or sent to
Naples. Let me not,/ Since I have my dukedom got/ And pardon'd the deceiver, dwell/ In this bare island by
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the same token, Caliban may or may not be left alone on the island. For both of them the
future is open: 
Will the magic of prayer help Prospero and his crew safely towards Milan where the marriage of
Miranda and Ferdinand may remind them that Innocence and Age are two sides of the same coin; that
there are no degrees of forgiveness; that compassion will not exclude any? Will Prospero, no longer
interested in temporal success, enter his grave without admitting that his every third thought remains
alive? For where, we wonder, is our excluded Caliban? And what fearful truth will Caliban discover
now the world he prized has abandoned him to the solitude of the original home: the Island which no
act of foreign appropriation ever could deprive him of? (Lamming 1992: 96)
Exile  has transformed both Caliban and Prospero,  and both characters may,  in turn,  have
transformed their  exile  into a  new way of  understanding each other  and themselves.  The
possibilities  that  are  disclosed  to  Caliban  and  Prospero  are  certainly  determined  by  an
encounter with the other that could not leave them unchanged, but the evolution of the two
characters  belongs  entirely  to  the  future,  as  the  recurrent  question  marks  that  Lamming
utilizes suggest. The greatness of Shakespeare's work, claims Lamming, lays in its capacity
not  only to  absorb  and  give  an  artistic  shape  to  the  issues  of  “England's  experiment  in
colonization”  (Lamming  1992:  13),  a  topic  which  was  certainly  feverishly  discussed  in
Shakespeare’s time, but also to prefigure the scenario of uncertainty and of open possibilities
which would follow the end of colonialism: “And it is Shakespeare's capacity for experience
which leads me to feel that The Tempest was also prophetic of a political future which is our
present” (ibid.).
The Tempest figures already in the introduction to the book, where Lamming imagines
his dialogue between an ‘I’ and a ‘you’ in the form of an imaginary trial in which the issue at
stake is not mentioned. References are made to the Haitian ceremony in which the souls of the
dead are summoned by the living in order to come to terms with some debt from the past,
calling into question precisely some of the most compelling issues concerning Caribbean past
and its present identity: “Revenge, guilt, redemption, and some future expectation make for an
involvement which bind the Dead and the living together” (1992: 10). The first and most
your spell;/But release me from my bands/ With the help of your good hands:/  Gentle breath of yours my
sails/   Must  fill,  or  else  my project  fails,/Which  was  to  please.  Now I  want/  Spirits  to  enforce,  art  to
enchant,/And my ending is despair,/Unless I be relieved by prayer,/Which pierces so that it assaults/ Mercy
itself and frees all faults/ As you from crimes would pardon'd be,/Let your indulgence set me free.” (l. 2404-
23)
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urgent step taken in this trial appears to be the attempt to understand the role of the different
agents who are taking part in it – in other words, to establish who may be considered a victim
and whom a perpetrator, who should ask forgiveness and who may give forgiveness. In the
account  of  this  imaginary trial  the  testimonies  of  different  people  overlap  and contradict
themselves,  until  one  witness  claims  “extraordinary  privileges”  (Lamming  1992:  11)  for
himself by assuming the roles of both Caliban and Prospero: 
He wants to assume Prospero's privilege of magic, while arguing in his evidence that no man has a
right to use magic in his dealing with another. On the other hand he sees himself as Caliban while he
argues that he is not the Caliban whom Prospero had in mind. This witness claims a double privilege.
He knows he is a direct descendant of Caliban. He claims to be the key witness in the trial; but his
evidence will only be valid if the others can accept the context in which he will give it. For it is only
by accepting this special context that his evidence can reveal his truth. What is the context which he
proposes?
He says: I am chief witness for the prosecution, but I shall also enter the role of the Prosecutor.
I shall defend the accused in the light of my own evidence. I reserve the right to choose my own Jury
to  whom I shall interpret my own evidence since I know that evidence more than any man alive. Who
then is most qualified to be the Judge? For the Law itself, like the men involved, is in some doubt
about the nature of this charge.  The result  may  be capital  punishment,  and I shall  be hangman,
provided I do not have to use the apparatus that will put the accused to death. It  is likely that the
accused,  when  he  is  found  and  convicted  and  forgotten,  may  turn  out  to  be  Innocent.  That  is
unfortunate,  for  I  am working on the fundamental  belief  that  there are no degrees  of  innocence.
(Lamming 1992: 11)
The  witness  described  in  the  passage  is  both  the  locus  and  the  agent  of  an  ongoing
identification, occupying at once the role of defendant, jury, prosecutor and defence. He is the
Caribbean subject whose subjectivity has been denied and repressed by centuries of colonial
domination,  slavery  and  dispossession  and  who  is  now  cast  under  the  panoptical,
disciplinizing gaze of the jury and the jury itself. He is, in other words called on to affirm
himself not only in front of others, but first and foremost in front of himself. It is necessary
for him to restore a sort of unified and unifying self-image from the many fragments of his
identity, about which a judgement – inevitably a judgement of culpability – may be made,
paving  the  way for  a  new pact  of  identity.  This  pact  will  be,  as  he  anticipates  with  the
statement “I am working on the fundamental belief that there are no degrees of innocence”
(1992: 12), a pact of total involvement with the other, in which the differences between the
roles played by the ancestors will be overcome to privilege the idea of a shared inheritance.
For this reason, the legitimacy of his role as a witness, and consequently of his being accepted
by all the agents involved in the trial, is strictly dependent on both his assimilation to Prospero
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and his identification with Caliban, of whom he claims to be a direct descendant, as much as
from the distance that he may be able to take from them.
The imaginary witness who has in his hands both Prospero’s and Caliban's inheritance
is left with an impasse: “He wants to assume Prospero's privilege of magic, while arguing in
his evidence that no man has a right to use magic in his dealing with another” (Lamming
1992: 11). Assuming that Prospero's magic was contained in his books, and that his power
was therefore connected with his capacity to write and to transform things with writing, the
conundrum formulated by Lamming could be translated as the three impossibilities which,
according to the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, are the conditions in
which a minor literature comes into being. The expression “minor literature” refers, in the
sense highlighted by the French philosophers Gilles  Deleuze and Félix Guattari,  not  to  a
literature from  a “minor language” but “rather that which a minority constructs within a
major language” (Deleuze 1986: 16). These three impossibilities, which the two philosophers
formulate in regard to the work of Franz Kafka, are “the impossibility of not writing, the
impossibility  of  writing  in  German,  the  impossibility  of  writing  otherwise”  (ibd.).  It  is
impossible not to write because “national consciousness, uncertain or oppressed, necessarily
exists  by means of  literature” (ibid.).  Literature is  the  very site  of  the trial  of  Caribbean
identity that Lamming imagines in  The Pleasures of Exile.  It  is through literature that his
witness is going to assert himself and claim his role as key witness, defence, and prosecutor.
Secondly, for Anglo-Caribbean writers it is not possible to use Prospero's language without
being aware of the oppression that this language has brought about, and of the distance they
still retain from the culture that produced this language. English is a “paper language”, spoken
by  an  elite  partially  cut  off  from  the  masses,  and  also  a  “deterritorialized  language,
appropriated for strange and minor use” (Deleuze 1986: 17). Thirdly, it is impossible to write
other than in English because other alternatives may not be viable or adequate.14
14 In an interview by Maria Cristina Fumagalli, Derek Walcott claims that his first intention would have been to
write his masterpiece Omeros, an eight-thousand-line poem which many consider to be the Caribbean epic, in
Creole. Yet after a while he had to give up his attempt partly because vocabulary in Creole was not rich
enough, partly because he could feel the artificiality of his operation: “I began to feel that I was doing that
effort out of some kind of national duty and I missed the excitement that I would have had in writing in
English. Then I sort of reminded myself that what was important was not the language but the tone of the
language and that speaking in English with the right tone would have been the same as speaking in Creole.
Now, I don't feel that there is any dialogue or any part of the narrative section in Omeros that is in any way
affected into a rhetoric. In other terms, and I hope this is true for my poetry in general, I feel that I have never
gone away from the sound of my own language: I am not saying the vocabulary but the sound, the tone”
(Fumagalli 2001: 278).
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The  parallels  between  Prospero/  major  language  and  Caliban/  minor  use  make  it
possible  to  highlight  how  Lamming  puts  the  issue  of  language  at  the  very  heart  of  his
interpretation of The Tempest. Indeed, the locus of Prospero's magic and Caliban's exile is not
the island  per se, but rather  ‘Language’. Lamming refers to Language with a capital  ‘l’ to
indicate Language as it was handed over as a gift from Prospero to Caliban. ‘Language’, as
opposed to ‘language’, is entirely the product of a dominating culture and of a world-view. It
may be elevated to its major role as a result of a political struggle in which a concept of
nationality or nation-state is affirmed and, in turn, may also contribute to the affirmation of
what  causes it  to emerge (cf.  Lecercle  2006).  Yet,  once it  is  established as a standard,  it
undergoes  a  process  of  idealization  and universalization  which  conceals  its  relativity  (“a
tradition of habits that becomes the normal way of seeing”, Lamming 1992: 157). 
Caliban  enters  Language  as  a  regime  of  symbolic  exclusion  and  separation.  This
dyglossic  or  semi-dyglossic  experience  of  Language  creates,  on  the  one  hand,  an
insurmountable,  symbolic  distance between individuals and the pre-colonial  Caribbean, or
pre-colonial  Africa or  India,  for  that  matter.  Also,  as  the Barbadian poet  Edward Kamau
Brathwaite remarked, it tends to privilege and affirm the hegemony of the culture of which it
is a bearer at the expense of the experiences of its colonial speakers: 
Paradoxically, in the Caribbean [...], the people educated in this system came to know more, even
today, about English Kings and Queens, than they do about our national heroes, our own slave rebels,
the people who helped to build and to destroy our society. [...] And in terms of what we write, our
perceptual models, we are more conscious (in terms of sensibility) of the falling of the snow, for
instance – the models are all there for the falling of the snow – than of the force of the hurricane that
takes  place  every year.  In  other  words,  we  haven't  got  the  syllables,  the  syllabic  experience,  to
describe the hurricane, which is our own experience, whereas we can describe the imported alien
experience of the snowfall. It is this kind of situation that we are in. (Brathwaite 1979: 8-9).
English,  as it  is  transmitted in traditional,  colonial  education systems, is  not  meant to be
adapted to the experience of its new speakers. Language functions as a sort of prison in which
the experience of colonized people should be contained and restricted: “For Language itself,
by Caliban's whole relation to it, will not allow his expansion beyond a certain point. This
kind of realization, this kind of expansion, is possible only to those who reside in that state of
being which is the very source and ultimate [sic] of the language that bears them always
forward” (Lamming 1992: 110).
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It  is  this  conception of Language which lies  behind Lamming’s  argument  that  the
master-slave relationship between Prospero and Caliban is not an innate one, conjured by the
intrinsic psychological structures of the two characters (as the French psychologist Octave
Mannoni  had  claimed  in  his  controversial  Prospero  and  Caliban:  The  Psychology  of
Colonization),15 but rather that it was induced at the moment in which Prospero met Caliban
on Caliban's island and taught him his Language. Lamming argues that Caliban's submission
to Prospero is the result of a process of colonization, estrangement, and exclusion taking place
precisely in Language. A slave, Lamming argues, “is a project, a source of energy, organized
in order to exploit Nature” (Lamming 1992: 15). As Caliban is introduced to Language he is
called into being as a slave and as a monster,  submitted not only to physical  but also to
psychological  torture.  This  is  why,  when,  in  The  Tempest,  Prospero  threatens  him  with
physical pain (“For this, thou shalt have cramps, side-stitches that shall pen thy breath up;
[...]”, l.475 ff.), Caliban replies by reproaching his master and his daughter for teaching him
their Language: 
This island's mine by Sycorax my mother, 
Which thou takest from me. When thou camest first, 
Thou strokedst me and madest much of me; wouldst give me 
Water with berries in't, and teach me how 
To name the bigger light and how the less 
That burn by day and night. And then I loved thee 
And show'd thee all the qualities o' the isle, 
The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile. 
Cursed be I that did so! All the charms 
Of Sycorax-- toads, beetles, bats-- light on you, 
For I am all the subjects that you have, 
Which first was mine own king; and here you sty me 
In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me 
The rest o' the island. (l.481-94)
Caliban reproaches Prospero because it is the treacherous gift of Language – slyly slipped in
with affected gentleness – that has separated him from his mother, Sycorax, from Nature and
from his  island.  Indeed,  even though Caliban may be  referred  to  as  a  “child  of  Nature”
(Lamming 1992:  96)  – and as  such imprisoned in  the  bestiality,  coarseness,  and animal
lewdness which is at the opposite pole to Prospero and Miranda – he is a far cry from Nature. 
Yet,  this  passage  from  The Tempest contains  the  same paradox  and  duplicity  that
15 See footnote 7.
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Lamming inscribed in the title of his book The Pleasures of Exile. The line “For I am all the
subjects you have” (491) is the very site of the twofold quality of Prospero's gift of language.
The word “subject”, which Caliban uses to define his own condition, is in fact marked by an
ambiguity which Lamming did not formulate but which seems to spring up from his writing.
The  word  subject  resonates  with  both  passive  and  active  significance:  a  subject  is  both
someone who has been submitted to a regime of power and someone who, through this very
submission, has acquired the capacity to act in a society (cf. Foucault 1975). Through the
language  that  he  has  learned  from  Prospero,  Caliban  has  been  subjected  to  both  what
Althusser,  ten  years  after  the  publications  of The  Pleasures  of  Exile,  would  define  as
“Ideological State Apparatuses” and “Repressive State Apparatuses” (Althusser 1970). Yet it
is  precisely  through  this  submission  that  he  has  come  into  being  and  acquired  a  new
knowledge of the world around him (“thou [..] teach me how/ to name the bigger light and
how the less”, Shakespeare l. 484-85) and, as Lamming puts it, he has been “made aware of
possibilities” (1992: 109).
Lamming,  to  put  it  differently,  seems to  endorse  the  philosophical  premise  of  the
expulsion of the centrality of the individual subject in favour of a collective, transformative
conception of subjectivity whose agency is externalized. Althusser's theory of interpellation,
according  to  which  ideology  addresses  the  pre-ideological  individual  and  produces
(interpellates) him or her as a subject, is completed with an assertion by which language takes
up the very role of what Althusser called ideology. Caliban is produced as a subject precisely
by the language that Prospero taught him; Caliban is spoken by Prospero's language. Or, as
Jean-Jacques Lecercle,  the French philosopher who in  A Marxist  Philosophy of Language
(2006)  re-read  Althusser's  concept  of  ideology  in  the  light  of  a  materialist,  historicized
conception of language, puts it: “language is the site of subjectivation through interpellation”
(128).
The premise to this is the idea that language is not the endeavor of a single speaker, as
Prospero may think, but it is always the product of a praxis issuing from a social interaction.
Prospero provisionally occupies the position of sujet-supposé-savoir: he places himself at the
centre of language and power, creating the illusion that he may use Language as an instrument
with which he may assert his control over the island. Yet, in the very moment he gives his gift
of language to Caliban, he immediately also loses the privilege of owning language: 
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This gift of Language is the deepest and most delicate bond of involvement. It has a certain finality,
Caliban will never be the same again. Nor, for that matter, will Prospero. 
Prospero has  given Caliban language;  and with it  an unstated history of  consequences,  an
unknown history of  future intentions.  This gift  of Language meant not English,  in particular,  but
speech and concept as a way, a method, a necessary avenue towards area of the self which could not
be reached in any other way. It is this way, entirely Prospero's enterprise, which makes Caliban aware
of possibilities. Therefore, all of Caliban's future – for future is the very name for possibilities – must
derive from Prospero's experiment which is also his risk. (Lamming 1992: 109)
When Prospero gives Language to  Caliban,  and with this  language “an unstated story of
consequences” (1992: 109), Prospero also realizes that Caliban has become a threat to him.
Prospero is aware that he cannot live without Caliban and he is afraid of him “because he
knows that  the encounter with Caliban is,  largely an encounter with himself”  (1992: 15),
Lamming claims. Prospero and Caliban are the same not because Caliban is the repressed
savage who threatens to return and make Prospero aware of his own bestial nature. On the
contrary,  they are the same because they are spoken by the same language,  by the same
“speech and concept as a way, a method, a necessary avenue towards areas of the self which
could not be reached in other ways” (Lamming 1992: 109). Indeed, Prospero is made aware
that language is not just an instrument at his service, but that, as for Caliban, Language may
also be the site of his own exile. The fact that at the end of the play he claims, “Now my
charms are all o'erthrown” (l.2404)) and has to ask for the audience's help, may be read as a
sign that he has lost his own illusion of being at the centre of power.
What  is  more,  at  the moment when Prospero  gives  Language to  Caliban it  opens
language to a political struggle.  Jean-Jacques Lecercle reminds us that interpellation is not
just a mono-directional process, but that the speaker may counter-interpellate language from
his or her own position: 
The subject becomes a speaker by appropriating a language that is always-already collective – which
means that she is appropriated by it: she is captured by a language that is external and prior to her, and
on which she will  leave her  mark – possibly even a lasting mark – through linguistic or literary
creation. Possession here is a transitive relationship, something clearly marked by the ambiguity of the
word I possess: I possess the language in as much as I am possessed by it. (Lecercle 2006: 142-143)
The Caribbean speaker is interpellated by a language that is partially foreign, but at the same
time it can make it his or her own. If, as Brathwaite puts it, the English language transmitted
through school as what Althusser would call a State apparatus lacks the “syllabic experience”
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(Brathwaite 1984: 9) to describe the hurricane that is part of Caribbean experience, the aim of
the poet will be to push English to its limits, to inhabit English in a different way, and to
enable it to express even foreign experiences or experiences of in-betweenness. Lamming sees
Caliban’s enraged speech and his attitude of resistance as a sign that he has already started a
process of counter-interpellation. Besides, he reads Caliban's (failed) attempt at  taking the
power from Prospero as the result of a “deep sense of betrayal” (1992: 15): it is precisely this
betrayal which will give him the possibility to assert himself and to access the “unknown
history of future intentions” (Lamming 1992: 109) that Language has endowed him with.
Indeed,  the real moment at  which he will  be able to  make English his  own is  only after
Prospero leaves his island to him. 
The very fact that Lamming based his own theory of exile and alterity on a re-reading
of a canonical text is already a sign of the “deep sense of betrayal” (Lamming 1992: 15)
which  characterizes  the  Caribbean  intellectual's  access  to  language,  reading  and  writing.
Indeed, reading and writing are interconnected practices through which Caribbean subjects
may renegotiate  their  own position in  the world by inserting  themselves  in  a  practice of
interpretation, thus taking the the source of meaning away from the author and the culture that
produced the text,  and re-staging the text in the light of a post-colonial  experience.  Post-
colonial re-readings and re-writings of canonical English texts  foster a radical engagement
with the way power is  encoded in literature,  inspiring new ways of reading literary texts
through which it becomes possible to detect the social antagonisms hidden behind the surface
of  literary  representations.  They  may  erode  many  of  the  assumptions  that  support
conventional  notions  of  language,  literature  and culture.  Also,  they elaborate  on  possible
strategies of resistance to and emancipation from the heavy, cultural burden of colonialism
that still informs the perceptual framework of a world bearing the marks of its past.
At this point, it should have become clearer why the witness who Lamming introduces
in his imaginary trial on Caribbean identity assumes that he is “working on the fundamental
belief that there are no degrees of innocence” and that “[i]nvolvement in crime, whether as
witness, or an accomplice, makes innocence impossible. To be innocence is to be eternally
dead. And this trial embraces only the living” (Lamming 1992: 11). It may well be that the
moment of Prospero and Caliban's encounter started the story of Caliban's dispossession, but
from the moment Caliban has language he also accepts it as a shared experience. The exile
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which  is implied in  language  is  affirmed  not  as  a  univocal,  disempowering  form  of
dispossession, but rather as the site in which a dialectics of transformation may unfold and
open new possibilities for existence going beyond the dual distinction between master and
slave, home and exile, self and other. 
“How to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gipsy in relation to one's language?”  16
(Deleuze):  Édouard  Glissant,   Antonio  Benítez-Rojo  and  the  radicalization  of  Caribbean
poetics of exile 
Deleuze and Guattari's  concept  of  minor  literature,  introduced above in  the discussion of
Lamming's The Pleasure of Exile, becomes even more interesting as a way of understanding
the  work  of  the  Martinican  poet,  writer  and theorist  Ėdouard  Glissant  and of  the  Cuban
novelist and essayist Antonio Benítez-Rojo. Acute interpreters of the work of the two French
philosophers, Glissant and Benítez-Rojo go even further than Lamming's conceptualization of
exile as transformative juncture. Indeed, Glissant and Benítez-Rojo multiply and diffract the
master-slave/  Prospero-Caliban  relationship  described  by  Lamming,  locating  the  conflict
within a language that is already a composite conglomerate of languages, dialects, accents,
power-relations. Besides, while Lamming transforms the fracture of writing and language into
a  form of  connection  with  one single other,  Glissant  theorizes  this  fracture as  a  form of
multiple,  transformative  relation  to  otherness.  For  Glissant  and  Benítez-Rojo,  exile  is  a
conscious choice to embrace the thought of the other in all its multiplicity, with the awareness
that this multiplicity is an inexhaustible source of difference, as well as that difference is the
very site of a never-ending becoming-minor. 
The works of Glissant and Benítez-Rojo are both concerned with the development of a
Caribbean poetics, as well as with the definition of the specificity of the Caribbean experience
within a wider historical and global context. Poétique de la Relation is the title of Edouard
Glissant’s  most  influential  theoretical  work,  a  work  which  re-perspectivises  Caribbean
literature not just in the light of its colonial history, but also in the light of the process of
16  Deleuze 1986: 19. Deleuze’s quotation introduces the topic of nomadism in relation to language – a central 
issue in Deleuze’s philosophy that has a clear bearing on the works of Édouard Glissant and Antonio Benítez-
Rojo. 
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globalization of which the Caribbean has been a protagonist and a privileged site.17 At the
centre of Glissant's Poétique is an idea of literature as tout-monde, i.e. of literature as being
able to recreate and account for the relation of a single, local place with the totality of the
world.  The word “Relation” has been maintained also in the English translation by Betsy
Wing  (1997).  Glissant  opposes  the  English  word  “relationship”,  which  he  considers
inadequate to  describe the entanglement  of the Caribbean within a  multiple  space,  to  the
French “Relation”, which, he claims, functions “somewhat like and intransitive verb” (1997:
27).  The Relation is  always-already there,  it  function as a  principle  of connection,  and it
involves, as Glissant puts it, neither the thought of the One, nor the thought of the one who
becomes two, but rather the thought of multiplicity. In  The Repeating Island, Benítez-Rojo
similarly engages with an attempt at dispelling the notion that the Caribbean is simply the
product of its complex roots. To do this, he takes up the notion of Deleuze and Guattari's
machine, a device made up of innumerable smaller machines working together, which in turn
revolve around even smaller machines and parts: “Which is to say that every machine is a
conjunction of machines coupled together, and each one of these interrupts the flow of the
previous one; it will be said rightly that one can picture any machine alternatively in terms of
flow and interruption” (1996:6). The working of these machines (desiring machines, abstract
machines, production machines, war machines, etc.) has determined the persistence of certain
patterns of development in the whole area, and reflects itself also onto Caribbean literature.
Benítez-Rojo's attempt to define how these regularities repeat themselves is always marked by
his specification “in a certain kind of way” (1996: 10), a way which he deliberately leaves
open and unexplained, refusing to essentialise or to reify the patterns of transformation that he
detects  within  the  Caribbean  and  in  Caribbean  literature  (cf.  Sprouse  1994:  80).  The
Caribbean is thus defined as an archipelago in which a single island repeats itself indefinitely,
each time with a difference, thus creating a multiplicity of differences.
To  explain  what  they  mean  by  “Relation”  and  “Repeating  Island”,  Glissant  and
Benítez-Rojo resort to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of rhizome. The image of the rhizome –
“a  continuously  growing  horizontal  underground  stem which  puts  out  lateral  shoots  and
adventitious roots” (OED) – is utilized by the two French philosophers not as a model, but
rather as a geographical metaphor for mapping non-hierarchical thought and for privileging
17 See note 3. 
52
the multiple over the dual. The rhizome  differentiates itself from the root-thought, or the root-
book, whose spiritual reality is inherently a logic of binary division, a logic of the one which
becomes two and then perhaps three, or four, or five, but always presuming a central unity or
an origin that makes  this  division and this  generative model  possible.  Prospero's  book is,
accordingly,  presumably a root-book, an image of the world which reflects  the world and
projects itself onto it, transposing onto it also the series of dichotomies that imprison Caliban
in his alterity (culture/nature,  purity/corruption,  docility/subversion,  etc.).  The rhizome, by
contrast, is “an assemblage of connected multiplicities, without center or origin, and is always
in process of becoming” (Sprouse 1994: 83). A rhizome does not imprison alterities because a
rhizome is, in itself, a connection of alterities. In this sense, the rhizome also becomes the
model of what Glissant and  Benítez-Rojo  perceive as creolization, the coming together of
different people in the Caribbean leading to the emergence not of an homogenous form of
national  identity,  but  rather  to  an  affirmation  of  diversity,  difference,  and  continuous
becoming. 
It  is  precisely  the  standpoint  of  multiplicity  which  makes  it  possible  to  inscribe
Glissant's  Poetics  of  Relation and  Benítez-Rojo's  The  Repeating  Island within  a  wider
discourse on minor literature which differentiates Glissant's concept of “Relation” from T. S.
Eliot's concept of tradition which was briefly outlined in the previous chapter. There are three
characteristics  which,  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  define  minor  literatures.  First,  minor
literatures  are  collective (1986:  17).  The  word  “collective”  suggests  that  the  two  French
philosophers, like Eliot, go beyond a conception of literature as an individual endeavour to
privilege  instead  the  idea  of  literature  as  a  series  of  words  leaning  upon  other  words.
Nonetheless, literature as a collective endeavour for Deleuze and Guattari does not lead to the
idealization of tradition that Eliot had in mind, or to its unifying and sense-making perfection.
Literature rests on what they call a “collective chain of utterances” (ibid.), it is not limited to
the textual surface but it enters a numbers of what they call machines. The literary discourse
does not lead to an unifying process, but rather to a process of continuous diffraction and
propagation. 
The second characteristic of minor literature that Deleuze and Guattari highlight is that
of being deterritorializing (1986: 16). Eliot's idea that in literature “every word is at home”
(V, l.4) is replaced by the idea that, in a minor literature, the conflict with the major language
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is  worked  through  with  an  act  of  continuous  deterritorialization.  With  the  word
“deterritorialization” the French philosophers describe the continuous taking away of order
and control from language and the decontextualization of sets of previous relation to prepare
words to be reterritorialized, or re-inhabited, in a different way. 
Finally,  the  two philosophers  claim that  in  minor  literature  everything  is  political
(1986: 17). The individual’s concerns vibrate with a variety of other concerns (commercial,
economic, bureaucratic, juridical, etc.) which connect minor literature immediately to politics.
The harmony implied by Eliot's concept of tradition is replaced by the idea of literature as a
form of conflict.
Both Glissant's Poetics of Relation and Rojo's The Repeating Island, in fact, implicitly
include these three characteristics of minor literature in their attempt to define a Caribbean
poetics precisely by referring to the model of the rhizome. Both of them utilize the rhizome to
explain the collective quality of Caribbean literature – that  is,  its  interconnectedness to a
multiplicity of machines, as well as its deterritorializing potential. In addition, both of them
read the individual concerns displayed in the literary text as connected to the political struggle
with the cultural, political, and economical legacies of a colonial past. Following the multiple
path of the rhizome is for both of them a way of radicalizing their exile in language and
writing, or as Deleuze and Guattari put it, “to become a nomad, and an immigrant and a gipsy
in relation to one's own language” (1986: 19). 
The  idea  of  the  collective  quality  of  Caribbean  literature  is  attributable  to  what
Deleuze and Guattari describe as the “principle of connection and heterogeneity” as well as
by the “principle of multiplicity”  (2004: 7 ff.). By these principles, the two scholars mean
that, since no generative point and no arboreal structure of dichotomous division are given in
a rhizomorphic structure, all points in the rhizome can and must be connected. A multiplicity
can be defined as such only if it has got no connection whatsoever with the One18 as a subject
or as an object. The rhizome thus describes the structures of collective chains of enunciation
and of machinic assemblages. That is why there are no fixed points or positions as there
would be in a root-structure. In a rhizome there are just lines of flight. A rhizome never ceases
to connect semiotic rings, linguistic, perceptive, mimic acts, power structures, machines of
production,  chains  of  enunciation.  The  fact  that  the  Caribbean  has  been  since  the  very
18 With the word “One” Deleuze and Guattari refer to the principle of unification which lies at the basis of what
they call “root-though”. 
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beginning a  place shaped by the multiple  encounters of different  peoples,  languages,  and
systems of production has made it a place in which the spatial layout of the rhizome is easily
detectible.19 
The  following  passage,  taken  from Antonio  Benítez-Rojo’s  The  Repeating  Island,
highlights how the Caribbean is always-already a space in a rhizomatic connection with the
rest of the world. Indeed, the passage casts a significant light on how the space of home is
always a space elsewhere: 
[…]  the Caribbean is  not  a  Common archipelago,  but  a  meta-archipelago (an exalted quality the
Hellas possessed, and the great Malay archipelago as well), and as a meta-archipelago it has the virtue
of having neither a boundary nor a center. Thus the Caribbean flows outward past the limits of its own
see with a vengeance, and its ultima Thule may be found in the outskirts of Bombay, near the low and
murmuring shores of Gambia, in a Cantonese tavern of circa 1850, at a Balinese temple, in an old
Bristol pub, in a commercial warehouse in Bordeaux at the time of Colbert, in a windmill beside the
Zuider Zee, at a café in a barrio of Manhattan, in the existential saudade of an old Portuguese lyric.
(Benítez-Rojo 1996: 4)
To claim that the Caribbean is a meta-archipelago is to perceive the Caribbean as a space that
always reveals its own entanglement with the rest of the world, with the multiple connections
of semiotic rings, chains of enunciation, machinic assemblages and power structures. From
this  perspective,  home and abroad coincide in  a most  compelling way.  Talking about  the
19 Interestingly, both Glissant and Benítez-Rojo apply these principles also to comment on the geographical
structure of the Caribbean (an “island bridge connecting, in 'another way', North and South America”, Rojo
1996: 2) as a sign of its multiplicity.  For Benítez-Rojo, the Caribbean is a “discontinuous conjunction (of
what?): unstable condensation, turbulences, whirlpools, clumps of bubbles, frayed seaweed, sunken galleons,
crashing breakers, flying fish, seagulls squawks, downpours, nighttime phosphorescences, eddies and pools,
uncertain voyages of signification; in short, a field of observation quite in tune with the objectives of Chaos”
(ibid.). The geography of the archipelago, differently put, makes it a place in which an incessant pattern of
disorder repeats itself ad infinitum, each time with a difference. Glissant instead opposes the Caribbean Sea
to the Mediterranean, a sea surrounded by lands, a sea that concentrates and that gives way to the thought of
the One (all the three great monotheistic religions have generated in the Mediterranean).The Caribbean is
instead an archipelago that diffracts: “It is not merely an encounter, a shock [..], a métissage, but a new and
original  dimension allowing each  person  to  be  there  and  somewhere  else,  rooted  and  open,  lost  in  the
mountains and free beneath the sea, in harmony and in errantry” (Glissant 1997: 34). This diffraction is an
aspect  that  touches upon every aspect  of  Caribbean life:  even religion takes syncretic  forms, combining
elements from Christianity with African, Amerindian, and Asian elements, a sign that in the Caribbean the
other is always being superimposed onto the self.Benítez-Rojo devotes a whole section of his book to the cult
of the Virgen de la Caridade del Cobre, a cult still followed by many Cubans. This cult combines elements of
European Catholicism (the Virgen of Ilesca), Taino religions (the Taino deity Atabey or Atabex), and African
(the Yoruba orisha Oshun). Benítez-Rojo claims that this cult is “not original, but originating” (ref). By that
he means that  all  these three figures  are already syncretic  objects,  and that  their  unification in the new
syncretic signifier of the Virgen de la Caridade del Cobre opens to a variety of  new syncretic significations
which are newly called into being each time this cult is performed. (1996: 12-16)
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Caribbean means simultaneously talking about somewhere else,  using a language,  literary
models  and  discourses  that  are  also  from  somewhere  else,  and  appropriating  them  by
performing a further movement of estrangement. This entanglement is not meant to cancel the
differences  and  the  idiosyncrasy  of  these  different  cultural  areas.  On  the  contrary,  “the
homogenizing  tendencies  of  the  centrifugal  forces  implied  by  the  term  connection  are
opposed by the insistence on the heterogeneity of the rhizome” (Sprouse 1994: 83).  This
means that the positioning of the self within this multiplicity is never a stable one, but always
a way of following a path that leads towards difference. 
In the above quoted passage Benítez-Rojo also utilizes the word “textuality” (1996: 2)
– from the Latin textere, “to weave” – to imply that that the Caribbean is woven with the rest
of the world. “Textuality” suggests that to be a “meta-archipelago” (1996: 4) not only refers to
the capacity of the Caribbean to go beyond itself or to undertake a process of continuous
transformation, as implied by the prefix “meta” in “meta-archipelago”. It also means that a
Caribbean  poetics  should  always  be  meta-reflexive,  that  it  should  talk  about this
interconnectedness,  this  entanglement  to  the  rest  of  the  word.  Each  single  linguistic
performance  is  already  a  collective  utterance  which  should  bear  the  mark  of  its  being
interwoven with a variety of other utterances, texts, machines of sense and representation.  
This insistence on movement,  interconnection and transformation rather than stasis
allows us to account for how the second characteristics of minor literatures – i.e., their being
“deterritorializing” –  may be applied to a Caribbean poetics. To deterritorialize, as suggested
above,  means to  take something away from its  territorial  belonging and from the sets  of
relations  in  which it  is  ingrained,  in  order  to  prepare it  for  further  possible  processes  of
reterritorialization.  It  means,  differently  put,  to  introduce  a  state  of  provisional  exile.
Creoleness emerges as a state of continuous becoming, of continuous intermingling – “what is
rhizomatic is the process, not the static fixed state” (Sprouse 1994: 83) – and this becoming is
precisely the result of an alternation of processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization
which also take place in the literary text.  To embrace the thought of the Relation means to
transform oneself together with the other, to make a rhizomatic connection with them, like a
wasp with an orchid, or like a virus with a germ cell to transmit itself into the cellular genes of
a complex species (cf. Deleuze 2004: 11 ff.). In other words, making a rhizomatic connection
with the other, in the Deleuzian perspective adopted by Glissant, means not just to imitate the
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other,  but  to  capture  their  codes,  to  become-other,  to  start  a  process  of  reciprocal
deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization.  By  describing  becoming-other  as  a  process  of
continuous  deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization  of  and  by  the  other,  the  two
philosophers  imply that the encounter with the other frees schizophrenic libido from pre-
established objects of investment and re-invests this libido within a process that pushes this
becoming ever further away: “There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding
of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that cannot
be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying” (Deleuze 2004: 11)
The emphasis that deterritorialization puts on the process of becoming is mirrored in
the  emphasis  that  many Caribbean writers  give  to  performance.  Benítez-Rojo claims that
“[t]he  people  of  the  sea,  or  better,  the  Peoples  of  the  Sea  proliferate  incessantly  while
differentiating themselves from one another, traveling together towards the infinite. Certain
dynamics of their culture also repeats themselves and sail through the seas of time without
reaching anywhere.  If I where to put this in two words these would be: performance and
rhythm”  (1996:  16).  Rhythm,  music  and  performance  are  an  essential  part  of  Caribbean
culture insofar as they provide a fluid space within which processes of deterritorialization and
reterriorialization are made possible.  Benítez-Rojo speaks of “polyrhythm” to indicate  the
way African  rhythms  of  percussion  –  which  used  to  beat  in  time  with  the  work  in  the
plantation – deterritorialize other rhythms, creating something new with each performance.
Polyrhythms  are  always  composite,  always  changing,  making  and  then  breaking  new
connections. The Cuban scholar gives this special prominence to performance and rhythm in
the many ways they enter Caribbean literature too. For example, it should not be forgotten
that some of the most refined Caribbean poets such as Louise Bennett and Edward Kamau
Brathwaite also insist on the importance of public readings, in which the artist uses his or her
voice to engraft new rhythms and new accents onto the written text, in ways in which each
single performance may reterritorialize it in a different way.  This multi-accentuation of these
performances can also be incorporated in the text, for example in the single interpretations of
canonical  European  literary  texts  or  works  of  art,  which  are  deterritorialized  and
reterritorialized through the exiled perspective of Caribbean writers.  
Benítez-Rojo's concept of polyrhythm is also beautifully illustrated by Edward Kamau
Brathwaite's poem “Limbo”, and more precisely by its section titled “Caliban” (1973: 194-
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95).  Limbo,  a  term coming from the Latin expression  “in limbo”,  means  “in the  border,
outside”. The Limbo is a place of exile, for lost, or forgotten or unwanted things or people, an
unknown intermediate condition between two extremes. Limbo becomes the condition of the
Africans on board of the slave-ship which will take them away forever from their original
homeland, as the refrain of the poem (repeated eight times) suggests: “limbo/ limbo like me/”.
The poem represents the moment in which some African deportees engage in a liberating
dance on the deck of the slave-ship, a dance which allow them to deterritorialize the language
of the slaver as well as the power-relations which inform the whole situation.  In the poem,
Caliban's task is to transform “Limbo” into a new condition of existence, a condition in which
language also becomes a primary weapon of resistance.  Brathwaite's poem puts the emphasis
on the appropriation of the language of the slaver by taking away the classical rhythm of
traditional poetry and replacing it with African rhythms.  It is the polyrhythm created by the
sound of African percussion and the sound of English words in a rhizomatic connection which
saves the new Caliban who is taking his Middle Passage to a future of slavery and uncertainty.
Brathwaite's poem, like the work of the writers presented in the following chapter,
uses the deterritorializing potential of writing to transform history from something imprisoned
in a historical memory of a past that is over and celebrated with tombstones, into a part of the
present, a lived reality of the rhizome. Indeed, Brathwaite's poem shows that as rhythms can
be broken by other, different rhythms to create polyrhythms, the rhizome can be broken at any
point but it revives again, finding one line of escape or another. Glissant  and Rojo apply this
idea in his interpretation  of the fragmentations and cracks that have marked each aspect of
Caribbean  culture,  as  well,  de  Certeau's  passage  quoted  before  suggests,  its  colonial
relationship  to  writing.  In  his  poem,  Brathwaite  reveals  the  Middle  Passage,  the  most
important rupture in the lives of millions of Africans deported to the West Indies as slaves, as
the moment at  which a new rhizomatic form of the Relation came into being. Indeed, as
Glissant also argues, the slave-ship is the a matrix of a Relation that is in the process of
becoming: in its holds, in the shared suffering of people who were forcibly brought together,
is the beginning of a shared knowledge of the other. Even those who were swallowed in the
abyss  of the sea are retrieved as part  of a history that proceeds by making and breaking
connections, deterritorializing and reterritorializing the past. 
The reference to Brathwaite poem shows how the concept of the rhizome does not
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dissolve the conflict implied in the issue of alterity, and thus enables us to introduce the last
characteristics of minor literature – that is, its being political. The main political concern that
haunts Caribbean literature is that of the legacy of a past of colonialism, which risks being
perpetrated through the use of the language and literary models of the colonizer. The model of
the rhizome overcomes and replaces the myth of derivation which has dominated Western
epics  and myth  and,  as  Glissant  claims,  belongs  to  the regime of  thought  of  the  One.  A
rhizome does not follow any structural or generative model, and as such it is alien from any
genetic axis. Literature and history are transformed from something to which the writer has to
pay homage and in which he will be judged – as Eliot suggested in his essay “Tradition and
the Individual Talent” – into a battlefield, an agon for a neverending struggle for the word. 
Along these lines, the Saint Lucian poet and Nobel laureate Derek Walcott asserted
that “[t]he future of West Indian militancy lies in art” (1998: 16), also raising the question of
what form of militancy art may provide.  In his essays “What the Twilight Says” (1970) and
“The Muse of History” (1974) Walcott sharply criticizes the work of writers who develop
their work from the recrimination of the history of slavery and exploitation. In his view, by
doing so, these writers perpetrate the generative model and the binary logic in which slavery
and exploitation were rooted. From Walcott's essay, instead, struggle emerges as a form of
becoming-minor which overcomes the Oedipus complex that haunts Caribbean writers, and
that liberates literature from the burden of history. Walcott thus advocates a way of inscribing
the political struggle that necessarily haunts the literary productions of Caribbean writers in a
peculiar form of acceptance of the inheritance left by colonialism, an acceptation of history
which is, nonetheless, also a form of alienation from it: 
I accept this archipelago of the Americas. I say to the ancestor who sold me, and to the ancestor who
bought me, I have no father, I want no such father, although I can understand you, black ghost, white
ghost, when you both whisper “history,” for if I attempt to forgive you both I am falling into your idea
of history which justifies and explains and expiates, and it is not  mine to forgive, my memory cannot
summon any filial love, since your features are anonymous and erased and I have no wish to and no
power to pardon. (Walcott 1998 [1974]: 64)
A poetics of creoleness, as it emerges from these lines, should be able to assimilate and forget
at the same time. The struggle with the ancestors is a way of assimilating their codes but also
of  enacting a  struggle for  appropriating  and distorting  those  codes  and of  refusing being
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incorporated in their  vision of history as something which “expiates and justifies” (ibid.).
Walcott's is a refusal of history as a linear succession of events, in which the logic of causality
may give somebody the power to forgive. The thanks that Walcott later gives to his ancestors
(“I give the strange and bitter and yet ennobling thanks for the monumental groaning and
soldering of two great words, like the halves of a fruit seamed by its own bitter juice”, ibid.)
reconstitutes history as an unstable, ever-changing map for cartographically representing and
reading  the  immanence  of  the  present,  onto  which  none  of  the  ancestors  may  have  a
privileged point of view. 
Language is the battlefield in which art may become capable of performing the kind of
militancy described by Walcott. Becoming-minor emerges from Walcott's essays as a way of
radicalizing  exile  within  language  as  the  very  material  of  which  literature  is  made,  the
material through which a new concept of Creoleness may come into being. Talking about the
blindness of “the New World Negro” (1998 [1970]: 15) who chooses to use literature as a site
of recrimination, Walcott highlights that the artistic failure of the latter consists in absorbing
without reflections the codes of the colonizer without really subverting them from within. In
this regard, Walcott claims: 
What would deliver him [the New World Negro] from servitude was the forging of a language that
went beyond mimicry, a dialect which had the force of revelation as it invented names for things, one
which finally settled on its own mode of inflection, and which began to create an oral  culture of
chants, jokes, folksongs, and fables; this, not merely the debt of history, was his proper claim to the
New World. For him metaphor was not a symbol but conversation, and because every poem begins
with such ignorance, in the anguish that every noun will be freshly resonantly named, because a new
melodic inflection meant a new mode, there was no better beginning. 
It did not matter how rhetorical, how dramatically heightened the language was if its tone was
true, whether its subject was the rise and fall of a Haitian king or a small island fisherman, and the
only way to re-create this language was to share in the torture of its articulation. This did not mean the
jettisoning of ‘culture’ but by the writer's making creative use of his schizophrenia, an electric fusion
of the old and the new. (Walcott 1998 [1970]: 15-16)
“[T]he forging of a language that went  beyond mimicry” (ibid.)  is  indeed the result  of a
process  of  deterritorialization  and  reterritorialization  of  the  language  that  the  artist  has
inherited. It is possible to see that underlying Walcott's words is the idea that the language in
which the text is shaped is not an immanent system in which meaning is given as such, but
rather a system in which meaning comes into being as formations of meaning. Replacing the
concept  of  “meaning”  with  that  of  “formations  of  meanings”,  as  Jean-Jacques  Lecercle
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claims, allows us to call attention to language as a system of continuous variations, as “an
unstable  state  of  tension  an contradictions”,  and as  a  terrain of  complex social,  political,
cultural  and  historical  struggle”  (ibid.).  The  artist  may  intervene  in  the  process  of  this
formation,  as  Walcott  puts  it,  by  “sharing  the  torture  of  [the]  articulation”  of  words
(Walcott.1998 [1970]: 16). In this sense, to come home in language means to be able to use
old words in such a way that they may express new meaning, transforming them altogether
into new words and new experiences. Walcott claims that this process is not “the jettisoning of
‘culture’ but the writer's making use of his schizophrenia” (ibid.),  a schizophrenia strictly
related to the writer's simultaneous belonging and non-belonging in the language he speaks
and  from which  he  is  spoken,  but  also  a  schizophrenia  (as  Deleuze  and  Guattari  would
theorize two years later) able to liberate words from their established uses. 
The experience of language which Walcott puts at the centre of the form of militancy
that art may assume is indeed the central issue that emerges from this transversal reading of
the  concept  of  minor  literature.  The three  characteristics  of  minor  literatures  (their  being
collective, deterritorializing and political) as they have been read against the grain of Édouard
Glissant's Poetics of Relation and Antonio Benítez-Rojo's The Repeating Island, put language
and  the  potential  for  transformation  within  language  at  the  very  centre  of  the  literary
experience. Lamming's reading of Caliban allowed him to anticipate Jean-Jacques Lecercle's
idea  that  language is “the  site  of  subjectivation  through interpellation”  (2006:  128).  It  is
precisely the possibility of transforming language, of putting it in a state of internal tension
and radicalized exile which allows Caribbean writers and artists to undertake their journey
home through literature.
On the way to language. Journeys of return as journeys of exile in language
I had no nation now but the imagination.
After the white man, the nigger didn't want me
when the power swing on their side.
The first chain my hand and apologize: 'History';
the next said I wasn't black enough for their pride.
Tell me, what power, on these unknown rocks -
a spray-plane Air Force, the Fire Brigade,
the Red Cross, the Regiment, two, three police dogs
that pass before you finish bawling 'Parade'?
I met History once, but he ain't recognize me, 
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a parchment Creole, with warts
like an old sea-bottle, crawling like a crab
through the holes of shadow cast by the net
of a grille balcony; cream linen, cream hat.
I confront him and shout, 'Sir, is Shabine!
They say I'se your grandson. You remember Grandma,
your black cook, at all? The bitch hawk and spat.
A spit like that worth any number of words.
But  that's  all  them bastards  have left  us:  words.  (From Derek  Walcott's  “The Schooner  ‘Flight’”
1993[1979] III, l.1-19 )
This chapter has engaged in a discussion of exile as an epistemological condition of writing,
and focused on how the Caribbean poetics here presented have tried to transform exile from
an instrument  of exclusion and othering to a instrument  of transformation and rhizomatic
connection with the other. Dealing with the other in Caribbean literature is not just a matter of
unveiling  the  presence  of  the  other,  but,  first  and  foremost,  of  envisaging  the  possible
transformations that the Relation with the other may entail. In this view, Rimbaud's famous
claim “Je est un autre” assumes, in the light of the considerations made in this chapter, a
completely  new  meaning.  Claiming  “I  is  another”,  not  only  externalizes  the  subject,
projecting him onto the always-already collective experience of language.  To embrace the
thought of what Glissant calls “Relation” means to transform oneself together with the other,
to make a rhizomatic connection with them.
The concept of minor literature as theorized by Deleuze and Guattari radicalizes the
fracture that Michel de Certeau had placed at  the very heart of writing,  multiplies it,  and
spatializes it in the figure of a rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari claimed that “we might as well
say that minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for
every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature” (1986: 18).
By asserting that a minor literature is a literature that forces itself into a major language,
Deleuze and Guattari make language the focus of their discourse: the language through which
the  world  is  transformed  and  which  in  turn  transforms  the  world.  Language,  to  put  it
differently, is not only an instrument for representation but also a weapon for intervention. It
is both an awareness of language and literature as weapon for intervention, and an awareness
of language and literature as discourses that can never really get rid of their instrumentality,
that sets in motion Caribbean literary figurations of home and exile. 
 The choice of radicalizing exile to make language a site for a multiple relation to the
62
other makes the homecoming journeys which will consequently be addressed in the following
chapters journeys unterwegs zur Sprache – (“on the way to language”), to borrow Heidegger's
expression – in a very unorthodox way. Being on the way to language means to embark on an
endless journey toward the multiple, unstable, fragmentary praxis through which language is
constituted  collectively  in  a  continuous  Relation  to  the  other.  “Die  Sprache  spricht”
(“language speaks”) – a sentence which, as Lecercle notes, contrasts with the commonsense
idea that  “I speak the language” – becomes an exhortation to consider the way language
speaks the subject, but also to work through this way (cf. Lecercle 2006a: 143). Dealing with
journeys of homecoming means to deal  with journeys  in  which hybrid subjectivities  take
shape within language as an external,  collectively shared medium and,  at  the same time,
contribute to put language in a state of variation, transform it and make it suitable to express
new experiences. To come home, to inhabit language, is never a stable act, but rather always a
way of making and breaking connections, of deterritorializing and reterritorializing language,
as Deleuze and Guattari would put it.
 As Lecercle claims, the field in which the knowledge produced by literature is unique
and irreplaceable is certainly the field of language (cf. Lecercle 2006 and 2006a). Literature
provides  access  to  a  knowledge  of  language as  a  lived,  shared  experience,  as  a  practice
embedded  in  social  relationships,  political  struggles,  historical  conjunctures,  and  cultural
contexts. Language is the site in which human experiences take form along the dialectics of
the  private  and the  public,  the  collective  and the  individual.  It  is  the  site  of  individuals'
subjectification by culture and its apparatuses. The mutual articulations and redefinitions of
personal and collective turning points are staged in literature as a dialectics between the way
the  individual  is  captured  by  the  always-already  collective  experience  of  language  and
included or excluded by the regime and structures of subjectification that inform his epoch.
For  this  reason,  literature  itself  will  function  as  a  form of  lived  experience  insofar  as  it
“encapsulates, inscribes and develops an encyclopedia (a system of knowledge and belief) and
structures of feelings” (Lecercle 2006a: 119). The social, realistic function of literature is that
it  “mirrors,  thematizes  and repeats”  the  formation  of  subjects  and experiences  in  and by
language (2006a: 120). 
Literature, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle transversely claims in all his works, is inherently
and constitutively a locus for an active confrontation with language as the site of the other,
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whereas  the  word  “active”  implies  that  literature  also  modifies  language,  and  produces
knowledge through language and of language. It is the analysis of an autobiographical novel
by the Italian writer Luigi Meneghello which provides Lecercle with a metaphor to describe
the peculiar way in which the literary text triggers off this process. Meneghello's Il dispatrio
thematizes the author's experience of voluntary exile in England in the form of a continuous
linguistic confrontation in which his experiences take shape within the three idioms in which
his life unfolds (which are revealed as linguistic and cultural formations): the dialect of his
hometown Vicenza, Italian, and English. Responding to this, Lecercle claims that literature is
in itself a form of dispatrio. The word dispatrio is a coinage that Lecercle interprets as deeply
ambiguous, by which the prefix “dis-” implies and subsumes both the negative idea of being
deprived of one's fatherland (“patria”), and the positive idea of multiplying and projecting the
lost fatherland onto new ones. Dispatrio indicates the necessity for a writer to “expatriate”, to
go out of his or her language-culture, and at the same time the impossibility of doing so,
because of an inevitable counter-movement that brings him or her back home: “Thus, [the
word dispatrio] is particularly apt to name the dialectic of identity and alterity, of exclusion
and  integration,  of  exile  and  nostalgic  return,  of  catabasis  and  anabasis  which  [...]  the
operation of literature achieve” (Lecercle 2006b: 129).  Dispatrio,  in  Lecercle’s  view, is  a
good metaphor to describe the way literature may work as an encounter with the other taking
place in language in the form of a “clash, unbridgeable separation and paradoxical fusion”
(Lecercle 2006a: 121): 
What is at work in the literary operation is a dialectical spiral, the dialectics of recognition and de-
recognition, if you pardon me this coinage, which is the dialectics of alterity and identity. The passage
back  and  forth  between  one  language  culture  and  another  involves  a  system  of  slippages,
displacements,  outright  contrasts,  in  the  interstices  of  which  the  knowledge  of  self  and  other  is
established. The literary operation is deeply paradoxical, which is its main interest: it  is about the
communicability of incommunicability. (Lecercle 2006a: 129)
Of  course,  Meneghello's  novel  is  particularly  significant  as  it  thematizes  the  continuous
exchange and untranslatability of three clearly separated linguistic and cultural  spheres of
experience.  What  is  at  stake  in  Caribbean  literature,  as  in  any  minor  literature,  is  the
emergence of one language, English, which already involves the simultaneous presence of
multiple others. In both cases, nonetheless, the repatriation involves an implementation of
knowledge deriving precisely from what Lecercle calls “a system of slippages, displacements,
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outright constrasts” (ibid.).
The journeys of homecoming presented in the next chapters will emerge precisely as
journeys of dispatrio, journeys in which the dialectics of expatriation and repatriation, of exile
and  return,  will  take  a  rhizomorphic  shape.  This  means  that  the  figurations  of  return  to
language, writing and literature will never allow the possibility to come back to the One, but
will rather lead to a rhizomatic multiplicity in which no beginning and no end are possible or
thinkable. Home will therefore emerge from its diffraction and from its continuous variations.
Recognizing home as a conglomerate of differences makes home the site of a continuous
interrogation, of a never ending quest for and confrontation with the other. Home and identity
will  therefore emerge as a  positioning within the flux of history,  literature and culture,  a
positioning  which  is  always,  nonetheless,  conscious  of  its  provisional  quality  and  of  the
multiple dialectics through which it can be reached. 
The lines quoted above, taken from the third section of Derek Walcott's poem “The
Schooner ‘Flight’”, provides, in the light of these considerations, a nice epigraph to introduce
the journeys of homecoming in the next chapter. The poem exposes the meta-reflexivity of the
journey home; it puts at its very centre the way in which literature works. The protagonist is
Shabine – a creole20 sailor who has left his home, his family and his lover in a “vain search for
one  island  that  heals  with  its  harbour/  and  a  guiltless  horizon”  (XI,  l.32-33)  –  to  the
experience of Caribbean poetry itself.  His two-folded refusal of and from History (“I met
History once, but he ain't recognize me”, III,  l.10), Shabine – and with him the poet who
articulates his own Caribbean experience of exclusion at the hands of The Writing of History –
signals  the  beginning of  a  journey through writing  in  search  of  the  other  who has  been
excluded by history,  and in search of ways of letting this other emerge in different ways.
Shabine's journey is precisely a journey outwards which turns out to be a journey aimed at
going along the patterns of transformation that have brought Shabine, “the red nigger” (I,
l.38), into being. Poetry, and in more general terms literature, will be the locus of an endless
journey in which  Shabine's and the poet's belonging, their home, and their identity will be
articulated. The only instrument which both Shabine and the poet have at their disposal for
articulating their own imagination and for deploying it against the space of exile that they are
20 Shabine, as the poem reports, is “the patois for/ any red nigger”  (I, l. 37-38) – “red nigger” being, in the
Caribbean, someone of clearly European and African descent, just like the poet Walcott himself. Shabine
says: “I have Dutch, nigger, and English in me,/ and either I am nobody, or I am a nation.” (I, l. 42-43)
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about to explore is what their forgetful grandparents have left them with: “words” (III, l.19.).
Words, therefore, have to be the starting point of their journey and also the point of their
arrival. Words, as inherited by the other with whom Shabine has made rhizome, will have to
be de-territorialized and re-territorialized in order to be inhabited differently, so that they can
become the site in which the alterity of Shabine, of the poet, and of the Caribbean subject may
emerge. 
“I had no nation now but the imagination” (III,  l.1), the line which opens the third
section  of  “The  Schooner  Flight”,  highlights  the  condition  in  which  the  following
homecoming journey unfold themselves. Exile is both a necessity and a choice which leaves
the artists in the condition of utilizing his or her own imagination to give shape to possible
narratives of home and return, of collective and individual identities.  In Poetics of Relation,
Glissant wrote that “thinking thought usually amounts to withdrawing into a dimensionless
place in which the idea of thought alone persists. But thought in reality spaces itself out into
the world. It informs the imaginary of people, their varied poetics, which it then transforms,
meaning (sic), in them its risk becomes realized” (1997: 1). This is precisely the challenge
that thinking about a return implies, and this is the challenge which, as the following readings
will  show,  is  taken  up  in  Caribbean  homecoming  journeys  precisely  by  intervening  in
language as the site in which subjects and reality come into being. 
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Chapter 3
The elusiveness of landscape and the positioning of the subject in V.S. Naipaul's
autobiography The Enigma of Arrival 
“Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms
that are yet to come”, professed Deleuze and Guattari in their essay on the rhizome (2004: 5).
A book, the two philosophers claim, is not just the production of a single set of contents, but
rather  a  conjunction  of  different  surfaces  and  materials  whose  relationships  are  first  and
foremost external; it  is the locus where processes of articulation,  segmentation, de- or re-
territorialization may take place. Indeed, if we understand a book as an abstract machine of
enunciation connected to other machines (of war, of love, of revolution, etc.) the question to
ask is  not  what  it  means,  but  rather  how it  connects  itself  to  other  multiplicities,  how it
produces new multiplicities, or how it metamorphoses its own. This means, differently put,
that it is necessary to consider a book in a pragmatic fashion, to see how it produces subjects,
how it enters the multiple language-games of interpretation, and how, in a way, it has an effect
on its external reality. 
Following the idea that the world is “not an automatic given, but a changing organism
that speaks differently and reinvents itself according to different times and cultures: now as
arena, now as living corpus, as system, as milieu”, the French scholar Frédéric Regard focuses
on the geographical quality of autobiographical writing (Regard 2002: 2). Regard envisages
autobiographies  as  a  peculiar  kind  of  writing aimed at  performing linguistic  acts  of  self-
placement within a polymorphous, ever-changing reality. Writing the self is an act that Regard
describes  in  terms  of  an  “assignations  to  residence”  (Regard  2002:  1).  Yet  the  word
“residence” emerges as a most unstable construct, not a fixed abode but rather a provisional
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positioning linked to an unfinished process of subjects-production. 
Regard suggests that a geographical analysis  of autobiographies should cast  a new
light on the discussion about how the border between truth and fiction is configured within
this literary genre. For this purpose, the French scholar reconsiders the specific “pact of truth”
which  characterizes  autobiographical  writing,  and which  Philip  Lejeune articulated  in  his
influential Le pacte autobiographique (1975). For Lejeune, the “truth” of an autobiography is
the result of an implicit pact established between the author and the reader, the latter accepting
that the author, the narrator and the character are to be identified as the same person. The
identity of the narrator is guaranteed not only by the “honored signature” reported on the
cover jacket of the book, but also by the necessary premise of the “identification of the self
with the self, all the more affirmed because it is repeated, uncovered, and recovered through a
series of events” (Regard 2002: 4). This premise of ipseity, which Lejeune considers to be the
product of an historical narrative (he defines autobiography as a “retrospective prose narrative
that  a  real  person  creates  about  his  own  existence  when  he  emphasizes  individual  life,
particularly the history of his personality”,  Lejeune 1975: 14)21 is reinterpreted by Regard
instead as a result of a spatial conjuncture, at the basis of which is not an author but an author-
function, and implicitly not a reader, but a reader-function. Both the author-function and the
reader-function are, in fact, ways of positioning the self within discourse, representation, and
language.  By the very fact of pronouncing the word “I”, the author-function inserts  itself
within a schema of relations with an imaginary you – the implied reader of his writing. In
turn, this positioning is made unstable by the reader-function insofar as the reader cooperates
with the writer to construct the meaning of the text, and interpellates, from his or her own
reader-position, the “truth” of the “author-function” by an act of interpretation. 
To  account  for  his  concepts  of  author-function,  Regard  draws  on  Deleuze  and
Guattari's concept of  becoming,  rather than of being. An author-function, in other words, is
not an entity existing outside of the text,  but is a heterogeneous formation,  a co-function
connected to a series of machine of enunciation, itself constantly generating new machines of
enunciations.  It  is  produced within  multiple  acts  of  interpretation,  language-games  which
Jean-Jacques Lecercle describes as the interaction in which other actants play a significant
21
Quoted in Regard 2002. Translation by Frédéric Regard. 
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role: language, the text, the reader, the encyclopedia. “The Deleuzian theory has the immense
merit”, Regard claims, “of allowing us to bury away the author's pure self preserved in the
autobiographical  tome,  to  foreground  its  schemas  –  its  wanderings,  intersections,  gaps,
tunnels, forks in the road, connections, combinations” (2002: 9). 
In the light of Regard's reflections on autobiography, V. S. Naipaul's  The Enigma of
Arrival (1987;  EA)  emerges  as  an  extraordinary  meta-reflexive  text.  More  than  an
autobiography, Naipaul's The Enigma of Arrival may indeed be read as a mise en abyme of the
unfinished  becoming  of  a  subject  never  coinciding  with  himself,  struggling  to  assign  to
himself  an  unstable  residence  in  the  world  as  well  as  in  writing.  Naipaul's  settling  in
Wiltshire,  a  rural  area  to  which  the  writer  seems to  be  attracted  because  of  its  apparent
remoteness  from his  hybrid  and  cosmopolitan  experience,  serves  as  a  narrative  fulcrum
around which the book unfolds itself. The story of the writer's move from Trinidad to England
at the age of eighteen and the later development of his literary career is only narrated in rare,
occasional flashbacks. Most of the novel is occupied with the writer's reflections, observations
and growing familiarity with the place he has chosen as his residence, as well as with the
stories of other people – not real friends, not people playing a significant role in the life of the
protagonist – but rather casual acquaintances whom the writer meets in his otherwise rather
isolated  life.  The  chronology  of  the  development  of  the  personality  of  the  narrator  is
secondary to the issue of his positioning himself within a certain landscape – geographical,
cultural and, above all, linguistic. This positioning emerges as the central issue in the text
insofar as it preludes to the narrator's becoming a writer and orientates his access to language,
discourse and representation.
Language as a site of exile and mediation. 
The ambiguity of a title like  The Enigma of Arrival already configures exile as the main
subject of the narration, not in terms of its spatial connotation, but as an internal disjunction of
the narrating ʻIʼ. Indeed, the title combines in an oxymoronic way the idea of relative safety
and accomplishment usually associated the word “arrival” with the eerie quality of the word
“enigma”. An “enigma”, in fact, exists only insofar as it is not solved. By the same token,
arrivals – even in his cottage in Wiltshire, the place which the narrator insists on considering
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his home and around which he has decided to arrange his emotional life – are depicted not as
accomplishment but as deeply estranging, unsettling experiences. Exile emerges as a force
that brings about the displacement of a subject from himself, from his fantasies and from his
conceptions of the world, and that makes him observe and interpret the reality around him
from an estranged  perspective.  Exile  is  therefore  not  to  be  understood just  as  a  real-life
experience of a writer who has constructed his reputation around his personal uprootedness,22
but rather as a way of seeing and as a constitutive part of his writing to be considered in its
textualization. 
The book begins with a retrospective, micro-narrative of the arrival of the narrator in
the  English  countryside,  an  arrival  whose  enigma  is  inscribed  directly  in  language.  The
narrator configures himself  as an alien presence by confessing his initial  ignorance of the
vernacular, and his inability to call things by the exact names utilized by the locals: 
For the first four days it rained. I could hardly see where I was. Then it stopped raining and beyond
the lawn and outbuildings in front of my cottage I saw fields with stripped trees on the boundaries of
each  field;  and far  away,  depending  on  the  light,  glints  of  a  little  river,  glints  which  sometimes
appeared, oddly, to be above the level of the land. 
The river was called the Avon; not the one connected with Shakespeare. Later – when the land
had more meaning, when it had absorbed more of my life than the tropical street where I had grown
up – I was able to think of the flat wet fields with the ditches as “water meadows” or “wet meadows”,
and the low smooth hills in the background, beyond the river, as “downs”. But just then, after the rain,
all that I saw – though I had been living in England for twenty years – were flat fields and a narrow
river. (EA: 5) 
Blindness is the main theme of the first paragraph. The impossibility of seeing, which seems
determined by the heavy rain of the first four days after the narrator's arrival, is followed by a
difficulty in deciphering the landscape. This hindrance, which appears at first to have been
22 The word “exile” has been used with reference to Naipaul's writing several times by different critics to serve
different  purposes.  For  this  reason,  a  contextualization  and  a  delimitation  of  the  field  of  analysis  is  a
necessary premise to an analysis of The Enigma of Arrival. As Rob Nixon, author of a monograph on V. S.
Naipaul, highlights, Naipaul “has come to be celebrated as the most comprehensively uprooted of twentieth-
century writers and the most bereft of national affiliations [...]. Certainly in Britain and in the United States,
where his  influence has  been strongest,  critics  commonly focus on the pathos of  his circumstances and
embrace him as simultaneously coming from nowhere and everywhere” (1992: 17). Yet, the American critic
suggests, such a reputation constructed on familial and personal uprootedness has provided the rationale for
“ignoring the shapes of his commitment” (ibid.). The rhetoric of exile, or rather, what Nixon sarcastically
calls “the licence of exile”, has served as a consolidating strategy to endow Naipaul with the authority to
speak as a metropolitan writer with a privileged viewpoint on the so called Third World – the viewpoint of
someone who is both an insider and an outsider. In this sense, exile has often served to shift the attention
toward the construction of the personality and biography of the author rather than to cast new light on the
textual implications of his work. 
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caused by the effects  of  the  light  on the fields  is  revealed in  the second paragraph as  a
cognitive problem. The narrator is not unable to see, but unable to speak. He is not able to
conceptualize the “ditches” as “water meadows” or “wet meadows”, an cannot call the hills
“downs”, even though his presumptive command of the English language and his familiarity
with English culture is asserted by his assurance that he “had been living in England” (the
progressive form stresses the extension and continuity of his stay) for about two decades. 
The  second  paragraph  instead  synthesises  a  successful  process  of  homing,  of
establishing  a  bond  between  the  narrator  and  the  landscape,  in  terms  of  a  translation
accomplished both in language and in the self. The linguistic passage from “ditches” to “water
meadows” is  a  passage  which  the  narrator  justifies  with the  expansion of  his  horizon of
experience, as he claims that it became possible “when the land had more meaning, when it
had absorbed more of my life than the tropical street where I had grown up” (EA: 5). The use
of  the  verb  “absorb”  is  extremely  significant,  because  it  implies  the  reciprocity  of  the
development of the self and of his linguistic capacities. Language is not just a mirror of the
widening of the horizon of experience of the narrator, but also the very site in which his own
experience of the world comes into being. Differently put, it is not the narrator who attributes
meaning to the landscape, but rather that meaning as an external, shared construct takes in the
narrator and allows for him certain new possibilities of existence. 
The translational, circular structure which is introduced in the first two paragraphs is
repeated constantly throughout the whole book. The beginning of the book already prefigures
the ending of the narrator's story, while the ending of the novel sends us back to the reasons
why the narrator decided to begin his autobiography. The Enigma of Arrival does not proceed
in a linear, chronological way, marking progress, so to speak, in the life of the narrator, or
organizing  his  development  around  specific  turning  points.  It  rather  presents  a  series  of
disconnected  observations  whose  temporality  is  expanded  and  revised.  Each  event  is
presented from the point of view of both the narrator's past and present self, juxtaposing the
different  ways  of  seeing  that  the  narrator  claims  he  has  developed  throughout  a  life  of
observation. Helen Hayward, author of a monograph on V. S. Naipaul, compares the writing
of Naipaul's autobiography to a revision of a literary text:
The writing of autobiography is shaped by an interplay between the desire to assert a connection
between a past and a present self  –  to establish a continuity over time which could be thought to
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define the very notion of identity – and an opposing sense of distance from the earlier  self.  The
revision  of  a  literary  text  similarly  implies  a  dialogue  between  past  and  present  selves,  and  a
continuity of concerns – those of the earlier writer remain those of the later writer – which is balanced
by  the  assumption  that  the  older  writer  is  better  able  to  express  what  the  younger  writer  has
endeavoured  to  articulate,  or  that  the  emphases  are  now  different.  Revision  need  not  involve  a
disowning  of  the  writing  of  the  earlier  self;  the  work  of  the  younger  writer  is  not  necessarily
superseded by the efforts of the older. Both autobiography and revision invite meditation on the nature
of identity within difference. (2002: 39)
Indeed, The Enigma of Arrival performs both a reworking of a life and the editing of certain
episodes, as well as a textual revision and re-contextualization of the work produced by the
narrator's  earlier  self.  The  “meditation  on  the  nature  of  identity  within  difference”,  for
Hayward (ibid.), is the result of a circular process of interpretation that the narrator repeatedly
performs throughout the whole text, connecting each episode to a wider conception of the
narrator's life and vision, and then coming back to the way the narrator is able to articulate
this process in his writing.
That  language  may  be  the  real  site  of  the  narrator's  process  of  revision  and
interpretation  is  asserted  and  repeated  throughout  the  text.  Immigration  as  well  as  the
narrator's presence in the English countryside are explained as a consequence of his being an
English speaker:
Fifty years ago, there would have been no room for me in the estate; even now my presence was a
little unlikely. But more than accident had brought me here. Or, rather, in the series of accidents that
had brought me to the manor cottage, with a view of the restored church, there was a clear historical
line.  The migration, within the British Empire,  from India to  Trinidad had given me the English
language as my own, and a particular kind of education. This had partly seeded my wish to be a writer
in a particular mode, and had committed me to the literary career I had been following in England for
twenty years. (52-53)
If  being a  speaker  also means to  be spoken by a  language,  English has allowed Naipaul
certain  possibilities  of  existence  which  would  have  been unthinkable  only half  a  century
before. Language is directly mentioned as the site of the narrator's emergence as a subject as
well as a reader. 
The knowledge of  the  English  language is  nonetheless  explicitly  mentioned as  an
indirect knowledge, a knowledge that the speaker has acquired from afar and embedded in a
very different experience of the world than the one required to inhabit his cottage in Wiltshire.
On the one hand, the narrator learnt English in Trinidad and, as he claims, reconstructed from
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his tropical, colonial island the meaning of words of which he had no direct experience, such
as “winter” (cf. EA: 5 ff.), words whose imaginary scope turned out to be very different from
his experience of the winter he knew in England (“The idea of winter and snow had always
excited me; but in England the word had lost some of its romance for me, because the winters
I had found in England had seldom been as extreme as I had imagined they would be when I
was far away in my tropical island”, EA: 5). On the other hand, the narrator gets acquainted
with the English spoken in the countryside through his philological expertise, an expertise
acquired through books and research, but still somehow disconnected from his experience,
creating  an horizon of  expectation  which  proves  somehow unfitting:  “I  knew that  ‘avon’
originally meant only river, just as  ‘hound’ originally meant a dog, any kind of dog. And I
knew that both elements of Waldenshaw – the name of the village and the manor in whose
ground I was – I knew that both ‘walden’ and ‘shaw’ meant wood. One further reason why,
apart from the fairy tale feel of the snow and the rabbits, I thought I saw a forest”, EA: 7). As
this  passage suggests,  the possibility to  recognize something through the dim light  which
illuminates  the otherwise  obscure  English landscape is  mediated by the  narrator's  literary
studies first in colonial schools and later in England. Yet these studies expose the narrator to
the  experience  of  linguistic  inadequacy,  which  causes  him  to  access  only  a  distorted,
unrealistic view of the landscape: “So much of this I saw with the literary eye, or with the aid
of literature. A stranger here, with the nerves of a stranger, and yet with a knowledge of the
language and the history of the language and the writing, I could find a special past in what I
saw; with a part  of my mind I  could admit fantasy” (EA:  18).  Literature,  differently put,
represents for the narrator a special form of exile, something that both connects and separates
him from the place he wants to call “his home” as well as from the people who live there. 
The foreignness  of  language and experience  that  the  narrator  finds  in  literature  is
presented  both  as  source  of  frustration  and  of  attraction.  The  narrator  describes  his
relationship  to  literature in  the episode  of  his  short  stay in  New York before  leaving for
London, as he immediately manages to find a book which he had despaired to find in the
emporia of Trinidad. The book, South Wind by Norman Douglas, is presented as a fetish of a
world that was foreclosed to the narrator in his life in Trinidad, and which the narrator buys
immediately. Yet the act of buying the book is not followed by a real possession, but rather by
the impossibility of reading a book which is destined to remain foreign:
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South Wind! But it remained unread. My first attempt to read it was like the attempts I made later: it
showed me that – like the books of Aldous Huxley and D.H. Lawrence and certain other contemporary
writers whose names had come to me through my father or through teachers at school – this book,
with a young man called Denis and a bishop, and an island called Nepenthe, was alien, far from
anything in my experience, and beyond my comprehension. But the alienness of a book, though it
might keep me from reading it (I never read beyond the first chapter of South Wind), did not prevent
me from admiring it.  The very alienness,  the  inaccessibility,  was  like  a  promise of  romance – a
reward, some way in the future, for making myself a writer. (EA: 118-119)
The narrator buys the book because it was recommended to him “by an English teacher who
knew  of  his  writing  ambitions”  (EA:  118).  The  book  is  invested  with  meanings  and
expectations. It is implied that the book would introduce the narrator into the literary universe
which he would have been required to know if he would have wanted to be included in it. Yet,
the  desire  to  become  a  writer  is  sustained  by  expectations  created  in  absence,  whose
fulfilment is destined to be deferred indefinitely. Later, the narrator claims that “so much of
my education had been abstract that I could live like this and feel like this” (EA: 119). To
illustrate this, he mentions his passionate studying of French Drama or Soviet Cinema as a
study carried  out  “without  having  any idea  of  the  country  or  the  court”  (ibid)  that  had
produced them. 
“Man fitting the Landscape”. The narrator's encounter with Jack and the beginning of the
process of self-translation.
The starting point of the process of the self-translation of the narrator onto the landscape is
therefore a  process  already taking place on the basis  of  a  highly mediated and estranged
experience:  “But  knowledge  came  slowly  to  me.  It  was  not  like  the  almost  instinctive
knowledge that had come to me as a child of the plants and flowers of Trinidad; it was like
learning a second language” (EA: 30), claims the narrator as he accounts for his becoming
more  and more  familiar  with the  place  where  he has  chosen to  live.  Yet,  the  imaginary,
spontaneous process of learning that the narrator ascribes to children who shape their first
experiences in a language which they can only think of as unified and meaningful,  never
really figures in the text. The narrator's “assignation of residence”, i.e. the learning of the
vernacular of the English countryside, is made possible because the narrator already speaks a
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second language, the language of literature, art, representation. The learning of the vernacular
is, in fact, made possible through a process of multiple linguistic mediations, which in fact
contrasts with any possible ideal of spontaneousness.
The inauthenticity of the narrator is presented as a potential threat to the landscape he
has decided to inhabit. The narrator often comments on the oddity of his presence in a place
that had been built to accommodate a very different kind of people, local families whose lives
would have been full  and meaningful  in  their  untouched,  rural,  Edwardian context.  “The
builder of the house and the designer of the garden could not have imagined, with their world
view, that at a later time someone like me would have been in the grounds” (EA: 52), claims
the narrator, ascribing to himself the falling apart of a world order. As an old lady visits the
place where she used to  spend her youth and cannot  recognize it  any more,  the narrator
accuses himself as follows: 
Embarrassed, in the presence of the old lady, by what I had done, I was also embarrassed to be what I
was, an intruder, not from another village or county, but from another hemisphere; embarrassed to
have destroyed or spoilt the past for the old lady, as the past had been destroyed for me in other places,
in my own island, and even here, in the valley of my second life, in my cottage in the manor grounds,
where bit  by bit  the place that  had thrilled and welcomed and reawakened me had changed and
changed, until the time had come for me to leave. (EA: 318)
In this passage, the narrator not only defines himself as the product of diaspora and exile, a
person to whom the possibility of being perfectly integrated in the landscape of his birth has
been taken away by history. He also refers to himself as being in exile, a condition which he
projects onto the place where he lives and which makes his sojourn unbearable. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of the narrator's exile is the figure of Jack. Jack, a
middle-aged English farmer and a  gardener  whom the narrator  occasionally meets  on his
walks in the countryside, is a character apparently perfectly integrated in his social, cultural
and  geographical  context,  an  image  of  plenitude  whose  perfection  will  be  questioned,
deconstructed and re-signified throughout the narration. Very little is told about this character,
and most of the narrative about him is contained in the first chapter, titled precisely “Jack's
Garden”, in which the narrator tells of Jack's cyclical, seasonal work in his garden repeating
itself every year in the same way until his sudden illness and subsequent death. As the narrator
introduces  him,  a  remarkable  joining  of  the  farmer  with  the  place  is  established:  “Jack
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himself, however, I considered to be part of the view. I saw his life as genuine, rooted, fitting;
man fitting the landscape. I saw him as a remnant of the past (the undoing of which my own
presence portended)” (EA: 15). Jack is fashioned by the narrator's view on him as traditional,
instinctive, unchanging, although it is immediately also stated that this view would change.
His life is full because it follows a pre-existing, pre-determined pattern that may have been
the same for centuries. Jack belongs to the stereotypical British context, and in this sense the
narrator never explicitly introduces him. Nonetheless, the fact that the real encounter between
the two men is postponed and anticipated by two other encounters (“It was his father-in-law I
noticed first” (EA: 21); “But before I got to know Jack I got to know the farm manager”, EA:
25) serves as a prelude for the fact that the solidity of Jack's presence may soon be replaced
by an elusiveness which will become the site of the re-signification of the character. 
Jack's integration with the landscape is initially configured as an idealized absence of
the mediation between him and language. The empathy between the farmer and the narrator is
not formed through words, but rather through gestures. It is after Jack becomes acquainted
with the odd presence of the narrator – who tries to imagine himself from the viewpoint of the
old man working in the garden as “a stranger, a walker, someone exercising an old public
right of way in what was now private land” (EA: 28) – that they start exchanging some extra-
linguistic, and yet extremely meaningful signs of sympathy and recognition: “But after some
time, after many weeks, when he felt perhaps that the effort wouldn't be wasted, he adopted
me. And from a great distance, as soon as he saw me, he would boom out a greeting, which
came over less as defined words than as a deliberate making of noise in the silence” (EA: 28).
Jack never speaks, the only direct utterances about him are those produced by his wife after
his death, words which by their unexpected change of viewpoint will reveal a completely
different aspect of Jack to the narrator. 
It is Jack's apparent lack of a need for language that makes him perfectly integrated,
and differentiates him from his neighbours. By imagining Jack as outside of language, the
narrator also grants him a privileged condition of freedom to which no one else could aspire.
As he compares Jack to Pitton, a neighbour who performs similar farming work but who is
instead a more accomplished speaker whose existence unfolds not just in nature but also in a
social context informed by power relations, the narrator highlights the difference between the
two characters as follows: 
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But Jack was free in a way Pitton wasn't and now could never be. Perhaps it was Jack's intellectual
backwardness, his purely physical nature, that made him content with what he had. And that was not
little.  Jack was lucky in his circumstances:  his cottage,  the land he could till,  and above all,  his
isolation, the silence and solitude he went to sleep in and woke up to. These circumstances of Jack's
together with the nature of the man, made his life appear like a constant celebration. That labor in his
garden, after his paid work on the farm, that exhaustion, the pleasure then of food and the drive to the
pub, the long, muzzying drinks, the sight year after year of the sweet or beautiful – and profitable –
fruits of his labor: why not, then, the bare back in the summer, as much as the fire in winter? (EA:
233)
Pitton's relative cultural superiority is presented as the mark of a submission to a system of
values by which Jack appears to be untouched. Along similar lines, the dairyman and his
family who suddenly disturb the life of the community by moving into a cottage previously
inhabited by an old couple are described as follows: “How could people like these, without
words to put their emotions and passions, manage? They could, at best, suffer dumbly” (EA:
34).  The scarcity  of  words  is  presented  as  a  much contemptible  condition  here  than  the
idealized  absence  of  language  which  characterizes  Jack's  life.  This  family,  coming  from
outside, cannot aspire either to the perfect integration with the landscape which appears as a
prerogative of a local like Jack, or the process of self-translation that the narrator may enact
thanks to his literary/ exiled expertise. Words make these strangers' lives mean, and imprison
them in a dumbness which Jack avoids because of his perfect communion with the landscape
and by the fact that he does not have any need to express anything that goes beyond his
limited field of experience. 
The ideal of the perfectly integrated, non-linguistic presence represented by Jack is
explicitly revealed as the construction of the narrator's fantasy and subsequently denied in the
same  moment  in  which  Jack  is  introduced:  “Jack  lived  among  ruins,  among  superseded
things. But that way of looking came to me later, has come to me with greater force now, with
the writing. It wasn't the idea that came to me when I first went out walking” (EA: 15). The
reason why the narrator first sees Jack as an image of harmony is because decadence is a
concept that the narrator first attributed to himself: “That idea of ruin and dereliction, of out of
placedness,  was  something  I  felt  about  myself,  attached  to  myself:  a  man  from another
hemisphere,  another  background,  coming  to  rest  in  middle  life  in  the  cottage  of  a  half-
neglected estate, an estate full of reminders of its Edwardian past, with few connections with
the present” (ibid.). Jack plays a fundamental role in the process of self-translation that the
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narrator enacts in the book – the performativity of which is highlighted even more strongly by
saying “that way of looking [..] has come to me with greater force now”. The use of the
temporal deictic “now”  indicates that the act of writing is still an unfinished act, producing
itself  under  the  eye  of  the  reader  and  the  writer,  and  that  the  vision  of  Jack  remains  a
provisional one. The narrator mediates his own  ‘I’ by putting himself in relation with this
representation of Jack that he has constructed through writing. 
Paul Eakin, author of  How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, defines  The
Enigma of  Arrival as  a  “stunning,  groundbreaking variation”  of  what  he  calls  “relational
autobiographies”,  autobiographies  thematizing  the  forming  of  identities  as  relational
constructs (1999: 91). The peculiarity of Naipaul's novel is, in Eakin's view, the way in which
the narrator seems rather untouched by the people living around him. Indeed, Naipaul points
out not his possible identification with the others but rather his difference, his alienation from
them: 
The mood of the narrative is cool, detached, brooding; the writer's vision is profoundly historical.
Here, truly, the relational life is seen sub specie aeternitatis – Naipaul's, anyone. Change – social and
cultural – is the greatest theme in these pages, and Naipaul argues that his “I”-narrative is properly
understood as a tiny part of the great diaspora of our time: “in 1950 in London I was at the beginning
of that movement of peoples that was to take place in the second half of the twentieth century – a
movement  and  a cultural  mixing greater  than  the  peopling of  the United States,  … a  movement
between all the continents (141). (Eakin 1999: 91).
Eakin considers Naipaul's narration as “cool” and “detached” (ibid.) because of the almost
casual ways in which accidents occurring to other people are reported. None of the characters
Naipaul meets occupies a central role in the plot, and none of their stories figure prominently
as  a  central  narrative  core.  Even  Jack  is  not  directly  involved  in  any  specific  episode
occurring to the narrator, but is just there, as a product of the narrator's capacity of seeing,
defined by it and through it.
Eakin  attributes  to  the  narration  both  a  “deeply  historical”  and  “sub  specie
aeternitatis” quality (1999: 91), a contradiction in terms which may be explained through the
way the ʻIʼ, the focalizing agency of the whole narration, emerges as a provisional result of an
unfinished process of negotiation. Eakin's observation that Naipaul's “ʻIʼ-narrative is properly
understood as a tiny part of the great diaspora of our time” inscribes Naipaul's book within a
wider exploration of the contradiction of what Homi Bhabha called “the conflictual economy
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of colonial  discourse” (1994: 122). This economy, according to the Indian philosopher,  is
characterized by the tension between, on the one hand, “the synchronic, panoptical vision of
domination” - i.e. the demand for a solid, unchanging identity – and, on the other hand, “the
counter-pressure of the diachrony of history”, i.e. change and difference (ibid.). Exile, as a
fragmentary, disjunctive experience, is paradoxically presented as a choice of the narrator, a
choice  by  which  he  looks  for  his  own  synchronic  discourses  of  identity  –  as  in  his
construction  of  the  characters  of  Jack  –  and  at  the  same  he  differentiates  himself  from
characters like Pitton or the linguistically deficient neighbours. Yet, exile is also embedded in
a precise historical, social and cultural phenomenon (which Eakin calls “the great diaspora of
our time”; 1999: 91), preventing the narrator from any possible identification with these self-
constructed rhetorics of rootedness. 
Mimicry is  what  Bhabha  defines  as  an  ironic  compromise  between  these  two
contradictory imperatives of colonial  discourse,  the a-historical,  dominating,  disciplinizing
gaze of the colonizer and the historicized, differential appropriation of the colonized. Mimicry,
a  term which  Bhabha draws from Lacan's  essay “The Line  and the  Light”,  refers  to  the
formation of identity through imitation, through the introjection of the image of the Other.
Colonial  mimicry,  supported  by  colonial  strategies  of  reform  and  discipline,  produces
colonized subjects who, in relation to their colonizers, are “almost the same but not quite”
(Bhabha  1994:  122;  italics  in  original).  Imitation  does  not  involve  the  harmonization  or
repression of difference,  but rather  a  form of resemblance which entails  a difference that
colonial discourses also wish not to erase. Mimicry is therefore the sign for an identification
which can never be completed, but always produces its slippages, “the desire for a reformed,
recognizable Other” (ibid.) who nonetheless cannot and should not be completely assimilated.
The menace of mimicry is that of a double vision which in revealing the ambivalence
of colonial discourse, threatens to disrupt its authority. The disciplinized subject can never be
perfectly submitted to the controlling gaze of the colonizers, but displaces it: “the look of the
surveillance returns as the displacing gaze of the disciplined, where the observer becomes the
observed and ‘partial’ representation rearticulates the whole notion of identity and alienates it
from essence” (Bhabha 1994: 127). In fact, Bhabha claims, mimicry has its specific function
in  colonial  society,  but  it  is  a  psychic  mechanism  of  identification  which  is  far  more
generalized. At the heart of Bhabha's articulation of mimicry is a conception of identity as
relational and unstable, articulated, as Lacan put it, along the axis of metonymy. Identity, to
put it another way, does not pre-exist but rather forms itself through a series of identifications.
“Mimicry conceals no presence or identity behind its mask”, claims Bhabha, referring both to
the colonizers and the colonized. Identity does not pre-exist the relational identification with
the Other for any of them, and emerges as the product of a disciplinizing gaze which can,
nonetheless, “shatter the unity of man's being through which [it] extends [its] sovereignty”
(1994: 126).
Language and writing are the site of the production of the narrator's mimicry, as well
as of his becoming a subject. As Bhabha puts it, “[t]he desire to emerge as ‘authentic’ through
mimicry  –  through  a  process  of  writing  and  repetition  –  is  the  final  irony  of  partial
representation” (1994: 126). The coming into being of a subject by introjecting an external
form of discipline emerges as a central motif as the narrator talks about his desire to become a
writer as a most “imprisoning” and “corrupting” desire: 
Children,  whose experience  is  so limited,  readily accept  an abused condition.  Even his  play can
encourage a child to live with his abused situation: can encourage masochism in someone meant to be
quite different. 
Thinking back to my own past, my own childhood – the only way we have of understanding
another man's condition is through ourselves, our experiences and emotions – I found so many abuses
I took for granted. I lived easily with the idea of poverty, the nakedness of children in the street of the
town and the  roads  of  the country.  I  lived easily with the idea of  the  brutalizing of  children  by
flogging; the ridiculing of the deformed; the different ideas of authority presented by our Indu family
and then, above that, by the racial-colonial system of our agricultural colony. 
No one is born a rebel. Rebellion is something we have to be trained in. And even with the
encouragement  of  my father's  rages  –  political  rages,  as  well  as  rages  about  his  family and  his
employers  – there was much about our family life and attitudes and our island that  I  accepted –
acceptances which later were to mortify me.
The noblest impulse of all – the wish to be a writer, the wish that ruled my life – was the
impulse that was the most imprisoning, the most insidious, and in some ways the most corrupting,
because, refined by my half-English half-education and ceasing then to be a pure impulse, it had given
me a false idea of the activity of the mind. The noble impulse, in that colonial setting, had been the
most hobbling. To be what I wanted to be, I had to cease to be or to grow out of what I was. To
become a writer it was necessary to shed many of the early ideas that went with the ambition and the
concept my half-education had given me of the writer. (EA: 244-245)
The reflection that children “easily accept an abused condition” is formulated with reference
to the narrator's observation of the “pain of memory” (ibid.) haunting a character named Bray,
with whom the narrator occasionally exchanges some views on politics and society. As Bray
talks about his childhood memories, he is ashamed to admit that he worked as a servant in the
big manor house when he was still very young. The narrator recognizes the shame that Bray
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feels about himself as the same shame that permeates the narrator's experience as a colonial.
Servitude is  a  condition that  is  perceived,  in  its  most  open and explicit  forms,  as  deeply
humiliating by adults who have developed into ambitious individuals such as Bray or the
narrator himself. Yet, servitude is something that they both imbibed as little children by being
put into a system of relations that not only tolerated but also fostered forms of submission to
discipline and rules.
Interestingly, rebellion is not described as a spontaneous reaction, but as something
that must also be introjected like discipline. The narrator has to learn rebellion from his father
in the same way as he learned to accept the idea of poverty, the brutalizing or ridiculing of
those who somehow diverged from any introjected model of discipline, and the very ideas of
authority connected with the racial-colonial-cultural system of his own Caribbean island. 
The desire to become a writer is described, therefore, as a double-bind. This desire is
dictated by the narrator's imprisonment by the gaze of the other, a gaze which he considers as
the most restraining and the most corrupting, but outside of which he is aware that he could
not exist. He defines himself as a product of a “half-English half-education” (EA: 245), an
education which will put him in a situation in which he could never really achieve the ideal
that he had constructed in his mind, and which will give him only a half-command of the
language  and  of  the  culture.  His  colonial  background  will  always  be  the  mark  of  his
difference. “To be what I wanted to be, I had to cease to be or to grow out of what I was”, the
narrator claims (ibid.). “To cease to be” means, in this case, to replace the idea of identity as
something “to be”, and therefore a paradigm of fixed identity and presence like that ascribed
to Jack, with that of “becoming”. His desire to write displaces him from being under the
lenses of the disciplinizing gaze of the colonializer to the position of the observer but in a way
which deeply unsettles the premises on which the disciplinizing gaze is based, shattering the
very conception of unity which it subsumes. 
The passage describes the transformation of the narrator from a passive recipient of
colonial discourse – more specifically of the colonial discourse carried through literature – to
that  of  an active producer  of  discourse.  This transformation cannot  be attained through a
simple exchange of the two positions – the act of rebellion that he claims to have learnt from
the father is just another form of discipline which cannot really produce a liberating discourse.
The  narrator  rather  constitutes  his  own “I-function”  (cf.  Regard)  by unsettling  these  two
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apparently  fixed  positions  of  receiver/  producer  and  positions  himself  in  a  continuous
exchange  between  the  reader-function  and  the  author-function.  Reading/interpreting  and
writing emerge as interconnected acts in which the self-writing subject develops a way of
feeling and perceiving, as well as a sense of home. The narrator positions himself both as a
reader of the reality around him – which he accesses through discourse and representation –
and as a writer.
The pragmatics of interpretation and the narrator's self-translation onto the landscape
Interpretation is what allows the narrator this dynamic exchange between the reader- and the
author- function. Interpretation emerges from The Enigma of Arrival as a process at the centre
of which is not the deciphering of a text, but rather, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle has theorized it,
a pragmatics in which the text acts as a prop for a language-game in which the author and the
reader  are  produced  as  places within  a  structure  of  interpellation.  In  Lecercle's  view,
interpretation is  to be understood as translation and intervention.  The reader is  not  just  a
passive recipient of the presumed  meaning produced by the author, but actively contributes
not just to the construction of the meaning of a text, but also to the creation of a fiction of an
author. Jean-Jacques Lecercle's formulation of the theory of interpretation goes beyond even
Iser and Jauss' reception theories insofar as it reads interpretation as a process taking place
within a structure which comprehends the following five elements, the initial letters of which
significantly compose the word ALTER: Author, Language, Text, Encyclopedia, Reader. What
circulates within this structure is not meaning, but rather interpellation. Both the author and
the reader are captured as places within this structure, but this capture is not a static one, as it
involves a continuity of counter-responses. 
When, for example,  in the above quoted episode involving the narrator's  exchange
with Bray about the condition of servitude, the narrator claims that “the only way we have of
understanding another man's condition is through ourselves, our experiences and emotions”
(EA:  244),   he already conceptualizes  interpretation as  a  dynamic  structure of  reading in
which the polarity of reader/  passive recipient  and author/  active producer  of meaning is
dissolved. The other, the person whom the narrator/ reader wants to understand (in this case,
Bray), is not just a pre-existing author of an utterance – an utterance about Bray's service in
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the manor as a child which in this case is actually missing (“And then the pain of the memory
overcame Bray's wish to tell me his story; and the days he had spent as a servant in the manor
remained secret”; EA: 244) – but is someone that comes into existence through the projection
of the reader's (narrator's) self onto him. By the same token, it is already implied that what the
narrator calls “ourselves, our experiences and emotions” (ibid.) is not a pre-existing entity, but
rather the result (through literature, education, colonial discourses, etc.) of an external process
of subjectivation  projecting itself onto the thus-constructed  inner life of the narrating self.
The inner-life of the narrator, his conscience, his feelings, his perceptions are, in other words,
always-already embedded  in  a  social,  external  relationship  to  the  other.  It  is  in  fact  the
observation of the others and the (partial) mimicking of their attitudes that makes the narrator
change his own vision of the world, and allows him to translate himself onto the landscape he
has elected as his home. Therefore, just as the reader/narrator creates the author/Bray, the
author/narrator is created through the projection of certain structures of feeling onto him (cf.
Williams 1977). 
As the positioning of the narrator as reader and as writer  is presented as that of a
“mimic” from the very beginning, in The Enigma of Arrival the reflection on the authenticity
of the narration has to start, paradoxically, from a declaration of inauthenticity. By exposing
the fictionality of his book, Naipaul also exposes the provisionality of the positioning of the
self that is performed through writing. In this sense, Naipaul's decision to subtitle his book “A
Novel”, may be read, not as a denial of the “pact of truth” that in Lejeune's view characterizes
the genre of autobiography, but rather as an inversion of values. The truth of the episodes
narrated – some of which may already be known or recognizable to the reader who is familiar
with Naipaul's previous writings or with the literature produced about him: interviews, essays,
monographs and so on – is not to be found in their correspondence with real-life events but
rather through the performance of an act of interpretation which re-signifies them within a
narrative structure.  This is  why,  towards the end of the novel the narrator  thematizes the
writing of his own autobiography as a construction that started from some fantasies which he
had re-elaborated several times and in different ways in his writing: 
I had thought for years about a book like The Enigma of Arrival. The Mediterranean fantasy that had
come to me a day or so after I had arrived in the valley – the story of the traveler, the strange city, the
spent life – had been modified over the years. The fantasy and the ancient-world setting had been
dropped. The story had become more personal: my journey, the writer's journey, the writer defined by
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his  writing  discoveries,  his  ways  of  seeing,  rather  than  by personal  adventures,  writer  and  man
separating at the beginning of the journey and coming together again in a second life just before the
end.
My theme, the narrative to carry it, my characters – for some years I felt they were sitting on
my shoulder, waiting to declare themselves and to possess me. But it was only out of this awareness of
death that I began at last to write. Death was the motif; it had been the motif all along. Death and the
way of handling it – that was the motif of the story of Jack.  (EA: 343)
This passage depicts interpretation not just as the necessary premise of Naipaul's book, but
also as the very object of his writing. These lines illuminate and complete an episode narrated
in the second chapter of the novel, a chapter titled “The Journey”, in which the retrieval of the
reproduction of a painting by the Italian surrealist artist Giorgio de Chirico becomes the pivot
around which the narrator organizes random fantasies and ideas about a book, interpreting
them in the light of his own life and experience of arrivals. The  Mediterranean fantasy to
which  the  narrator  refers  is  precisely  the  fantasy  that  has  arisen  from his  interpretative
transformation of the visual artefact that he finds by coincidence in his cottage into a written
artefact  (ekphrasis).  This  translation  from the  visual  to  the  literary  gives  way to  further
translations which develops into a series of stories that develop into other stories, converging
then into the biographical narrative produced in The Enigma of Arrival. The interpretation of a
painting gives way to fiction, which in turn gives way to new interpretations which give way
to the coming into being of the narrator's ‘I’. The “Mediterranean fantasy” developing from
the  ekphrasis serves  as  a  prelude to  a  pragmatics  of  writing which subsumes,  as  well,  a
pragmatics of reading and interpreting. 
The  assertion  Naipaul  makes  concerning  the  “writer  and  man  separating  at  the
beginning of the journey and coming together again in a second life just before the end” (EA:
343) puts the episode of the ekphrasis of the De Chirico's painting at the very centre of the
narration. Indeed, the ekphrastic interpretation of the De Chirico painting – a painting titled
precisely The Enigma of Arrival and the Afternoon – is much more than an excuse for a title
or theme. The American scholar Robert Hamner has argued that the textual rendition of the
painting constitutes a “pivotal axis of ekphrasis” around which “we must attend to three levels
of  meaning:  the  narrator's  candid  act  of  explication,  its  authorial  and  autobiographical
application, and the implications of interrogating the artistic motive behind the entire novel”
(2006: 37). The fact that this ekphrasis is cited again at the end of the novel, and that the
narrator  speaks  of  it  as  the  site  in  which  “man  and  writer”  were  first  separated  at  the
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beginning of the novel only to be reunited “just before the end” (EA: 343) connects the second
and the third level of which Hamner speaks in an indissoluble way. “The artistic motive”
(Hammer 2006: 37) behind the entire novel is indeed an interrogation and a constitution of the
self and of the spatial and temporal construction of the ‘I’ narrative, and interpretation is the
way in which this is attained. 
That  the  ekphrastic rendition  of  de  Chirico's  painting  should  emerge  as  an
interpretation  is  made clear  by the  very condition  in  which  the  episode  takes  place.  The
narrator does not limit himself to the description of an object, but provides a context for it,
and also includes some of the comments that others have produced about the image:
The cottage at that time still had the books and some of the furniture of the people who had been there
before. Among the books was one that was very small, a paperback booklet, smaller in format than the
average small  paperback and with only a few pages.  The booklet,  from a series  called the Little
Library of  Art,  was  about  the  early paintings  of  Giorgio  de  Chirico.  There  were  about  a  dozen
reproductions of  his  early surrealist  paintings.  Technically,  in  these very small  reproductions,  the
paintings did not seem interesting; they seemed flat, facile. And their content was not profound either;
arbitrary assemblages, in semi-classical, semi-modern settings, of unrelated motifs – aqueducts, trains,
arcades, gloves, fruit, statues – with an occasional applied touch of easy mystery: in one painting, for
instance, an overlarge shadow of a hidden figure approaching from round a corner. But among these
paintings there was one which,  perhaps because of  its  title,  caught  my attention:  The Enigma of
Arrival. I felt that in an indirect, poetical way the title referred to something in my own experience;
and later I was to learn that the title of this surrealist painting of Chirico's hadn't been given by the
painter, but by the poet Apollinaire, who died young in 1918, from influenza following a wound, to
the great grief of Picasso and others. (EA: 97-98)
The context that the narrator outlines is the context of his own retrieval of the painting and of
his own personal act of interpretation. The source of the painting, its author, remains in the
background as a secondary aspect, to the point that the narrator does not even seem to realize
that his elision of the prefix “de” the second time he mentions the surname of the Italian
painter  is  actually  a  deliberate  elision  (the  surname  should  be  de  Chirico,  and  not  just
Chirico).  In  the  forefront  is  the  “flat,  facile”  reproduction  of  the  painting  found  by  the
narrator, and most of all, the title that the French poet Guillaume Apollinaire gave to it. The
mentioning of Apollinaire is particularly significant. By saying that the French poet had given
a title to the painting, the narrator already quotes an interpretation given by somebody else.
Besides, the title given to the painting doubles the painting, and becomes a second text for the
interpretation of the narrator. 
Following the scene of recovery, both the title and the reproduction of the painting are
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appropriated by the narrator's personal vision. The paragraph quoted above produces a sort of
zoom in from the external condition of the recovery,  the glossing of the painting (i.e.  the
information  about  the title  and about  Apollinaire),  and the way both the painting and its
glossing catch the narrator's attention. In the second paragraph, where the  ekphrasis of the
painting is performed, the narrator establishes a new connection between the painting and
Apollinaire, himself and the painting, himself and Apollinaire:
What  was interesting about  the  painting itself,  The Enigma of  Arrival,  was that  –  again perhaps
because of its title – it changed in my memory. The original (or the reproduction in the Little Library
of Art booklet) was always a surprise. A classical scene, Mediterranean, ancient-Roman – or so I saw
it. A wharf; in the background, beyond walls and gateways (like cutouts), there is the top of the mast
of an antique vessel; on an otherwise deserted street in the foreground there are two figures, both
muffled, one perhaps the person who had arrived, the other perhaps a native of the port. The scene is
of desolation and mystery: it speaks of the mystery of arrival. It spoke to me of that, as it had spoken
to Apollinaire. (EA: 98)
In claiming that “it [the painting] spoke to me of that [the enigma of arrival], as it had spoken
to  Apollinaire”  (ibid.),  the  narrator  performs  at  least  three  important  functions.  First,  he
postulates, years after Apollinaire had given a title to the painting, what Lecercle calls “a
constructed  mythical  moment  of  origin”  (1999:  22),  which  is,  in  fact,  a  double  moment.
Naipaul imagines that the painting is the bearer of an original meaning which de Chirico gave
to  the  painting,  and which  emerged verbally  through the  title  that  Apollinare  gave  to  it.
Secondly, by claiming that he knows what the French poet had meant by ‘The Enigma of
Arrival’,  he  produces  a  representation  of  the  author  Apollinaire  which  has  an  imaginary
relation to the poet's real condition of existence and which is highly mediated by ideology.
Thirdly,  the  narrator  usurps  the  role  of  the  author  Apollinaire  by  proclaiming  his  own
identification with the French poet. The identification with Apollinaire emerges as much more
significant than any possible identification with de Chirico not only because both the narrator
and Apollinaire are writers, working with language rather than with image, but also because
their production is revealed as a form of reading and interpreting someone else's artefact. 
The  first  premise  on  which  Jean-Jacques  Lecercle's  theory  of  interpretation  as
pragmatics is based is that of indirection. It is not the speaker who masters the meaning of his
or  her  utterance,  but  the utterance that  masters  the  speaker.  Differently put,  “the speaker
means something different from what she says, or something more, or something less; and she
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says something different from what she means” (Lecercle 1999: 76). This happens because
language,  the means through which interpretation takes place,  cannot  be mastered by the
speaker either. The meaning of the text is thus separated by the author's original meaning. The
narrator of The Enigma of Arrival does not have to “re-construct” the meaning of the painting
or of Apollinaire's title, but rather to construct it. The word “construction” is used by Lecercle
with reference to Freud's theory of interpretation, which he considers “not a simple matter of
adequacy (and Freudian interpretation cannot be the recovery of an intention of meaning), but
rather of the effect of an absent cause” (1999: 20). The absent cause to which Lecercle refers
is both Apollinaire's relation to the painting and the painting itself. 
Secondly,  interpretation  is  inevitably informed  by the  idea  of  vagueness.  “Natural
languages are vague”, Lecercle argues, “[n]ot only because they perform what linguists call
‘hedging’ (as in ‘he is kind of nice’), but because they sometimes deliberately reject clarity of
expression and univocity of reference” (1999: 77). A title like  The Enigma of Arrival could
evoke  multiple  possible  associations,  all  of  which  would  have  to  be  constructed  by  an
interpreter  according  to  a  context  and  to  specific  conjunctures.  By  the  same  token,  the
painting bears  this  mark of vagueness  too.  Naipaul  describes  the reproductions in  his  art
booklet as “flat, facile” (EA: 97). The figures in the scene of the painting he describes are
“muffled” and his interpretation of them is marked by the use of the word “perhaps”  (ibid.).
Vagueness is indeed a characteristic of the artistic movement to which De Chirico belonged.
Metaphysical  art,  often  assimilated  to  surrealism,  is  an  art  that  sets  itself  the  goal  of
representing what goes beyond the physical appearance of reality and beyond the experience
of the senses. As opposed to Futurism, the artistic and literary movement that dominated the
Italian intellectual panorama of the first two decades of the twentieth century, in Metaphysical
painting,  stasis  and immobility are  predominant.  Through a return to the most  traditional
instrument  of  painting  and  perspective,  in  metaphysical  paintings,  space  and  things  are
represented  as  standing  still,  petrified  in  an  atemporal  dimension.  The  multiplication  of
vanishing points forces the observer to interrogate him/herself about the dispositions of the
images in the composition. 
What interpretation performs is described by Lecercle as a form of translation and
intervention  happening  through  re-contextualization:  the  text  is  de-contextualized  and  re-
contextualized by every act of reading. This implies that “[m]eaning varies (increases and
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multiplies,  or  wilts  and  wanes)  with  every  link  in  the  chain  of  the  serial  arrangement”
(Lecercle 1999: 78). The narrator indeed claims: “What was interesting about the painting
itself, The Enigma of Arrival, was that – again perhaps of the title – it changed in my memory.
The original (or the reproduction in the Little Library of Art booklet) was always a surprise”
(EA: 98). When the narrator says that “[t]he scene is of desolation and mystery: it speaks of
the mystery of arrival” (ibid.),  what is implied is that this “desolation” and mystery” also
change according to the different scene in which the story is re-contextualized. 
The story that the narrator constructs right after describing the de Chirico painting may
be considered as a second ekphrastic interpretation of the painting unfolding itself in narrative
form. In this story, the enigma of arrival is bound to a context which reproduces the classical,
atemporal atmosphere of the image:
My story was to be set in classical  times, in the Mediterranean. My narrator would write plainly,
without any attempt at period style as historical explanation of his period. He would arrive – for a
reason I had yet to work out – at a classical port with the walls and gateways like cutouts. He would
walk past that muffled figure on the quayside. He would move from that silence and desolation, that
blankness, to a gateway or door. He would enter there and be swallowed by the life and noise of a
crowded city (I imagined something like an Indian bazaar scene). The mission he had come on –
family business, study, religious initiation – would give him encounters and adventures. He would
enter interiors,  of  houses and temples.  Gradually there would come to him a feeling that  he was
getting nowhere; he would lose his sense of mission; he would begin to know only that he was lost.
His feeling of adventure would give way to panic.  He would want to escape,  to get  back to the
quayside and his ship. But he wouldn't know how. I imagined some religious ritual in which, led on by
kindly people, he would unwittingly take part and find himself the intended victim. At the moment of
crisis he would come upon a door, open it, and find himself back at the quayside of arrival. He has
been saved; the world is as he remembered it. Only one thing is missing now. Above the cutout walls
and buildings there is no mast, no sail. The antique ship has gone. The traveler has lived out his life.
(EA: 98-99).
The story should be linked to the painting in an ut pictura poesis way: the pictorial techniques
utilized by de Chirico should be reproduced in the text (“My narrator would write plainly,
without any attempt at period style as historical explanation”, ibid.). The image is translated
into words in a way that reveals a transformation of a static image into a recontextualized
narrative.  The characters  are  not  precisely identifiable;  the reason why the traveller  finds
himself in a foreign city are unknown or omitted; the incidents that occur on his way remain
untold. These new elements added to the image are a production of the narrator/ interpreter's
experience as well as of the specific conjunctures in which his reading and interpreting takes
place. 
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The vagueness of this account of an uncanny arrival in a dangerous city and of the
impossibility  of  departure  constitutes  the  basis  for  a  model  that  repeats  itself  in  several
variations and in different contexts in the chapter.  First  the narrator  tells  of a book he is
writing about an African colony, a story in which he recognizes the same narrative pattern of
“a sunlit journey ending in a dangerous classical city” (EA: 99) to the point that he is not able
to recollect which of the two stories comes before the other. Then he realizes that the same
story is the version of a recurring dream (“Nor did it occur to me that it was also an attempt to
find a story for, to give coherence to, a dream or a nightmare which for a year or so had been
unsettling me”, EA: 100). Afterwards, the narration shifts to a story which he had been trying
to write and which did not come out as expected, an episode in which Robert Hamner (2006:
44) recognizes the author's breakdown after his rejection of the manuscript of The Loss of El
Dorado  (1969). Finally the narrator relates his own uncanny experience of arrivals, first in
New York – a short stop-over in the journey of migration that brought him, as a student, to
England – and then to London.
The many versions of the story of the De Chirico painting emerge as a consequence of
différance –  the  separation  between  the  author  and  text  as  well  as  reader  and  text  as
formulated  by Jacques  Derrida.  As  Lecercle  puts  it  “writing  belongs  to  the  realm of  the
different  (there  is  no  iteration  without  alteration),  of  differing  and  deferring  (the  contact
between speaker and hearer occurs in praesentia; the absence of contact between author and
reader is due, in the first instance, to a temporal gap), and of differends (the type of 'dialogue'
that will ensue is agonistic, made up of verbal struggle and games rather than cooperative and
irenic)”  (1999:  78).  Naipaul  not  only  displaces  the  temporality  of  the  action,  but  also
intervenes and translates it onto different contexts which he refers to his own life. Each of
these translations depends then on specific conjunctures, determined by the moment in which
the reading of the De Chirico painting is performed.
Re-contextualization and différance are not, nonetheless, just the result of “an external
process involving two occurrences of the same text in different conjunctures, but also [of] an
internal one”, which Lecercle refers to as metalepsis (1999: 78). With the word “metalepsis”
Lecercle refers both to Austin's theory of the speech-act – claiming that a text is a multi-
layered,  extended speech-act  in  which several  different speech-acts may take place at  the
same time (for example both illocutionary and perlocutionary)  and to  Genette’s theory of
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metalepsis as a contamination between the world of the telling and the world of the told.
Metalepsis disrupts the distinction between the different levels of the narration, for example,
by  allowing  the  extra-diegetic  narrator  to  intrude  in  the  diegetic  word.  The  example  of
metalepsis which Genette introduces in Figures III (1972) is a short story by the Argentinian
writer Julio Cortazar titled “The Continuity of Parks”. In the short story, a man sits in an
armchair reading a detective novel in which two lovers prepare themselves to kill someone.
The end of the short story shows the prospective murderer entering a house and approaching a
man reading a novel on a sofa. Metalepsis plays a fundamental role in The Enigma of Arrival
insofar  as  the  narrator,  through  his  acts  of  interpretation,  transgresses  not  only  different
narrative levels, but also his role as reader, author, narrator, and character. Simultaneously, the
narrator depicts himself as the observer of a painting (de Chirico's The Enigma of Arrival and
the Afternoon), he identifies with the interpreter who gives it a title (Apollinaire), he becomes
the  author  of  a  story  which  “speaks  out”  (the  word  “ekphrasis”  etymologically  means
precisely “speaking out” or “telling in full”, Heffernan 1991: 302) the events depicted in the
painting as well as of a novel whose story is later revealed to him as another version of The
Enigma of Arrival. Then the narrator becomes the protagonist of the story he experiences in
his dreams, as well of the story of his own personal enigma of arrival first in New York and
then in England. 
Metalepsis  becomes even more significant  when Naipaul,  at  the end of  the novel,
utilizes it once again and declares: “The story had become more personal: my journey, the
writer's journey, the writer defined by his writing discoveries, his ways of seeing, rather than
by personal adventures, writer and man separating at the beginning of the journey and coming
together again in a second life just before the end” (EA: 343). Metalepsis, as Lecercle claims,
“inscribes within the text, in a paradoxical form, the possibility of interpellating more than
one set of actors, of projecting from the same text more than one structure of actants” (1999:
81). In this case, metalepsis, which is embedded in the act of interpretation of the painting, in
the version of the story that the narrator tells also becomes the means through which the extra-
diegetic enters the diegesis, in which the narrator transforms what is subtitled as “a novel”
into  an  autobiography,  and  which  re-establishes  the  pact  of  truth  which  Philip  Lejeune
considers to be the basis of autobiography. Therefore, the narrator also interpellates the reader
of his books and tells him or her to believe that the story he has just written is a story of his
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own self. He invites the reader to produce him as author-function and interpellates the reader
as reader-function.
To  return  to  the  issue  of  the  geographical  nature  of  Naipaul's  autobiography,
metalepsis  functions  as  the main device through which the self-writing subject  constructs
himself as place. To claim that a subject is a place means that the subject comes into being as
the result of a process of subjectification in connection with space. The subject emerges not as
the source of the process of signification and writing, but rather as an effect of all this. He
emerges  in  the  dialogue  between  an  image,  the  text  produced  about  the  image,  the
interpretation  he gives  about  them,  and the  story he constitutes.  His  act  of  interpretation
allows him to project himself onto the landscape and project his own foreignness into the
open-ended act of interpretation.
Naipaul's fantasies of home.  The Enigma of Arrival   as reflexive nostalgia
In “Autobiography and Geography”, Fréderic Regard asks himself the question: “does the act
of  writing  oneself  place  the  self-writing  author  at  the  heart  of  his  works,  as  the  passive
product of these devices, or does it rather cause him to conceive of himself as a ‘heterotopia’
(cf. Foucault 2006), i.e. an agency constructing rival spaces in breaking with the dominant
geographical  order?”  (2002:  3).  Naipaul's  The  Enigma  of  Arrival  seems  to  entail  both
possibilities. The self-writing subject constitutes himself as place and as subjectified by the
structure of ideology, he imbibes the language of the place, he learns to speak the language
and the culture of the place.  At the same time, he is  also able  to occupy more than one
position at the same time. He can enter the language-game of interpretation from multiple
positions. His counter-interpellation of the structures that have made him into a mimic subject
happens in the moment in which he configures himself as master of language, and threfore
able to traverse the porosity of the process of subjectification in which his colonial education
had put him. 
It is through this multiple positioning of the ʻIʼ-function that the narrator constitutes
his own home in writing. The enigma of arrival on which he elaborated with his interpretation
of  the  de  Chirico  painting  becomes  the  site  of  the  narrator's  homecoming,  as  the  last
paragraph in the novel seems to suggest:
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Our sacred world – the sanctities that had been handed down to us as children by our families, the
sacred places of our childhood, sacred because we had seen them as children and had filled them with
wonder,  places doubly and trebly sacred to me because far away in England I had lived in them
imaginatively over many books and had in my fantasy set in those places the very beginning of things,
had constructed out of them a fantasy of home, though I was to learn that the ground was bloody, that
there had been aboriginal people there once, who had been killed or made to die away – our sacred
world had vanished. Every generation now was to take us further away from those sanctities. But we
remade the world for ourselves; every generation does that, as we found when we came together for
the death of this sister and felt the need to honor and remember. It forced us to look on death. It forced
me to face the death I had been contemplating at  night,  in my sleep; it  fitted a real  grief where
melancholy had created a vacancy, as if to prepare me for the moment. It showed me life and man as
the mystery, the true religion of men, the grief and the glory. And that was when, faced with a real
death, and with this new wonder about men, I laid aside my drafts and hesitations and began to write
very fast about Jack and his garden. (EA: 354)
Robert  Hamner  (2006)  described  this  passage  as  a  circular  one,  a  passage  in  which  the
conclusion of the book sends us back to the very beginning of the novel, thus inviting the
reader  to  another  process  of  revision  and reflection  on  difference.  The  passage  certainly
produces a semantic shift, transforming the issue of  arrival, which had been the dominant
theme in the novel, into the issue of  return. The narrator, who has come back to his native
Trinidad to assist  and participate in the funeral of his  sister,  re-projects  his  story and his
reflections on strangeness, home and alienation, against the backdrop of his own familiar and
geographical background. This background emerges as a world created through the fantasies
and the emotional investments of someone who has lived far away from it for many years, and
who is afraid by the idea that this very world may soon fade and disappear,  just like the
English  countryside  where  the  narrator  had  perceived  himself  as  a  disturbing,  disrupting
presence.
As mentioned before, in The Writing of History Michel de Certeau defined history as
“a labor of death and a labor against death” (1988: 5), a sentence which seems to be taken up
as a challenge in Naipaul's autobiographical novel, as the passage above seems to suggest. In
order  not  to  forget,  History  erects  monuments  and  dwells  in  the  celebration  of  these
monuments, compensating for the mourning of the past with artefacts which are also a sign of
loss. This novel strives precisely to save history both from oblivion and from the temptation
of filling the void of loss by creating fetishes.  For example Jack, who in the text is first
presented as a monument of a past that can no longer be, is re-signified as a site of projection
and  multiple  identification  in  which  the  narrator  may  himself  intervene  and  counter-
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interpellate the structures of signification through which he had first seen him. Homecoming
does not signify a recovery of identity. The journey in the space of the imagination does not
end with an accomplished assignation of residence, but rather starts again by unsettling the
very possibility of residence that language and culture has provided the narrator with.
In  the  above  quoted  passage,  The Enigma of  Arrival is  revealed  as  a  book about
nostalgia, but a nostalgia of a very peculiar kind. The word nostalgia is a composite of two
Greek roots:  nostos,  meaning precisely “return”,  and  algos,  “pain”.  The kind of nostalgia
described here is a nostalgia dwelling much more on the pain than on the real return, i.e. on
the processes through which the identity of a person is constituted rather than on the real
possibility of coinciding with the image of plenitude which the idealized past of nostalgia
represents. It is a form of nostalgia which the Russian artist and scholar Svetlana Boym would
call “reflective nostalgia”, a nostalgia concerned with “historical and individual time, with the
irrevocability of the past and human finitude” (2001: 49). It is, in other words, a nostalgia that
deliberately postpones homecoming to an indefinite moment, thus dwelling in the the process
of longing in ways that prove, nonetheless, that “longing and critical thinking are not opposed
to one another, as affective memories do not absolve one from compassion, judgement or
critical reflection” (49-50). 
Naipaul's dwelling in this kind of nostalgia is a result of his critical engagement with
the memories of a past that he has to construct out of some cherished fragments of memory.
This  past,  in fact,  can come alive only through an effort  which does not only save these
fragments from oblivion, but also allows the narrator to access his own hybrid subjectivity
through the multiple processes of interpellation that this provisional construction envisages.
Writing is the instrument the narrator has to insert himself in the flux of history, transforming
both himself and his worlds by translating them onto the written page, and involving an effort
of memory which may save them from the annihilation that time inevitably brings. 
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Chapter 4
Middle passages. The mediations of language and the impossible homecoming of
a hybrid subject  in David Dabydeen's  post-modern slave narrative  A Harlot's
Progress
[T]he real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all
representations,  because they  are representations,  are embedded first  in the language and then in the
culture, institutions, and political ambiance of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one
(and I believe it is), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated,
embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the "truth," which is itself a representation
(Said 1978: 272)
The  paradox  highlighted  by Edward Said  in  his  seminal  work  Orientalism (1978)  is  the
starting  point  of  a  highly  provocative  trans-medial,  trans-cultural,  and,  in  many regards,
transgressive  rewriting  of  William  Hogarth's  series  of  paintings  (1731,  now  lost)  and
engravings (1732) A Harlot's Progress. The novel of the Guyanese-born writer, critic and poet
David Dabydeen, likewise titled A Harlot's Progress (1999; HP), deals precisely with how the
inevitable  mediations  of  representation  invalidate  the  possibility  of  accessing  an  absolute
truth.  The  “culture,  institutions,  and  political  ambiance  of  the  representer”  which  Said
mentions in the extract quoted above act always as a hidden, ideological – sensu Althusser (cf.
Althusser 1971) – filter through which reality is accessed and comes into being.
The work of ideology is exposed in the novel from the trans-cultural perspective of a
hybrid subject, himself an orientalized other, making his appearance as a secondary character
– the black page dressed in a Moorish costume attending to the “Harlot” of Hogarth's series –
in  the  second of  the  six  plates  composing the  series.  The  truth  in  question  in  the  novel
concerns the possibility of the return home of Mungo, an African man deported to England at
a young age, colonized by the language of his slavers and forced to spend over thirty years of
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his life among foreign people. If a return to the land in which he was born cannot take place in
reality – as Mungo sets out to tell his story, he is too old and weak to embark on a real journey
to his  native homeland,  and his  tribe has  been exterminated in  the raid in  which he was
captured – the site of his spiritual homecoming should be, at least, the possibility of narrating
his story, of setting down in black and white the memory of a land which would otherwise
disappear forever. Mungo's homecoming, in this way, should take a two-fold path: first toward
the lost land of his childhood, which he will reconstruct in his narration, and secondly towards
English,  the  language in  which  his  narration  will  take  shape.  The latter,  which  is  a  pre-
condition of the former, assumes in the narration an ever more prominent role inasmuch as
Mungo unveils the inadequacy of English as an instrument to enable him to come home.
Language, the role it plays in the multiple mediations of representation as well as in
the process of shaping a hybrid subjectivity thus becomes the central theme around which
Dabydeen's critique of representation revolves. Mungo engages with a highly self-reflexive
first-person  narrative  focused  on  his  relationship  to  the  language  of  his  oppressors.  His
attempt to tell the story of his life in English thus results in a critique of language as a means
of reaching a truth of any sort,  as well as in a highly provocative,  “revisionist” (Sommer
2001:  147)  historical  account  of  the  slave  trade  as  well  as  of  eighteenth-century English
society. 
Dabydeen's  A Harlot's Progress begins with a scene pregnant with the potentialities
for  a  fruitful  cooperation.  Mr  Pringle,  a  devout  Christian  and an  enlightened eighteenth-
century abolitionist, is ready to interview and ghost-write the autobiography of Mungo who,
thirty years after the events depicted by Hogarth, has become the oldest black inhabitant of
London. The writing of Mungo's story would presumably bring great advantages to both men.
Mungo, because of the unsought fame which Hogarth's engraving brought him, appears to his
prospective ghost-writer Mr Pringle as the perfect subject for one of those slave narratives
which in the last decades of the eighteenth century were beginning to carve themselves an
ever larger niche in the English literary marketplace.23 Years earlier the portrait and fame of
the black man, together with the many prurient series it spawned on the erotic adventures of 
23
Among some of the most well-known are also  The Interesting Narrative and the life of 'Olaudah Equiano'
or Gustavus Vassa, the African, by Olaudah Equiano (1789) and The History of Mary Prince, a West-Indian
Slave (1831), to which Dabydeen's novel also refers.
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Fig. 1. Hogarth, William. A Harlot's Progress, Plate 2. 1732. Etching and engraving. British Museum, London.
Mary Hackabout,  who has  become the  mistress  of  a  Jewish  merchant,  distracts  her  protector  to  allow her
younger lover to escape. On her left, Mungo watches the scene holding a teapot.
Mary/Moll  Hackabout  and her  black  page,24 had  been  circulated  among vast  numbers  of
people across all many strata of English eighteenth-century society in thousands of legal or
pirated copies. In his previous life, Mungo had also met some of the most gossiped about
characters of his age, living on Captain Thistlewood's25 ship and later serving in the house of
the aristocratic Lord and Lady Montague, as well as in the house of the questionable Jewish
merchant Mr Gideon. If published, is story would cause a huge sensation, exciting the morbid
curiosity of his contemporaries and at the same time opening their eyes to the evil of the slave
trade with its sincere testimony of suffering. Mungo, for his part, would get an extraordinary
occasion to speak which would catapult him from the marginality to which Hogarth's portrait
had relegated him – after  all  he was just  a  secondary character  in  the bottom right-hand
24 Cf. Sommer 2001.
25 The  figure  of  Captain  Thomas  Thistlewood  is  an  imaginary  character.  Towards  the  end  of  the  novel,
Dabydeen anachronistically conflates the story of Thistlewood with that  of the captain of the slave-ship
Zong,  Luke  Collingwood.  The  novel  relates  how  Captain  Thistlewood's  story  was  on  everybody's  lips
because of a legal scandal, nowadays referred to as “The  Zong Massacre”, which at the time got a lot of
publicity in the newspapers. As the overloaded slave-ship Zong set sail to Jamaica, an epidemic broke out
among the slaves and the captain made the decision to throw 133 slaves over board with  the excuse that this
would prevent the contagion spreading among other voyagers. The ship’s owners filed their insurance claim
but the insurers refused to pay, and set in motion a  trial for fraud. This episode, which happened in 1781, is
mentioned in the novel by Lord Montague, at whose house Mungo claims to have been employed before
meeting Moll. As Hogarth's series was painted in 1731, there is a discrepancy of about fifty years between
Mungo's narration and the real Zong Massacre. 
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margin of the second of the six plates that make up A Harlot's Progress – to the role of the
protagonist of his own story. Mungo would thus manage to project onto the written page a sort
of spiritual reunion with his past and with his lost innocence. Besides, with the profit gained
from the book and with the subsidy granted by the Abolition society he would certainly find
relief from the poverty and privation of his present life.  
Nonetheless, in spite of all the mutual interests which binds the two characters, the
scene of their encounter does not show any sign of co-operation. The first lines opening the
novel tell the reader that Mr Pringle and Mungo have met three times already, but Mr. Pringle
has not yet been able to make a start in the drafting of the novel because Mungo, for some
unknown reason, refuses to utter a word:
22nd April 17– . Mr Pringle sits at the table in Mungo’s garret, a table which Mungo uses as a desk, a
place to eat and a place to lay out his Bible. He shuffles his blank papers into a neat pile. He jabs the
nib of his pen into the inkwell and stirs nervously, awaiting word. This is the third visit, but at least he
has made a start, if only to record the date of the meeting. (HP: 1)
Pringle, who is getting more and more nervous because of the old man's unexpected refusal,
starts procrastinating in a neurotic way, ordering his pile of paper, dipping his pen in the ink,
writing the date of the encounter, as if to assert his frustrated desire to act, while instead he
can only sit there, impotent, “awaiting word” (HP: 1). In this passage, narrated by a third
person omniscient narrator but focalized by Mr Pringle, Mungo is mentioned only in a brief
reference to the place he lives in, his garret, and to the table on which he would habitually
perform his vital and spiritual functions, respectively eating and laying out his Bible. Lying in
his bed and keeping silent, the old black man is nothing but an absence. His soul could not be
further away from the persevering abolitionist who holds the paper and the ink in his hands
and who is impatient to write. Doubt about whether the writing of Mungo’s autobiography
will really bring him home already begins to take shape in Mr Pringle’s mind, as well as in
that of the reader. 
Mr Pringle paid Mungo in advance for the account of his life as a slave, and Mungo
has accepted the payment: a pact in which words should be exchanged with money has been
established between them, or so at least the zealous abolitionist seems to think. Indeed, Mr
Pringle is convinced that he has acted well and in good faith, and that the exchange he has
proposed to the black man is an honest one. He has established an equation between money
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and words, apparently neutral means in an exchange based on transparency and sincerity. That
is why he expects that the truth, or rather the “word” which he sits “awaiting” (HP: 1) should
come out of the mouth of his investment (“‘Something must be said,’ Mr Pringle urges, ‘there
must be a story’”,  HP: 1). That is also why the free indirect representation of his thought
(“True, a man, even a nigger, has got to be respectful to other people's charity, though he
would prefer to hoard the past and squirrel on it through miserable season”, HP: 2) shows that
he is getting more and more maddened by Mungo's attitude. The only reasonable explanation
that he can give to the black man's silence is that the trauma of slavery, the many years of
misery in a foreign land, as well as the illness that is plaguing his old age may have turned
him into a “ruined archive” (HP: 3), and made him dysfunctional. 
In spite of the fact that the title of the novel contains the word “progress” there is
actually no real progress in the relationship between Mungo and Mr Pringle. As the novel
draws to a close, no sensible exchange may be said to have taken place between the two men.
Even though Mungo claims that Mr Pringle's request for a beginning breaks over him “with
such unexpected passion” that he had to “yield to him immediately” (HP: 8), it is clear that
the narration that Mungo delivers in the following nine chapters is not destined to be collected
by Mr Pringle. His implied reader/ listener is certainly not the eighteenth-century audience of
which  Pringle  would  also  be  part,  and  therefore  Mungo  imagines  himself  to  be  talking
sometimes to the ghosts of his African tribe who torment him with memories and a sense of
guilt for having survived their massacre, sometimes just  for them. In the last pages of the
novel, Mr Pringle is still waiting and nervously making marks on the same paper on which he
had  registered  the  date  of  his  meeting  with  Mungo (“He draws  and re-draws  the  moon,
shading in its crown so that it resembles a skull-capped Jew or Papist. He draws ruptured
circles and broken triangles. Collapsed shapes, twisted and ruptured shapes”, HP: 276). Not a
single word has been put down in black on white, and no single step has been made by either
man toward the other. 
Since Pringle's “awaiting word” (HP:  1) encompasses the whole of the novel,  this
“word” which the Englishman is so impatient to get and Mungo so unwilling to give him may
be regarded as the object of the whole book. In fact, the narrative frame contained in the
epilogue serves  to  outline  the  conflict  between  two different  ways  of  relating  oneself  to
“word” and therefore to language, incarnated by two characters who occupy two different
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position vis-a-vis power and representation. One of them can claim to be a man of his time,
whose identity might  be described as  embedded in a  series  of  discourses  on Christianity,
rationality, and nationalism. The other is a hybrid subject who has become hybrid by his being
simultaneously  interpellated  and  marginalised,  or  even  excluded,  by  the  structures  of
subjectivation at work in his age. For Mungo, in fact, neither “word” nor “money” are or may
ever be neutral in any way, as they are already embedded in a system of power in which he is
imprisoned in a marginal role. 
The  first  paragraph  of  the  novel  prefigures  a  scene  of  interlocution  in  which  the
Habermasian  idea  of  inter-subjective  understanding (Habermas  1981),  criticised  by Jean-
Jacques  Lecercle  in  A Marxist  Philosophy  of  Language, gives  way to  a  real  agon upon
language. The novel illustrates and performs a conception of language as activity, in which at
least two interlocutors are necessary to produce an utterance. Although Mungo refuses to talk
directly to Mr Pringle,  Mr Pringle is revealed as his counterpart because, as a matter of fact,
without  him,  he would never  have the means to  tell,  or  the  reason for  telling,  his  story.
Nonetheless,  the  idea  of  agreement,  on  which  Habermas  founds  his  pragmatics  of
communication,  is  firmly denied  by the  very conditions  in  which  the  (missed)  encounter
between Mungo and Mr Pringle takes place. 
Mungo's narration, in fact, does not honour the four universal claims to validity that
Habermas describes as the pre-conditions for an act of communication: intelligibility, truth,
sincerity  and accuracy.  Habermas  claims  that  when  these  claims  are  not  honoured,  and
consensus is not reached, we leave the domain of “communicative action” to enter what he
calls “strategic action” (Habermas 1981). The strategic quality of Mungo's utterance emerges,
nonetheless,  not as  an individual's  precise choice to  achieve his  goals  at  the expenses of
someone else, but rather as a precondition dictated by the way the interlocution scene has
already been informed by power. 
The intelligibility of Mungo's story is subjected to a paradox. Mungo knows that if he
wants to be believed he will have to pretend, and speak in broken, childish, obscure English,
as  is  expected  from a  semi-civilized  black  slave  with  little  education.  “[Pringle]  cannot
believe me capable of speech as polished as my teeth once were. No, nigger does munch and
crunch the English, nigger does jape and jackass with the language, for he is low brow and
ape resemblances”, claims Mungo, interpreting what is going in his benefactor's mind (HP:
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5).
Neither can Mungo’s narration completely fulfil the  truth claim, not even as a goal.
Pringle already shaped the truth of Mungo's story in his mind, and should the words that he
may hear from Mungo disrupt his perfect vision, he would either not be able to understand
them, or turn a deaf ear to them. For this reason, as Mungo wants to tell him something about
Lady Montague, he has to censor himself: “Mr Pringle is a true gentleman, not the nigger
that I am who makes baseness wherever I go, turning gold to dirt by heathen alchemy. To him,
a Lady is  not  ever improper,  and if  she is,  it  can never be in print” (HP:  226; italics in
original).  The  “truth”  of  Mungo's  story,  to  which  Mungo  himself  has  access  only  in  a
fragmentary and incongruous way, multiplies and escapes from him as he has not real control
on the medium of his narration. The story of the characters he talks about follow divergent
paths,  different  versions  of  the  accounts  of  his  life  in  Africa  overlap  and  contradict
themselves, his personal story becomes merges with the history of England, in the same way
that Saleem Sinai's story in Salman Rushdie's Midnight's Children becomes confused with the
story of India. 
Finally,  the  sincerity  and accuracy  claim are  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  no
framework of consensus may be created among the two men. Their access to language and
representation are always-already pre-conditioned by their respective positions of marginality
and centrality in the discourses of their  time. Accuracy is not possible because the set  of
norms to which the two interlocutors should collectively subscribe is the very object of the
contention between them. While Pringle wants to conform to the models and the standards of
representation that characterise his age – including William Hogarth's series of engravings –
Mungo is convinced that those models are not able to tell the truth about him (“Mr Pringle too
will replicate Moll and me in lies, for he believes Mr Hogarth's prints and the dozen pirated
versions of them”;  HP: 275). Mungo is aware that both Hogarth's series and the biography
that Mr Pringle is willing to write are embedded in the same cultural system which has turned
him into a slave.
The  impossibility  of  reaching  a  consensus  between  the  two  speakers  appears
determined by the fact that, although it may be true that they have a  lifeword background
which should be the basis of their discussion, their access to this  lifeword is always-already
pre-determined by the condition of their access to language. Mungo is aware that English, a
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system which  he entered as  an outsider,26 is,  like  any other  foreign language,  a  “cultural
shock” (Lecercle 2006: 51). As will emerge from his account of his life and of his coming into
being as an hybrid subject through language, for Mungo language is not compatible with any
form of rational agreement. It is rather only through struggle that he may be able to assert
himself. 
The very title  of  David  Dabydeen's  novel  may be  read  as  a  representation  of  the
struggle for meaning that the novel enacts.  A Harlot's Progress quotes and re-sites the title
chosen by William Hogarth for a series which the English painter himself defined as the first
of his “modern moral subjects” (Paulson 2003: 27). Both the word “Harlot” and the word
“Progress” are open to a series of conflicting identifications and interpretations according to
who utters them. The following analysis will be structured as a reflection on how the title
comes to signify at least three different things, from the perspective of Mr. Pringle, that of
Mungo, and that of a twenty-first century reader, for whom the word “progress” has become
one of the key terms of modernity,  with quite different connotations from those it  had in
Hogarth's time. In the first part of the chapter the main issue will be the way in which Mr
Pringle tries to replace the figure of the Harlot with that of Mungo in a composition that
partially follows the same pattern as Hogarth's series. The second part will deal with Mungo's
own appropriation of the role of the Harlot. His own description of his progress in what he
calls “The New World of Whiteman” (HP: 36) will be expedient for a deconstruction of the
system of representation by which Pringle may try to frame his story as a progress. Finally, in
the last section, the main issue will be the representation of progress and modernity – in the
customary sense for contemporary reader  – emerging from Mungo's work of deconstruction. 
“A Harlot's progress”: Mr Pringle's perspective 
Very little information is provided about the character of Mr Pringle in the novel. Even though
Mr Pringle  demands  to  know all  about  Mungo,  Mungo,  despite  his  ardent  desire,  is  not
allowed to ask a single question of the man who is sitting in front of him: 
26 The African language that he spoke in his childhood is not taken into consideration in the novel, as Mungo,
who is above all a hybrid subject, has forgotten it. The object of his analysis is therefore Mungo's access to
English.
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Sometimes I want to appreciate more of him, but it is not my place to ask questions of his intimate life. 
Young in face, his eyes steady, his hand steady, a mask of composure, his heart and mind confirmed in 
Christ, and yet what is it that has so afflicted him that he comes to me for relief? Why his obsession 
with ruin? What dreadful thing has happened to his mother that makes him seek of me the story of my 
mother? What conflagration has engulfed his family that he insists on knowing my Ellar, my Kaka and 
others of my tribe? I sense that he carries an epic pain with him, but I am a black man, it is not my 
place to enquire, much less be ambitious of writing an Englishman's history (HP: 276). 
There is an insurmountable asymmetry between the two men, an asymmetry to which Mr
Pringle does not seem to pay attention, but which in fact prevents Mungo from really getting
in touch with his interlocutor. Just as money can flow only from Mr Pringle to Mungo, words
are not allowed to flow other than from Mungo to the abolitionist. Mungo, and therefore his
implied  readers/  listeners,  are  forever  excluded  from  the  possibility  of  enquiring  or  of
knowing the other as a peer. 
If Mungo cannot access Mr Pringle's individual story, he can, nonetheless, access the
chain of enunciations in which the abolitionist's enterprise is embedded. Pringle's utterances,
as revealed in the few representations of his thought, are imbued with both Christian and
Enlightenment  discourses.  These  discourses  connect  with  the  political,  the  religious,  the
economic, the social, the financial. Unknown to him, Mr Pringle is a cog in the machine of
modernity, a machine that Maria Cristina Fumagalli compares to Medusa, a Gorgon who, “in
order to legitimize itself, [..] petrifies those who stand before it, freezing them into a state of
[...]  perpetual backwardness, primitivism, or non modernity” (2009: 1). This is indeed the
role Mr Pringle plays with regard to Mungo. In order to legitimize his own views and to
sustain the machine of modernity and progress, Mr Pringle tries to transform Mungo into a
primitive, backward other, an other whose threatening potential must be annulled by making
him intelligible. 
For Pringle, making sense of the other implies the possibility of including Mungo in
his predetermined logical scheme. Mungo's story is framed within a structure that is already
culturally determined, encompassing a beginning, a middle and an end. Before the two men
start talking, as a matter of fact, Pringle has already outlined the story of Mungo's progress
around a series of sense-making turning points: 
Mr Pringle begins to write Mungo’s murmurings into an epic, the frame of which he has already
constructed in his mind. All he awaits are the droolings of a decrepit nigger. He has invested in an
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expensive leather-bound notebook in which to record Mungo’s story. It creates an image of dignity
and professionalism which his previous loose-leafs of paper lacked. Although Mungo has uttered only
cryptically so far and threatens to expire in body and speech at any moment, Mr Pringle does not
regret his investment. He is, at heart, a Christian, and believes in the inexhaustible generosity of the
Almighty Divine, that He will deliver up Mungo’s true  character  and  adventures,  howsoever  in  the
telling blemished by frailty of mind and heathen grammar. Mr Pringle, as the humble instrument of the
Divine, will purge the story of its imperfections, to reveal Mungo in his unfallen state. He will wash
the Aethiop white, scrubbing off the colours of sin and greed that stained Mungo’s skin as a result of
slavery.
He orders his notebook with a series of chapter headings:
1 Africa.
2 Voyage to the Americas in Slave Ship.
3 Plantation Labour.
4 Voyage to England with Captain Thistlewood.
5 Service in the Household of Lord Montague.
6 Purchase of Mungo by Mr Gideon, a Jew. 
7 Debauched by Service to Moll Hackabout, a Common Prostitute.
8 Descent into the Mire of Poverty and Disease.
9 Redemption of Mungo by the Committee for the Abolition of Slavery.
He crossed them out and begins again.
1 The Beloved Homeland of My Birth: Africa
2 Paradise Lost: The Terrors of my Expulsion to the Americas in the Bowels of a Slaveship.
3 The Pitiless Sun: My Plantation Travails.
4 etc., etc. (HP: 6-7)
To Mr Pringle the structure of Mungo's story, and therefore the possibility of packaging it in a
way that would be acceptable and appealing to its potential reader is even more important
than Mungo himself. The ill man is addressed in Pringle's thought as a “decrepit nigger” and
his  utterances,  which differ  significantly from the structure already outlined in  the young
abolitionist's mind, are dismissed as “droolings” (HP: 6).
Although Mr Pringle's unwritten book would certainly report on its cover that Mungo
is the narrator of his own story, the above quoted list reveals that the story, and the way it
leads to Mungo's salvation, is much more important than Mungo  per se. Mungo is only a
character who has been put at the centre of the composition for the benefit of a reader whose
interest may be aroused by the morbid plot or whose pity may be induced by the touching
conversion  which  the  story  certainly  displays.  Mungo  will  be  the  object  of  the  reader's
curiosity  in  the  same  way  Mary/Moll  Hackabout  figures  at  the  centre  of  Hogarth's
composition to please and gratify a spectator who may take pity on her, or be captivated by
103
her beauty, or just intrigued by her story.
Mungo's story, as conceived by Mr Pringle, also joins the story of Hogarth's Harlot
Mary/Moll Hackabout in a more significant way than that suggested by the casual encounter
outlined in point 7 of the list he drafts or in his complicity in her betrayal of the wealthy
Jewish lover depicted on plate 2 of Hogarth's series.  The stories of both characters, in fact,
reiterate the very same structure. They both begin in a state of innocence. Just like Mungo in
Pringle's scheme figures in his uncorrupted state in “the beloved homeland of [his] birth”
(HP: 7), in plate 1 of Hogarth's series Moll/Mary is represented as a young woman from the
countryside adorned with the symbols of purity and good will (a rose in her bosom, a light
dress to highlight her purity, scissors and a pincushion hanging on her arm). Their fall should
be  imputed  to  the  unfortunate  encounters  they  have  during  their  life,  as  well  as  to  the
corruption of their society. Guilty for Mungo's fall are the Jewish merchant Mr Gideon and
the  “common  prostitute”  Moll  Hackabout.  Instead,  those  held  to  be  blameworthy  for
Moll/Mary's fall are the procuress Elizabeth Needham, who intercepts the young woman upon
her arrival in London and sacrifices her to the lust  of the notorious rake Colonel Francis
Charteris27 while a clergyman turns his back on the scene of corruption (plate 1). A whole lot
of  suffering  follows  these  ill-fated  encounters,  paving the  way for  a  possible  atonement.
Mungo should descend “into the mire of poverty and disease” (HP: 6) while Moll faces a life
of prostitution (plate 3), prison (plate 4), and syphilis (plate 5). Finally, while Moll's story
concludes with her death at the age of 23, Mungo's life is saved thanks to his redemption
through being patronized by his benefactors from the Abolition society.
These thematic parallels show that the two narrations are linked insofar as they are
produced by the same culturally pre-determined model, that of Christian progress, i.e. a model
deeply rooted  in the concept of redemption. Hogarth's A Harlot's Progress is read in terms of
a sacred parody by the American art historian Roland Paulson, who suggests that Hogarth's
use  of  literary references  (John Bunyan's  The Pilgrim's  Progress)  and artistic  models  (in
particular Dürer's woodcuts and engravings from The Life of the Virgin and Life of Christ)28
27 Although Hogarth's Harlot is a fictional character, other characters were modeled after real-life personalities
of Hogarth's age whose features were easily recognizable for the contemporary spectators as they had been
the protagonists of notorious scandals.
28 The first plate, representing Mary/ Moll Hackabout's arrival to London and her encounter with a bawd who
picks her up for the pleasure of a rake, is reread as a parody of the Visitation. The figures of the Harlot and
the bawd, shows Paulson, are clearly modeled after Dürer's representation of the encounter of an hesitant
Virgin Mary seeking reassurance for her exceptional pregnancy from her cousin Elizabeth, whose husband
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allows for a double reading of the work. With the words “sacred parody”, Paulson refers to
the carnivalesque medieval practice (cf. Bachtin 1979) of inventing parodic equivalents of
prayers, liturgies, or hymns. A constitutive characteristic of parodies is that they are always
double-voiced. Sacred  parodies not only mock forms of devotion, but also actually perform
different forms of devotion whose existence is deeply rooted in a vernacular experience. By
the same token, the story of the Harlot is, in Paulson's view, not just a parody of redemption,
but also a form of parody as redemption. The story of the fall of Moll/Mary is also the story of
an innocent lamb punished for the sins of somebody else but whose death may contribute in a
positive way to the catharsis and salvation of her spectators.
The word “redemption” (from Latin  redimere,  a composite of the prefix  re- and the
verb  emere,  “to  buy”  and therefore  “to  buy again”,’‘to  recover,’ see  Paulson 2003:  2)  is
utilised in Christian theology to define mankind’s deliverance from sin through Jesus Christ’s
incarnation,  passion,  death  and  resurrection.  The  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries
witnessed the flourishing of new, rationalist approaches to theology by which belief, i.e. the
possibility of explaining religion through logic, was beginning to be privileged over  faith,
which is rather based on unconditioned trust in God. In this context, Jesus's teachings were
read for their ethical content (“thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself”) rather than for their
promises of salvation. Nonetheless, as Roland Paulson puts it, [t]he Redemption, whether in
beliefs or parody or blasphemy, represented to eighteenth-century Englishmen a story or set of
images and symbols that enabled them to cope with fears and anxieties concerning death and
what might follow – salvation or damnation or nothing” (Paulson 2003: xvi). 
Redemption served as  a  “set  of  images” in  the work of a  deist  like Hogarth,  too.
Paulson argues that the Enlightenment utilized the doctrine of salvation in order to recover its
moral teaching. In fact, the doctrine of salvation was appropriated in even more subtle ways,
becoming part of a system for the formation and production of subjects, a scheme that was
also later transformed into a practice of analysing, structuring and writing history. 
From this perspective,  the use of the word “progress” in both Hogarth's  work and
stands in the doorway in the same position of the rake depicted in the plate.  The rose that Mary wears on her
bosom is also a Marian symbol. Plate 3 is reread as a parody of an Annunciation, whereas the figure of
Magistrate Johnson coming to the boudoir of Mary to arrest her for prostitution is compared to the Archangel
Gabriel announcing the imminent divine birth. Plate 4, in which Mary serves her time in Brideswell and is
harassed by the jailer and his wife is compared to the Flagellation, while in plate 5 the pose of the dying
Mary Hackabout is a reference to the pose of Mary mourning at the foot of the cross. Finally, the sixth plate,
representing Mary's wake, reminds one of Dürer's engraved copy of Leonardo's last supper.
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Dabydeen's  novel  is  extremely  significant,  since  it  conflates  both  religious  and  secular
meanings, the latter of which was not yet fully articulated in Hogarth's time. The first usage of
the  word  “progress”,  which  first  entered  the  English  language  in  the  late  Middle  Ages,
conveys the idea of a spatial rather than a temporal movement. Derived from the Latin verb
progredior (“to walk forward”, “to move on”), in the late Middle Ages the term designated a
state journey or an official tour, especially by royalty. John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress
(1678), the spiritual autobiography of a man seeking his own redemption, sanctions a new
metaphorical use of the term, and it is this sense of the term that is the object of Hogarth’s
parody in  A Harlot’s  Progress.  The  journey forward  became a  journey of  moral  growth,
personal  advancement  and redemption.  Paradoxically,  although  its  trajectory may seem a
straight line, it actually leads, in the end, to the uncorrupted state where it should have begun
– that of a human being purified from both his or her sins, including original sin, and perfectly
reconciled with God.
“Progress” in a Christian sense unfolds in time rather than in space, a semantic shift
that  Reinhart Koselleck (2006: 173 ff.) highlights as fundamental for the transformation of
“progress” into a modern category, for which  the contents of experience and the horizon of
expectations did not exist before the eighteenth century. “Progress” replaced the concept of
“decadence” (from a golden age)  by which pre-modern man defined his relation to time,
stressing the idea that mankind is always moving forward and that traditional experiences are
outstripped by new ones at an amazing speed. Koselleck also defines “progress” as a trans-
personal agency bringing together many experiences (historical, social, technological, etc.) in
a single, unified expression. In Koselleck’s view, progress is therefore one of the “collective
singulars” (2006: 173) which, in the late eighteenth century, multiplied rapidly to subsume
ever more complex experiences at an ever higher level of abstraction.
Pringle is  convinced that  redeeming Mungo – or rather,  buying him back with an
exchange of money against words – will contribute to the salvation of his own country. Like
the Harlot in Hogarth's painting who becomes a sacrificial lamb to deliver her spectators from
sin, the narration of Mungo's sufferings will have to “prick the nation's conscience” (HP: 144)
and  “hold  up  a  mirror  to  the  sins”  (HP:  70)  of  the  English  people.  Mungo's  personal
redemption from the life of sin to which Hogarth's series alludes will be instrumental to the
redemption of all his contemporaries. In fact, Pringle would not even care for Mungo, if it
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weren't for the fact that he expects that he will play some sort of role in the attainment of a
greater good. The attitude of Mr Pringle prefigures the passage of the word “progress” from
its  old  religious/spatial/individual  meaning  to  its  modern  secular/temporal/collective
acceptation.  The purpose of the novel  he is  willing to ghost-write is  the increase of “the
Christian Charity of an enlightened citizenry” (HP: 5). To reach this target he couples the
language  of  the  doctrine  of  salvation  with  the  language  of  profit,  development,  and
nationalism. Mungo’s progress, in other words, will contribute not just to the moral collective
advance – political  and economical – of Pringle’s nation.  Mungo is  to “become a crucial
instrument to rescue England from his enemies” (HP: 144), which are the nations who are
benefiting from England's trade in human beings. Mr Pringle's philanthropy is revealed as the
“philanthropy plus five percent” which C.R.L. James referred to as an insufficient means for
the real emancipation of the slaves in Caribbean plantations (1982: 139).29 The idea that all
men are equal, and that society as a whole might improve with the acknowledgement of such
equality, is in fact quite remote from Pringle’s point of view.
The question of how Mungo's innocence may be bought back inevitably involves the
monetary agreement that he has established with the Abolition society. Mungo will rejoin the
“Beloved Homeland of [his] Birth” (HP: 7), or at least the state of innocence that preceded his
fall  by  selling  his  word.  If  the  word  that  Mr  Pringle  is  expecting  from  Mungo  is  the
foundation-stone  on  which  this  still  embryonic  machine  of   progress  must  be  built,  it  is
necessary to understand what kind of philosophy of language forms the basis of Pringle's
request and constitutes the reason for his failure.
The word that Mr Pringle wants from Mungo must be a suitable means for an honest
exchange. First of all, it is a word which could be easily transformed into a different word
without becoming something different. Mungo's scanty vocabulary needs to be improved and
the syntax corrected, but this sort of intervention is not perceived as a substantial mediation.
Mr Pringle is convinced that he – and not Mungo himself – “will deliver up Mungo's true
character and adventure, howsoever in the telling blemished by frailty of mind and heathen
grammar”(HP:  6).  Mungo's  English is  not  adequate  to  express  his  story because  Pringle
considers  English  a  standard  language,  any deviation  from which  would  be  dubious and
incorrect.  In  this  sense  Pringle's  attitude  reflects  what  Lecercle  calls  the  principle  of
29 James referred to Cecil Rhodes famous claim “philanthropy is very well in his way, but philanthropy plus
five per cent is better” (ibid.).
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immanence, i.e. t the idea that the external phenomena which determines an utterance are just
secondary and separable from the only standard form of the language. Secondly, the word that
Pringle  wants  is  a  functional word.  It  is  a  word which  may be  put  at  the  service  of  an
informational narration, a narration which will tell about the important facts in Mungo's life
(what Jacobson would call the referential function), which would move its readers to charity
(the emotive function), and will convince them of the evil of slavery (the conative function).30
Thirdly, the word Mr Pringle expects is a transparent word. Lecercle defines transparency as
the capacity of language to make itself invisible. A reflection on how Mungo learnt English or
on the  way he  mediates  his  thought  within  a  language which  he  has  learnt  as  a  foreign
language is  not  interesting  for  Mr  Pringle's  purposes.  By the  same token,  to  Pringle  the
linguistic  changes  that  Mungo  has  undergone  in  his  life  are  completely  uninteresting
(synchronicity), since what he wants is the point of view of a redeemed Mungo, which in fact
would be the point of view and the language spoken by Mr Pringle himself. Finally, Mungo's
word must be systematic. By systematicity, Lecercle means the idea  that language  is a set of
rules. The fact that Mungo's word will have to be rephrased with a better grammar is not just a
formal  issue.  Mungo's  word  will  have  to  reflect  the  order  of  the  world  which  this  very
grammar has established. 
Only  if  the  word  that  Pringle  gets  from  Mungo  satisfies  all  these  principles
(immanence, functionality, transparency, systematicity, synchronicity) which Lecercle ascribes
to a dominant philosophy of language (2006: 64), will this word redeem Mungo. It will, to put
it differently, make Mungo's story reversible, so that he may get back to the lost innocence of
his childhood, and be delivered from the sins that he has committed in his debauched life. In
this way Mungo will serve as a commodity – and therefore usurp the role that had been that of
Hogarth's Harlot – to redeem England from its sins and to make it advance in the political and
economical struggle against it enemies.
 Nonetheless, Mungo presents himself as a sort of friction that would otherwise disturb
a world that  holds  together  thanks to  its  transparency and functionality.  Significantly,  the
expression “ruined archive” which Pringle uses to label Mungo because of his failure to utter
(HP: 3), is also used by Mungo to talk about himself, assuming a very different value in the
black man's mouth. While Mr Pringle's vision of Mungo as a ruined archive is tainted by his
30 cf. Jakobson 1966
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idea that Mungo will not be a good investment, for Mungo, being a ruined archive means
elaborating an account of sorts, of the many passages, or rather mediations, that brought him
to such a state of ruin. “I would be the ruined archive of our tribe, but also his resurrected
expression, writing the discovery of the New World of Whiteman”, declares Mungo (HP: 36),
suddenly defying Mr Pringle's expectations. If a story of any sort is to be told, that story will
run counter to Pringle's expectations about identity and alterity. Mungo will focus not on his
being an  outsider  in  eighteenth-century England,  but  rather  on the  alterity  of  eighteenth-
century England from his own point of view. 
4.3. “A Harlot's Progress”: Mungo's perspective. 
Each of the nine parts of the novel – but not the prologue, whose focalizer is Pringle rather
than Mungo – begins with one of these  random fragments taken from Hogarth's  A Harlot's
Progress: a young black page with a turban holding a teapot; the leg of a small table from
which a fragile porcelain tea set is falling onto the floor; a young man doing a shushing sign
with his right hand; a mask and the corner of a frame lying on table; a woman pouring water;
a little monkey running away with some frills on its head; the puzzled expression on the face
of a richly dressed gentleman with a cup and a saucer in his hand; a sick woman with a cloth
wrapped with a shroud about her, a mean-looking woman stealing clothes from a younger
one, winking at theft.  Dissociated from the original whole, these fragments do not become
part of a meaningful composition. Even the link to the text is not made explicit.  The link
between image and word which in Hogarth's series played a central role in the sense of the
story31 –  Hogarth  is  sometimes  even  credited  for  creating  a  precursor  of  strip  cartoons
(Meskin 2012: xxi) – is completely broken. 
By the same token, Mungo lays bare the fiction beneath the sequentiality of Hogarth's
and Pringle's narrations and breaks up the illusion of truth that both works convey through
image  and  word.  He  deterritorializes  these  representations  thus  freeing  them  from  the
constraints  of  their  previous  coding.  The  reader  is  challenged  to  abandon  his  previous
knowledge about the story of Hogarth's Harlot and to see it from the fragmentary, deformed
31  Words contribute significantly to the sequentiality of Hogarth's work. They define the setting of the Harlot’s
imprisonment – that  is, the prison of Bridewell – and her illness, and her tomb explained that she died aged
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and marginal perspective of a character who is probably the only remaining witness who can
tell something about the events that led to Mary/Moll Hackabout death. 
Both Hogarth's series of engravings and Dabydeen's novel may be called “parodies”,
although in  very different  ways.  Hogarth's  parody was  discussed  by Paulson as  a  sacred
parody,  and  therefore  read  as  a  double-voiced  discourse  whose  end  may  also  be  the
redemption  that  it  parodies.  Dabydeen's  novel  is  a  post-modern  parody  in  the  sense
highlighted by Linda Hutcheon. The American scholar argued that "through a double process
of installing and ironizing, parody signals how present representations come from past ones
and what ideological consequences derive from both continuity and difference" (1990: 93).
Hutcheon claims that  although among many critics "[t]he prevailing interpretation is  that
postmodernism offers a value-free, decorative, de-historicized quotation of past  forms and
that this is a most apt mode for a culture like our own that is oversaturated with images"
(1990: 94), post-modern parodies are endowed with the potential for strong epistemological
and  political  critique.  Hutcheon  insists  that  parody  serves  as  an  instrument  to  politicize
representation,  illustrating  the  ways  that  interpretation  is  ultimately  ideological.  Parody
unsettles all doxa, all accepted beliefs and ideology. 
Mungo openly asserts that his task is to put into question Pringle's construction  (“I
envy Mr Pringle his quest for tidiness, but the truth is otherwise,” HP: 111), although in fact
he is also unable to provide any ultimate version of the truth either, and he even explicitly
states that part of his story is a fabrication (“I can change memory, as I can change my pos-
ture”,  HP: 2). The object of  the black man's critique is Pringle’s  mode of emplotment: no
matter how rational, sense-making and economical it may be, Mungo questions its validity as
a  cognitive  instrument  for  reaching the  truth  of  what  Kowaleski-Wallace  defines  as  “not
simply a story to be told, but a series of messy, overlapping narratives in which competing
voices still struggle for dominance” (237). The slave trade is too complex and composite to be
somehow compatible with the desire for closure which inspires Mr Pringle. 
Mr Pringle is  so engrossed in his  desire to  see the truth of Mungo's  story that he
ignores that the issue of people's  commodification goes even further than the slave trade.
Mungo's dependence on Pringle's money is not a minor detail  for the black man. Money puts
Mungo in a condition of dependency which reiterates the condition of slavery that the white
man wants to oppose: “Mr Pringle wants to hear, first about Captain Thistlewood, then about
110
Lord Montague, and if I do not tell he will make hunger press upon my stomach not by iron
weights (for England was barbarous then, without the benefit of commerce) but by the lightest
of coins” (HP: 180-81). The situation replicates a form of submission. Mungo's benefactor,
even if a Christian and an abolitionist, can easily slide into the role of the slaver, setting and
controlling the rule of an exchange in which Mungo initially occupies the weaker role. 
Remaining silent to Mr Pringle's reprimands, Mungo becomes, for a moment, “master
of the situation” (HP: 1). His dishonest way of dealing with the pact, so to speak, makes him
similar to Caliban who, for Lamming, “plots murder against Prospero not in hatred but out of
a deep sense of betrayal” (Lamming 1992: 15). As long as he does not give his words to the
man who has paid for them, he creates a situation in which the asymmetry of power goes, for
a while, in his favour. He compares the arts of narrating to the art of prostitution that Moll
practised: “Moll's hands were deft as she made knots and stays with silken cords, until her
client was decorously trussed.  She was as skilled with thongs as any grammarian is with
language” (HP: 55). Like Moll, he tries  entrap Pringle  to frustrate his desire, although he
knows that this pleasure of his (and of Moll's) is not destined to last: “[b]ut all was an illusion
of restraint, for her client still twisted and strained rankly” (HP: 55), reports a disillusioned
Mungo, aware of who has the whip in hand to wield over him. 
Mungo  seems  to  know  better  than  Mr  Pringle  the  implications  of  any  form  of
mediation – financial, monetary, cultural, linguistic – because mediation played a central role
in his life. It is precisely because of the many processes of mediation that he has undergone
and partially failed in his life that he cannot identify his “word” with the “word” that the
young  abolitionist  would  have  him  utter.  Mungo  was  born  in  Africa,  spoke  an  African
language, was captured and deported on a slave-ship, and then spent more than thirty years of
his adult life in England. Forever deprived of his family and of his tribe, who were killed
during the raid in which he was enslaved, Mungo does not belong either to what he calls “the
world of Whiteman”, for his black skin acts as an indelible sign of his difference. Mungo is
not even allowed to be a “mimic man” in the sense that Homi Bhabha and V.S. Naipaul have
outlined. Even though Mungo is better educated than many English people of his time  – and
as much in the passage quoted above, asserting his perfect knowledge of the King James
Bible – he cannot even call himself “anglicized” (Bhabha 1994: 128). His role can only be
that which Hogarth prepared for him in his engravings, that of an Oriental other paralysed in
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stupor and silence. 
Mediation is ignored by Mr Pringle on three different levels. First, he ignores the very
context  in  which  Mungo  has  been  asked  to  produce  his  narrative,  and  therefore  the
implications of money and power. Secondly, the man who writes and the man who utters “I”
are already separated from the first page of the novel.  Pringle's intervention in the ghost-
writing of the slave-narrative would be a major one, to the point that the truth to which he
aspires will be nothing but the production of his own imagination. Thirdly, the man who utters
“I” is different from the man who writes not only because they are actually two different
persons, but also and foremost because Mungo is also unable in any way to perceive  himself
as  a  unified subject.  To relate  anything about  himself,  Mungo will  in  fact  have  to  relate
information about a multiplicity of persons: “I had many beginnings, all of them marked by a
long and futile wailing – not from my mouth but from my father's”, claims Mungo (HP: 27).
In his life he had to be many different people: the child of a dead African warrior, the secret
lover of a slave-ship captain, a slave put on sale on the slave market, a pet for the company of
an annoyed aristocratic woman, a page in an engraving that would be replicated in thousands
of  copies,  an old man lying in a  garret  and trying to  recollect  his  past  with an effort  of
memory  and  imagination.  All  these  identities  are  associated  with  a  different  first  name:
Mungo is called Perseus, Noah, and by other names that he is not even able to recollect.
Besides,  all  of  these  different  identities  are  marked by Mungo's  entering  into  a  different
regime of signs, and into a different relation to language, power and representation. Therefore,
the language he speaks – or rather the language he is spoken by – reflects this sedimentation
of beginnings and identities.
Throughout the novel, Mungo also speaks in different voices. Even though he is the
main focalizer for most of the novel (with the clear exception of the prologue, which is mostly
told from Mr Pringle's point of view), the author oscillates inadvertently between a first- and
third-person narrator as if he were not in control of his own voice. His linguistic identity is
characterized by great instability. In the beginning of the novel he claims: “I can write my
story for myself, for I have imbibed many of your mannerisms of language, and the King
James Bible is at hand to furnish me with such expressions as could set your soul aglow with
compassion for the plight of the Negro” (HP: 5). Later on he assumes the kind of voice that
Pringle would expect from him: “Pa is far. He is never here. He is tilling field or fighting
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war.” (HP: 11). It is always through the voice of the Other that Mungo speaks. 
The narrative that Mungo produces about his many passages and his many beginnings
is a narrative about words, and about how he entered language and was interpellated by it.
Mungo's  subjectivation  is  depicted  as  a  process  that  leaves  him entangled  in  a  series  of
paradoxes and contradictions. He is a hybrid subject in a world that denies his hybridity, and
as such he can inhabit language only in certain ways that are allowed to him in his condition.
His ability to speak a language is determined by the conditions of the speaking.  
The  most  significant,  and  the  most  explicit  narrative  about  Mungo's  entering  the
language is told in the episode of Mungo's branding on the slave-ship of Captain Thistlewood.
Mungo has been brought to Thistlewood's ship after Thistlewood, participating in a raid in
which  all  the  members  of  Mungo's  tribe  were  killed,  apart  from  Mungo  himself.  The
encounter with Thistlewood marks for Mungo the beginning of a new life, a life in which,
nonetheless,  the  ghosts  of  his  dead  brethren  will  keep  haunting  him,  accusing  him  of
responsibility for their destruction – the disgrace is believed to have been brought on the tribe
because Mungo has transgressed the tribal rules in venturing into the Katran bush, the place of
the dead – or reproaching him, or just talking to him as if they were still part of his life. The
reason why Thistlewood spared Mungo, as will  be explained later,  is  that  Thistlewood is
attracted to Mungo with a passion that will drive him completely mad.
Captain Thistlewood emerges as a duplicitous character, both a saviour (“When for the
first time in my life I opened my eyes, a whiskered face loomed over me” says Mungo as soon
as he recovers from the shock of the raid,  HP: 46) and a torturer. Thistlewood is a deeply
disturbed man, a sadist and a paedophile, unable to control his passionate love for Mungo but
capable of expressing it only through a series of unspeakable violences, mixing beating and
rape  with  kisses,  tears  and  pleas  for  forgiveness.  In  his  mind,  Mungo  is  convinced  that
Thistlewood not only killed his mother, but also, as the ghost of his tribesman Ellar suggests
to him, that he actually ate her: “'Don't you remember? You saw it all, you were chained a few
yards from her. Each night the Captain came below to feed on your mother, a little at a time.
Her toes. Her feet. Her ankles. Her legs. Only her torso was left, fixed to floor by irons at her
neck  and  hands”  (HP:  121).  Yet  the  killing  of  the  mother  is  a  prelude  to  Thistlewood's
becoming Mungo's new father, as Mungo calls him on more than one occasion.32
32 See, for example; “And yet they were not fully human, for none were baptised in the body of Christ, none
reiceived the sacrament from Captain's Thistlewood's, my father” (HP: 49); or: “And Captain Thistlewood,
113
The scene of Mungo's branding suggests, significantly, that Thistlewood, more than
just  a  paternal  figure,  becomes  for  Mungo  what  Jacques  Lacan  called  “the  name of  the
Father”. He incarnates, differently put, the agent who marks the passage of Mungo from the
regime of the Imaginary, that of the identification with the body of the mother, to that of the
Symbolic, i.e. of the law:
One day with a kind hand Captain tie my limbs and stuff my mouth with cloth. He light the coal pot,
put a brand in it and when it shine red he raise it to my head. I faint with the shock and when I wake I
faint once more with the smell of my own burnt flesh. Captain care me for days and days, rub oil in
my skin to cool it and wet it with kiss, till I grow well, and then he fetched glass for me to see how he
mark my forehead, TT, and his voice is love as I gaze at the strange bites, and he tells me soon Cross
will join Cross when the flesh heal and stretch, and that I am now in life, and will be in death, his own.
(HP: 66-67)
Mungo, who is the first person narrator of this passage, speaks in broken English, as if to
highlight his powerlessness towards the doings of his master, Captain Thistlewood.  Mungo,
also  bound  to  Captain  Thistlewood  by  a  love  which  Mr  Pringle  will  never  be  able  to
understand or to put into words, submits to the act of branding because he has come to think
that what the white man is doing to him may also be the prerequisite of his salvation. 
The scene of the branding represents  Mungo's  subjectivation not  as a result  of  an
unfinished process of interpellation, but rather as a very definite moment in time, as if it could
be conceived as a sort of rite of initiation. Mungo is initiated into language in the liminal
space  of  a  slave-ship,  where  he  is  completely removed from his  old tribe  but  not  really
assimilated to a new context.  This episode thus becomes a pivotal moment in Mungo's life.
Mungo accepts that he must submit to the ritual performed by Thistlewood, and therefore
accept his subjection (sensu Foucault) as the very pre-condition of his existence. He knows
that, by having been singled out to perform this ritual, he will later acquire a capacity to act
that his fellow slaves, chained in the holds of the slave-ship, will never be able to attain. Later
in the novel, he will declare himself grateful for this initiation, and will even come to fear
emancipation as a “terrifying freedom” (HP: 257)
Mungo  calls  the  ceremony  of  the  branding  a  wedding,  because  it  establishes  his
communion with Captain Thistlewood, but also a baptism. “TT”, the symbol that Captain
Thistlewood’s  impresses  upon  Mungo’s  forehead  to  mark  his  entry  into  the  white  man’s
who fathered and delivered me onto a knowledge of Christ.” (HP: 51).
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world, recalls, significantly, a double sign of the cross. The black man’s forced embrace of the
Christian faith has turned him into a Creature of God: “I consumed the Eucharist on board and
came to the knowledge that our true slavery was temporary slavery to death, our true freedom
the acquisition of a soul manacled eternally to the will of God”, says Mungo (HP: 51). The
“TT” makes him similar to the white man, who is no less of a slave than he is, chained to his
Christian consciousness and to the pastoral power exerted by the Church.
Thistlewood's “TT” is a syncretic sign because it  combines both a Christian and a
Euclidean significance. Thistlewood’s “TT”, which will become a Greek Pi “when the flesh
heal  and  stretch”  (HP:  67),  also  inaugurates  Mungo’s  access  to  the  language  of  logic,
geometry, and rationality that the white man uses to decipher, classify, and conquer the world.
Mungo comes to see geometry and faith as inseparably linked. “Only when the Christian
came were we told that there was science to our suffering”, he says, as he begins to see the
word  as  a  rational  creation,  where  faith  and  logic  concur  to  explain  the  sufferings  of
humankind (HP: 47). He becomes so convinced of this new order of the world that he even
begins  to  despise  his  fellow  Africans  who  do  not  realize  its  perfection:  “If  my  African
brethren still languish in a world of sensation in spite of your proselytizing, it is because they
prefer chaos to the symmetry of Christian truth” (HP: 48).
Mungo is forced to enter the world of logic with the aid of Thistlewood’s brute force.
Yet Thistlewood’s acts of force are not an external supplement to his teaching but rather a
manifestation of the violence which is already implicit in language. As Gilles Deleuze and
Félix  Guattari  claimed  in  their  “Postulates  of  Linguistics”  (cf.  Deleuze  2004),  the  basic
enunciation of  language  is  the order-word, and any order-word is  already joined to  other
orders, like in a self-sustaining machinic assemblage. The purpose of language, as the two
philosophers claim, is not to give information, or be believed, but rather to make others obey.
The authority of geometry to explain or of grammar to describe a language does not derive
from their apparently neutral, informative quality, but from the fact that they are supported by
a system of order-words from which derives their power to transform and act upon reality.
The  discourse  of  geometry  orders,  commands,  decrees:  its  performative  power  is  not  a
consequence of information, but it rather imposes semiotic coordinates in which the subject
positions him- or herself and builds his or her relationship to the world. 
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The scene of Mungo's rebirth on the ship replicates in an interesting way the scene of
coming into being of an hybrid subject through violence of the whip which Edward Kamau
Brathwaite described in the section titled “Caliban” of his long poem “Limbo”. “Stick is the
whip/  and  the  dark  deck  is  slavery”  (III,  l.20-21),  says  the  collective,  lyric  voice  in
Brathwaite's poem to describe how the violence of the slaver is transformed by the slaves
performing a limbo dance on the deck of the slave-ship. The limbo dance appropriates the
slaver's  brutality  to  transform it  into  a  new,  empowering  dance  allowing  the  newly-born
subject to re-emerge as a different person after the Middle Passage, or to go “up/ up/ up”(l.44-
46) after having been “down/ down/ down”(l.34-36). The deported people in Brathwaite's
poem enter the language of their master by breaking it up and adapting it to the rhythm of an
African dance, envisioning for themselves the possibility of inhabiting it in a different way. In
Dabydeen's A Harlot's Progress, the Middle Passage instead appears as the passage of a single
man. No newly created community will accept Mungo after Thistlewood has given him a
treatment of favour. In fact, even if Mungo introjects the discipline of Thistlewood's teaching,
he will never really become a full subject, capable of acting and interacting in what he calls
“the New World of Whitemen” (HP: 36).
Mungo highlights the ambiguity of his own situation by explaining to the astonished
washerwoman  who  is  in  charge  of  him  after  his  arrival  in  England  that  “Euclid  […]
calculated, even before the birth of Jesus, that parallel lines will never meet. The godly and
the savage are one, but will never meet” (HP: 107). According to the teaching he has received
from Captain Thistlewood, Euclid's calculation is not just a statement of fact, but rather the
result  of  a  way  of  ordering  the  world,  whereas  the  word  “ordering”  both  signifies
“commanding” – as any form of teaching is also to be understood as an exertion of power –
and “arranging”. Euclidean geometry and faith have joined in a machine that has created the
“savage” (ibid.) as the other, and his identity will have to be kept separated from that of the
godly. The question of where Mungo should be positioned in this dichotomy remains highly
problematic. His baptism on the slave-ship made him a Christian. Yet, if the godly and the
savages are like parallel lines destined never to meet, then Mungo's transgression of the order-
word/  order  of  the  world  carried  by  Thistlewood's  teaching  will  put  him  in  a  deeply
contradictory situation, the articulation of which is the object of his whole narration. 
The Middle Passage which has transformed Mungo into a new subject has put him in a
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very problematic relation to  the word. Language appears from Mungo's perspective not as the
ideal system that Pringle has in his mind but rather as a very complex, heterogeneous and
even  contradictory phenomenon.  Language,  in  other  words,  is  embedded  in  a  materialist
philosophy that Jean-Jacques Lecercle describes as diametrically opposite to the dominant
philosophy of language of which Mr Pringle is a bearer.  
First of all, from Mungo's perspective, following what Lecercle calls the principle of
non-immanence, “it is impossible to separate language from the world in which it emerges
and of  which  it  is  an integral  part”  (2006:  70).  Mungo is  aware of  this  because he  is  a
bilingual speaker, although he has almost forgotten the language of his tribe. He knows that
by entering into Captain Thistlewood's language he has also accessed a new system of beliefs
and representation. Similarly, he knows that his experiences in his African village cannot be
narrated  in  the  language  of  Mr  Pringle,  not  just  because  of  a  matter  of  etiquette  and
convention – the image of his tribe that emerges from his narration is rather promiscuous, and
quite far from the ideal of innocence that Mr Pringle would like to describe in his book – but
also because the language of Mr Pringle expresses a fundamentally different kind of system of
thought.  As  Mungo,  inspired  by  the  smell  coming  from Captain  Thistlewood's  cabin,  is
suddenly  reminded  of  his  lost  homeland,  he  realizes  that  sensory  experience  cannot  be
translated  in  English.  He  can  only  communicate  his  experience  to  the  ghost  of  his
tribespeople, in the tribe’s lost language: “And the smells and tastes of our village so revive
our senses that speech returns, not in the grunting of whiteman but in the melody of our
language” (HP: 99). So their memories of home are left untranslated in a language that cannot
be understood by anybody but them because the experiences they are talking about cannot
possibly be described in any other way.
Secondly,  for  Mungo,  language is  dysfunctional.  According to  what  Lecercle  calls
principle of dysfunctionality, “[l]anguage is not an instrument at the speaker's disposal. It is an
experience and an activity; it is not an object distinct from speakers and manipulated by them”
(2006: 70). The fact that he cannot really use it as a tool is strictly dependent on the non-
immanence of language, i.e. on the fact that a language already carries a vision of the world,
or also carries, as emerged in the episode of the branding performed by Thistlewood, a way of
ordering the world. When Mungo speaks English, his statements are guided by the language
that speaks him, giving shape and meaning to his experiences. It is not Mungo who speaks
117
English,  but  English  that  speaks  Mungo,  making him assume the  point  of  view and the
linguistic mannerism of eighteenth-century speakers of English. 
Thirdly, language is never transparent for Mungo and it can never annihilate itself in
the telling of his tale. Lecercle calls this the principle of opacity: “The speaker negotiates her
expression with her language: we say what our language allows us to say; we speak with – but
also  against  –  our  language;  and  the  meaning  of  our  utterance  is  always  a  compromise
between what we would like to say and what we discover [...] that we actually did say” (2006:
71).  The  opacity  of  language  is  made  into  one  of  the  main  motifs  throughout  Mungo's
narration because language is the very site of his hybridity. Speaking through the voice of the
other  and dismantling  the  other's  position  from within  make Mungo transform the  major
language spoken by Pringle into a minor language (cf. Deleuze 1986). 
Fourth, language emerges as a material (principle of materiality) and as an historical
(principle of historicity) phenomenon. Language is a material phenomenon insofar as it is
“not separable from its realization in the form of speech or performance”, in the sense that “an
utterance is always a vector of power” (Lecercle 2006: 71). This is the teaching of Mungo's
subjectivation through the branding of his forehead. Also, this is the point that Mungo makes
when he refuses to speak to Mr Pringle: the very issue at stake is indeed an assertion of power.
Fifth  and  sixth,  language  emerges  from Mungo's  narration  as  partially  systematic
(principle of partial systematicity).  By saying that language is not wholly systematic, and
therefore not completely inscribed in the set  of rules outlined in grammar and linguistics,
language  emerges  as  a  “set  of  sub-systems  or  partial  systems  in  continuous  variation”
(Lecercle  2006:  71),  the  sedimentations  of  which  depend  on  the  very  historicity  of  its
performances.  The  fact  that  Mungo  cannot  be  contained  in  the  order  of  the  world  that
language simultaneously fashions and expresses, allows him, with his hybrid performance, to
break the set of rules that Pringle has prepared for him and to put the English language in a
state of continuous variation.
It is against the backdrop of these characteristics that Mungo's refusal to speak to Mr
Pringle is to be read. Mungo refuses communication insofar as communication would make
him transparent and relegate him, along with the contents of his experience, to the margins of
representation,  disempowered  of  his  capacity  to  unsettle  the  language  and the  culture  he
speaks. By re-semanticising the scheme of Progress that Pringle has prepared for him, Mungo
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makes an even more transgressive move. He not only usurps the position of the Harlot to tell
her story of moral fall from a minor (sensu Deleuze) perspective. Significantly, he also gets
out of the role in which representation has framed him and occupies the very place of the
reader/observer.  It  is  from  this  external  perspective  that  he  produces  a  deconstruction/
deterritorialization of the narratives of 'Progress' that order not only his experience but also
the way his epoch is beginning to represent itself. 
Mungo's enigma of arrival and the novel's post-colonial, post-modern critique of Progress 
“Forget the land” (HP: 69) and “remember the land”(HP: 62): Mungo's journey to England is
haunted by these two contradictory orders uttered respectively by Captain Thistlewood and by
the ghosts of his  lost  tribe.  Learning English as a foreign language will  be for Mungo a
exercise of mediation between these two poles. While Thistlewood makes it a condition that
to  be a  new subject  he will  have to  forget  everything about  his  previous  life,  his  fellow
tribesmen keep warning him that the uprooting of the pictures of Africa from his memory will
be even worse than dying. “'He will not kill you with blows but with new words'”, his old
friend Manu admonish: “He will plant in your mind pictures of his land and root up ours'”
(HP:  65). Through the  new words that he learns from Thistlewood, Mungo will inhabit a
different  language and a  different  horizon of  experience,  which will  make him forever  a
foreigner  among  his  own  people.  Manu  prophesies  that,  however  beautifully  Captain
Thistlewood may talk about England, his words will not be a new home for Mungo but rather
a mortal prison, where he will soon succumb to their alienating force as he did not succumb to
the violence of Thistlewood's whip. 
Deciding  between  remembering  or  forgetting  the  land  and  the  language  will  not,
however,  be  a  matter  of  free  choice  for  him.  Mungo's  arrival  in  England  will  prove  so
uncanny to Mungo that all the categories that he had built in his mind while on Thistlewood's
ship are destined to become blurred. Mungo's first experiences in his new country are even
more enigmatic than those depicted in the De Chirico painting described in Naipaul's novel
because the landscape around him does not even allow him any possibility for recognition or
interpretation. As Captain Thistlewood finally decides to part from him, he is left completely
alone in a cold, dark, damp cellar, without the possibility of seeing or being seen. When Betty,
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the washerwoman who has taken him into his custody, takes him out of the cellar Mungo
seems already aware that in that place he will not even be recognized as a human being. “'Are
you going to eat me?'” (HP: 106) he asks her, moved by a sincere fear. Betty appears from the
first pages on to be an extremely naïve woman, debasing herself by doing what she considers
to be the most demeaning among all chores: the washing of the “nigger boys” (ibid.) who are
later going to be sold on the slave market. Although she says to Mungo, “This is England,
everything makes sense” (HP: 136), she has not got much sense herself. She lives in the fear
of the ghost of Mary, a younger woman who lived with her and whose story seems likely to
follow the same pattern of moral fall as Mary/Moll Hackabout. She cannot count and she is
sincerely distressed to hear that the young man in front of her knows much more than she
does, and that he understands Euclidean geometry as well. 
Later, as Betty goes on telling her and Mary's story, her narration becomes even more
complex and enigmatic. If Mungo declares himself content to have escaped the ramblings of
his fellow tribespeople because “[t]he world of logic was promised, the logic, however cruel,
of  slavery”  (HP:  111),  Betty’s  narration  throws him in  a  further  state  of  confusion.  She
contradicts herself, proving to Mungo that she can indeed count, confessing to cheating Mary
on the soap, and of being guilty of what the young woman was accused of. Later on the story
takes another different path, and she explains that she accused Mary because she was in love
with a Jew who evidently preferred the younger and more attractive woman to her. Her story
evades  her,  embracing the  ordinary  stories  of  thousands  of  women  of  her  time  and
overlapping with the story of the Harlot in Hogarth's engravings as well as with the story told
in novels like Daniel Defoe's Moll Flanders (1722): the threat of deportation, the prison, the
fall into immorality and prostitution, slavery. 
 The enigma of Mungo's arrival involves not only the unease of a hybrid subject who
finds himself at odds in a foreign world and in a foreign language, but also casts light on the
contradictions of an epoch that is in a process of change and that perceives Mungo's hybridity
as  a  potential  threat  to  his  stability.  As  Mungo befriends  Betty,  he  suddenly realizes  the
validity of Manu's warning that “[a]ll the descriptions of his [Thistlewood's] land are false, he
speaks noble and beautiful  words,  but  he has  been at  sea for centuries,  and England has
coarsened in his absence” (HP: 66). When Mungo refers to “the New World of Whiteman”
(HP: 36), he does not refer to England as “New” only because it was unknown to him before
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he ever met Captain Thistlewood. England is new because it is entering a new phase in its
history, a phase which will later be labelled as “modernity”.33 Major historical, political, and
economic changes are about to take place in eighteenth-century England as well as in the rest
of Western world, paving the way for what will later be known as “The Age of Revolution”.
Colonial empires are consolidating themselves, and the cheap labour force of African slaves
deported to the West Indies as providers of an abundance of raw material to Europe, prepare
the ground for the Industrial Revolution and the growth of a burgeoning capitalist economy.
Mungo occupies  an unstable  position within  language,  but  it  is  precisely because of  this
instability that he is able to see through the epistemological changes that are about to take
place.
Although  the  word  “progress”  was  used  in  the  seventeenth  century  only  in  the
individualist/ spatial/ religious acceptation, as in the title chosen by Hogarth for his series,
Mungo engages with the term as if he could foresee the semantic changes that it would later
assume. Mungo talks about progress ambiguously, as if he could see that progress is about to
become a key term in the experience of modern men, indicating not just a spatial metaphor,
but also a way of experiencing and perceiving a new relationship to temporality. Progress is
recognized by Mungo as an agent of the changes that threatens a radical transformation in the
language and in the experience of his time, a transformation that he would like to elude by
eloping with Betty:
And she [Betty] will speak of hurst and weald and holt, of briar and furze and rush that survive the axe
and plough; the memory of England’s originality preserved in the curious ancient names for plants and
vines (local names that survive the Progress of ships which transformed him into Mungo, Noah, Boy
and the like). (HP: 151)
In this passage, the  word “Progress”, significantly written with a capital letter, implies and
subsumes two different meanings. The first, and most explicit, is of course the spatial one: the
33  The word “modernity” is used with reference to the definition provided by Maria Cristina Fumagalli in
Caribbean  Perspectives  on  Modernity.  Returning  Medusa's  Gaze.  Fumagalli  suggests  that  a  number  of
“narratives of modernity” are produced in historical, philosophical, economic or even political discourses,
and consequently a number of possible beginnings of modernity have been suggested (see note 5 chapter 2).
“Modernity” is a term that indicates a break in temporarality, the entering of a new phase in history. Whereas
the “when” of modernity is rather difficult to pinpoint, Fumagalli argues, the “where”, or even the “who”, is
nonetheless absolutely clear. “Modernity” is an exclusively/ western (European and American) category. Just
like the mythical Gorgon, Modernity has the power to petrify its others, immobilizing them into a sort of non-
modernity.
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ships move forward across the sea and the ocean, while plants and vines remain anchored in
the soil and are allowed to preserve their ‘original’ names. The second meaning implies that
“Progress” is a trans-personal agency inextricably linked to the movements of ships, goods,
and people and to the global connections between Africa, Europe and the Americas. 
In  this  short  passage,  Mungo  produces a  micro-narrative  of  his  life  which  is
completely opposed to  Pringle's  construction.  Mungo does  not  cede  to  the  temptation  of
putting himself at the centre of his life and presenting himself as the product of a process of
redemption.  On  the  contrary,  he  emerges  as  a  subject shaped  by  an  external  agency
completely independent from his will, but rather dependent on the situation in which he finds
himself, and on the names which his new fathers give him: “Mungo, Noah, Boy and the like”. 
Mungo's  micro-narrative  also  discloses  that  the  name  “Mungo”,  with  which  the
narrator has been introduced since the very beginning, is not linked to the black boy's original
identity, but is rather a product of “the Progress of ships” (HP: 151). Mungo is a nickname
that Betty gave him as she did not know what to call him. Although all the ghosts of his
African  tribe  who  accompany  Mungo  throughout  his  life  are  always  called  by  their
presumably original, African names, Mungo cannot recollect what he used to be called when
his village still existed.  “So what was I before I  came to you?” asks a puzzled Mungo to a
perplexed Betty (HP: 64). “Don’t ask me, you should know. Whatever it was you didn’t seem
to care.  Whenever  I  called  you Mungo you sat  up,”  she  replies  (ibid.).  Significantly,  his
identity is bound to an order. “Mungo” is what he thought white people called all Africans,
and whenever they addressed him as such he immediately responded to their command. His
origin is either irretrievable or non-existent, and Mungo, who has become a hybrid subject, is
unable to think about himself outside of the structures of linguistic subjectivation by which he
was interpellated as he entered into his new language. 
Although  the  passage  suggest  that,  differently  from  Mungo,  the  identity  of  rural
England seems chained to  the names of  plants  and wine which in  the local  dialect  have
preserved their original names, neither this dream of stability is allowed to last. Progress will
soon eat it up. In fact, Mungo cannot know that the Yorkshire that he pictures as an idyllic
place untouched by the passage of time will soon be radically transformed by the very same
“Progress of ship” (HP: 151) that carried him from Africa to England. Betty's rural homeland
will soon become an industrialized area, where the raw cotton fibres coming from the colonial
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plantation will be processed and sent again into the same circle to furnish other markets in
India, West Africa, China, and the Americas. Betty also reveals that enclosures and hunger is
threatening her Yorkshire, which is not an hospitable place for her any more. Betty is herself a
product of progress, just like the Harlot in Hogarth's series, of which she claimed that she
wore the same clothes and of which she shared the same attitude toward strangers when she
came to England in a wagon packed with other Yorkshire girls:  “'I wore a stuff frock and a
white apron and a tucker over my shoulder and – she will laugh gaily – “a rose in my bosom
to  catch  any stranger's  fancy'”  (HP:  151-52),  confesses  Betty.  Again,  Betty  unsettles  the
expectation of the reader who so far has identified her – by Mungo's physical descriptions and
by her account of the role she played in the events that brought about the hanging of her
younger assistant Mary – with the maid who in plate 3 of Hogarth's series attends to Mary/
Moll Hackabout. Betty is also another version of the story of Hogarth's harlot. 
Progress  threatens  rural  England  not  only with  the  imminence  of  the  Industrial
Revolution, but also by the disorder caused by Mungo, whose effects are most devastating on
the character of Captain Thistlewood himself. The places that the old Captain had painted as a
locus of reason and harmony in his account of them to Mungo become the very theatre of his
own ruin. As the old captain leaves Mungo, the world he had constructed with the precision of
geometry and with the exactitude of a seasoned tradesman – he loved to contemplate with
Mungo the perfection of the triangle binding together Africa, England and the Americas and
the globe so perfectly defined within this triangle – crumbles like a house of cards. It is his
passion for the black boy that disrupts all Thistlewood's certitudes and makes him – or at least
one of the paths that Thistlewood's story takes, since the other one leads to madness and
suicide in a different way34 – retire and go progressively mad in an estate in the countryside.
Far from living the life of a wealthy landowner which most retired tradesmen of his time
would lead, Captain Thistlewood embraces a state of disorder and uncouthness: 
And if you go to Hampstead, and come upon his estate – as Moll and I once did – you will see scenes
of such desolation that you will be convinced by Mr Pringle's account. It is a veritable jungle, the
gardens grows wild, the house strangled by vines. Captain Thistlewood has courted ruin, revelling in a
disdain for Progress.  Whilst  others of his rank plant  and embellish and gentrify,  he presides over
weeds. Whilst other stock their land with deer, he encourages mole, polecat, sow – beasts of no status
or  value,  beasts  that  stink  or  maul  or  scavenge.  Those  who have  seen  him are  few,  for  he  has
withdrawn from polite and vulgar society.  The odd tradesman who serves him with candlewax or
34 See  footnote 23.
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tobacco reports  a creature overgrown with hair.  His eyes are lowered as  he addresses you in the
modest voice of a woman. The more superstitious of his neighbours speak of him as a witch, and only
his reputation as one of England's formidable sea-captains, a true patriot in the service of commerce,
saves him from harm. (HP: 111)
Captain  Thistlewood  is  said  to  live  in  “disdain  for  Progress”  when  it  comes  to  the
advancement  of  “others  of  his  rank”  who  “plant  and  embellish  and  gentrify”  (ibid.).
Nonetheless,  it  is  clear  that  his  disdain is  addressed mostly against  the way the world is
turning  in  the  direction  outlined  by the  ships  he  once  presided.  His  choice  is  one  of  a
decadence  which  opposes  the  discourses  on  advancement  that  will  later  be  developed  to
accompany and define his  modernity. 
Mungo’s own  description  of  progress  –  and  of  the  modernity  in  which  both  his
personal and mankind’s progress in general are embedded – contrasts with the concept of
advancement to which it is usually associated, too. “Look at the whitemen, look at what they
do,” the ghost of his African fellow Manu tells him. “Day and night they work the sea but
they catch nothing but wind, they make nothing but speed” (HP: 62). The movement of the
ship  which  turns  him into  “Mungo,  Noah,  Boy and the  like”  is  to  him not  a  movement
forward, but rather an acceleration of his life, which begins to rotate in a vortex of continuous
changes and metamorphosis. The same could be said of the sailors, cogs in a machine that
devours their labour, chained to toil so that the ship may move. Also for them this movement
will prove pointless, and modernity will not bring them any immediate, concrete benefit. 
By the  same  token,  Mungo  refuses  to  make  sense  of  his  experience  in  terms  of
progress. Redemption is not perceived by him as the final achievement of his progress. He
refuses to bestow redemption on himself and on his implied reader:
All or part of Mr Pringle’s conception of my Progress is, or may be, true, but I will not move you to
customary guilt, gentle reader, even though you may crave that I hold up a mirror to the sins of your
race. You will reward me with laurel and fat purses for flagellating you thus, especially should I, with
impoverished imagination, evoke for you the horrors of the slaveship hold, the chained Negroes, their
slobbering,  their  suffocation,  their  sentimental  condition.  No,  they  laughed,  they  chattered,  they
gossiped, they cried, they desired, as they had always done in the villages in Africa. There were chains
there too. They merely exchanged their distress for yours, when you packed them on your boat. And
perhaps your distress will eventually prove to be more creative: I prophesy a time not when we will
sire your kings and queens, nor lead your army into battle, for such is a fool’s gold and a counterfeit
ambition. I prophesy a time when the love I bore to Moll will be a common compact, that the ache of
the nightingale’s song will give way to blessed union. It is your love that I greed for, not the coinage
of your guilt. (HP: 70)
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Mungo’s revisionist, highly controversial refiguration of the “Progress of ships” (HP: 115)
that turned millions of Africans into new people claims that “Progress” is neither a movement
forward, nor a fall for those who, like him, were uprooted from their homeland. It is just an
exchange of old pain for new, a replacement of one submission to one system of signs and
order-words with another submission to a different system of signs and order-words.
If Mungo interprets the direction that humankind is following in terms of an exchange,
the question about his role in this exchange remains open. In fact Mungo perceives himself
both as a disrupting factor in the unfolding of the history of England and as a consolidating
figure. “I became an historical and memorable figure in the birth of Democracy in the British
realm” (HP: 274), claims Mungo. Marginalised and disempowered in the representation that
Hogarth  made  of  him,  his  otherness  contained  by the  representation  of  him produced in
writing and in painting, Mungo is going to become a household character in the society of his
time. 
The remorse that he attributes to himself for the disruption of his tribe is the same
sense of guilt that makes him claim that “a simple nigger like me was deemed to be the
undoing of England” (HP: 242). Mungo is aware of being a transgressive character. It is his
transgression of the order that the Katran bush should not be crossed, as it represents the
border between life and death that brought disgrace onto his tribe. By the same token, it is his
crossing of the border between “godly” and “savage” (HP: 107) established by Thistlewood's
teaching that makes him into a potential threat to the order of England. 
A crisis  arising  from his  unsettling  presence  occurs  when  Mungo,  bought  by  the
diplomat Lord Montague to replace a dead monkey in the affection of his wife, rebels against
the harassments he has to suffer from the hand of the other house servants who take advantage
of his sub-human condition to submit him to any sort of violence. Mungo, who has learnt to
his expense that to become free he has to suffer in his body as well as in his soul, decides to
cut off his ear and to accuse a maid of the deed. His cut ear becomes, in the eyes of his master
Lord Montague, the very ear that Robert Jenkins, captain of a British merchant ship, exhibited
to the Parliament to denounce the treachery of Spanish navy, breaking the pacts on the slave
trade established with the England and attacking English fleets carrying their business in the
Caribbean Sea: 
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A war came when a Spaniard ruffian cut off the year of one Mr Jenkins, sailorman and true servant of
the King going about his proper business in the Caribbean Sea. And Lord Montague who did go
abroad to make peace and spend so much effort to heal whatever sickness grip the foreigner, whatever
make him want to rave and froth and bite up like a rabid dog, now face great trouble which undo all
his great work. Like the foreigner is chronic, you can't balm him, that thought passed through Lord
Montague's mind when he look upon me and see the missing ear. He look on me as if my black art
caused the war, that the very hour the dago put a dagger on Mr Jenkins. Oh, how his heart grieve to
think of me as evil sprite or at best omen of disaster, for he did not buy me out of true pity reading the
crosses on my forehead (which now appear as upside-down crosses, for my growing skin stretch with
time, sure mark of devilry. (HP: 244)
It is precisely Mungo's gesture of producing his own cut-off ear that makes Lord Montague go
out  of  his  mind.  It  is  his  fault  if  the  situation  between  Spain  and  England,  which  Lord
Montague had tried to protect, crumbles, giving way to what historians will later call “the war
of Jenkins' ear”.35 By endorsing the guilt for the war, Mungo deterritorializes the construction
of  history  bequeathed  in  history  books.  Mungo  disinvests  the  war  of  its  political  and
commercial  causes  and  makes  them  into  the  scared  reaction  of  an  old  man  who  feels
threatened by a potential loss of sense. 
Mungo decides to leave Lord Montague's house as soon as he to be perceived as a
devilish figure: “No, he must rid me for he think I bring chaos to his house, corrupt his wife,
and one day I may even rise up to slay him for I have the instincts of a savage, no feathered
turban, silk and silver ornament can enslave them for too long” (HP: 245). It is under these
circumstances that he meets two characters that will later figure, like him, in the series of
engravings produced by William Hogarths. Mr Gideon, the Jew whom Hogarth depicted as
the  wealthy  lover  of  Moll/  Mary  Hackabout,  figures  as  a  quack  doctor  who  visits  Lord
Montague's house to offer his cordial to heal an unexplicable disease which is afflicting Lady
Montague. Quite the opposite of the mature Jew in Hogarth's painting, Gideon is the director
of  a  sanatorium where  he  takes  in  prostitutes  suffering  from syphilis  or  other  infectious
diseases for no other apparent reason than his unconditional love for humankind. It is there, in
that place outside of the world that Mungo meets Moll. Moll is not the sinner who appears in
Hogarth's painting. On the contrary,  Moll appears to Mungo's eyes as the very image of the
Virgin whom he saw in the house of Lord Montague.36 Moll is described as a suffering woman
35 There is actually a chronological inaccuracy in Mungo's account. The war lasted three years, from 1739 to
1742. Mungo's servitude in the household of Lord Montague precedes his being portrayed by Hogarth, but
Hogarth's engravings dates back to 1732. 
36 Mungo's  observation certainly Paulson's  study on the influence of Christian models  of  representation in
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whose illness is not so much a physical as a spiritual one. “As soon as I saw her I recognized
the imprisonment of her spirit”, Mungo says (HP: 265), suggesting that Moll, like him, has
been transformed into one of the others of modernity,  that she has been imprisoned, like
Mungo, by the structures of subjectivation informing their epoch but also excluded by them,
never really acquiring the capacity to act freely that a full subject should gain.
Mungo, the Jew, and Moll are equally exiled by a society that does not have a space
for them. All of them seek refuge in a place at the margins, not only of the city but also of
society. Mungo meets Moll in the Mr Gideon's sanatorium after he escapes Lord Montague's
house. The empathy which binds Mungo and Moll together is indeed a feeling going beyond
the understanding of Mr Pringle. The love which draws Mungo and Moll Hackabout together,
which Mungo hopes will one day become a “common compact” (HP: 70), is indeed outside of
any kind of social order and outside of any conception of good and evil. It is a love without
constraint for which Mungo breaks the law and the Christian commandment by killing Moll
to relieve her of her sufferings. 
Mungo’s critique of language, representation and power opens out into a prophecy and
a utopian wish. The provocative claim he makes by saying “I prophesy a time when the love I
bore to Moll will be a common compact, that the ache of the nightingale’s song will give way
to blessed union” (HP: 70) suggests that freedom will not be attained through exchange. The
oppressed will not be delivered from their sufferings by occupying the power positions which
used to be somebody else’s. That would just be an illusion of power, since power remains a
trans-personal agency which informs a system to which the so-called powerful themselves
must  also submit  to in order to  belong to it.  Mungo refuses to be at  home,  preferring to
cultivate  his  isolated  deterritorialization,  and  not  submitting  to  the  trap  that  Pringle  has
prepared for him. Nonetheless, his choice of deterritorialization prevents him from coming
home.  Caught  in  a  continuous  process  of  becoming,  he  manages  to  deterritorialize  the
language  he  speaks,  but  the  movement  of  deterritorialization  is  not  followed  by  any
reterritorialization  of  any  sort.  For  this  reason,  the  unfolding  of  Mungo's  story  may  be
interpreted as a successful counter-interpellation but as a failed homecoming.
A Harlot's Progress, like V. S. Naipaul's The Enigma of Arrival, may be defined as a
study of exile and of the possibility for a spatial “assignation of residence” (cf. Regard 2002)
Hogarth's painting. The American scholars also highlights how the character of Mary Hackabout reproduces
and parodies in many interesting ways the representation of the Virgin Mary.
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for  a  self-writing  author.  It  is  obviously  not  possible  to  call  Dabydeen's  novel  “an
autobiography” in the same way as Naipaul's novel, as in fact no autobiographical pact sensu
Lejeune is ever concretized in the British-Guyanese writer's book. Nonetheless, both works
share the same concerns about the very conditions that lay at the basis of the writing of an
autobiography – i.e. the issue of representation, the positioning of the subject through an act
of  interpretation,  and  the  relationship  to  language.  Like  Naipaul's  novel,  Dabydeen's  A
Harlot's Progress may be called a self-reflexive novel about the coming into being of a hybrid
subject through the act of writing. While for Naipaul, writing represented a way of negotiating
a position for a hybrid subject within a system of representation, Dabydeen's novel is rather
concerned with the dismantling of the “positioning” in which other writings – as well as other
forms of representation – have imprisoned the narrator, freezing him in a paralysis of silence
and otherness. Mungo's positioning in the autobiography that Mr Pringle wants him to write
would in fact be, as Gillian Whitlock puts it, “a forceful example of just how the access of
post-colonial subjects to the status of autobiographer is negotiated through a kind of middle
passage, from which the subjectivity emerges bearing the imprints of experience and culture,
self  and society” (Whitlock 1997:  330).37 Differently put,  to access the place of speaking
which his so-called benefactor has prepared for him, Mungo's subjectivity would have to be
produced according to an historically and institutionally defined scheme, a scheme in which
he, nonetheless, does not want to belong. 
Of course, some important discriminating remarks must be made on attributes of exile
and home in Naipaul's and Dabydeen's novels. While it is true that both novels conceive of
exile as a linguistic experience and that its exploration may cast light on the hidden presence
of the other in language,  the political  angle of their  conceptions of exile  is  actually very
different. Naipaul manipulates his cultural and linguistic exile to sustain his own reputation as
a cosmopolitan writer, as well as to construct his inhabitable fantasies of home. Dabydeen, by
contrast, exploits exile as an oppositional category. His character, Mungo, remains an exile
throughout the whole of the narration. Although he manages to deterritorialize English and
37 Whitlock, author of the essay “From Prince to Lord: The Politics of Location in Caribbean Autobiography”,
refers  to  the  biography of  Mary Prince,  published  some fifty  years  later  than  the  imaginary  encounter
between Mr Pringle and Mungo. The History of Mary Prince, A West-Indian Slave, Related by Herself may in
fact have served as a reference for Dabydeen's novel. The character of Mr Pringle may actually have been
modelled after the Scottish abolitionist Thomas Pringle who employed the Bermudan ex-slave Mary Prince
and convinced her to deliver her story to a memher of the Abolition Society who transcribed and edited it,
making it into one of the best sellers of his time. 
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put the language in a state of continuous variation, his attempt to come home in language is
doomed to fail because of the historical conditions in which his story unfolds. His narration
will not be collected by Mr Pringle, and Mungo will not be able to reterritorialize Mr Pringle's
language from his hybrid perspective. Mungo, differently put, will never be able to make
English his home. 
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Chapter 5
Exploring the silence of the ancestors: The hybrid writing of  Marlene NourbeSe
Philip’s  She  Tries  Her  Tongue,  Her  Silence  Softly  Breaks and  Looking  for
Livingstone: An Odyssey of Silence 
“Language is impersonal: its working through and across us is indifferent to us, yet in the
same blow it constitutes the fiber of the personal” (Riley 2005: 1): this paradox, phrased by
the  English  poet  and  philosopher  Denise  Riley,  may  well  express  the  fundamental
preoccupation beneath the work of the Tobagoan writer Marlene NourbeSe Philip. Underlying
Riley's statement is the idea that language is a form of praxis, a process issuing from social
interaction rather than from individual speakers, a vehicle of culture and a vector of power, as
well as a set of dialects, registers and styles that transcend the individual. Yet, language is also
a  material  phenomenon,  involving bodies:  bodies  who speak and bodies  who are in  turn
spoken by language.  Language speaks the most intimate parts  of the self,  its  feelings,  its
emotions, its desires, or as Riley puts it,  “its affect” (ibid.).  Therefore, language effects a
torsion  on  its  speakers,  “it  courses  like  blood”  through  them,  claims  Riley (ibid.),  thus
subverting the idea of an unconscious springing up from the privacy of the body and soul of
each  individual  speaker  and  advancing  the  idea  of  an  outward,  relational  unconscious
hovering between people.
The main issue addressed in the hybrid writing of Marlene NourbeSe Philip – hybrid
in particular with reference to her use of literary genres: her poetry incorporates prose and the
essay form, while her novels contains substantial sections of poetry – is the way language acts
as  a  weapon  in  a  symbolic  struggle,  the  object  of  which  is  a  gendered,  racialized  body.
“Language”, Jean-Jacques Lecercle argues, “tells us a story of body and affects, of oppression
and  liberation,  of  struggle  and  rapports  de  force”  (Lecercle  2004:3).  This  emerges  as  a
particularly significant  observation in the light  of the experience of those who have been
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enslaved, mutilated, deprived of a native language and forced to live in a foreign language, a
language which has acted as a carrier of both racist and a patriarchal bias, a language in which
the  body  of  the  black  woman  has  become  a  site  of  double  estrangement  and  a  site  of
dispossession  through  the  discourses  of  colonial  desire.  Philip's  poetics  dwells  in  the
investigation  of  the  borders  between  the  inner  and  outer  body.  It  concentrates  on  how
language inhabits and colonizes the bodies of black women as a form of affect, on how it
defines their most intimate experience (sex, menstruations, maternity), and also on how what
Riley calls “impersonal passions” (cfr. Riley 2005) not only create a black woman's body, but
also  alienate  it  from her.  Secondly,  the  question  that  Philip  addresses  concerns  the  very
possibility  of  decolonizing  the  body  through  the  re-appropriation  of  language.  Philip
prospects  the  possibility  of  enacting  a  process  of  counter-interpellation  of  the  foreign
language and the foreign culture which has not only alienated but also mutilated the bodies of
black women,  a  process which she describes  as  a  search for a  mother  tongue within the
English language. 
Rememoring the mother tongue as a way of coming home 
In Philip's collection She Tries Her Tongue, Her Silence Softly Breaks (1989) – a collection
which, while still  a manuscript,  earned the poet from Tobago the prestigious  Casa de las
Americas Prize – the issue of a search for a mother tongue is displayed as an effort to actively
question  and  reconstruct  the  past,  particularly  of  how  African-Caribbean  people  were
deprived  of  their  historical  memory  through  enforced  linguistic  dispossession.  As  the
American  scholar  and  poet  Noemi  Guttman  puts  it,  the  discourse  of  historical  amnesia
(collective, cultural) which emerges from Philip's writing is strictly connected with that of an
historical aphasia  (both individual and collective) ingrained in the body (Guttman: 1996). If a
language is a vehicle and a carrier of a culture, depriving African-Caribbean people of their
own language also made it impossible to express cultural, but also emotional and corporeal,
experiences that could not be translated into the language of the oppressor: “to speak another
language is to speak another consciousness”, as Philip puts it (1989: 81). Philip posits her
poetry  “against  a  dominant  mythology  which  is  ready  to  privilege  the  voice  of  easy
communication and blame the suffering for their silence” (Guttman 1996: 53). This dominant
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mythology is precisely the mythology of a universalizing and universalistic logic of language,
which conceals and excludes the very issue of the untranslatability of languages, cultures and
experiences, considering it just a minor friction in what should be the neutral, informative
function of language. Philip, on the one hand, interrogates this logic, regarding it as the result
of an historical product of dominant, racist discourses aimed at keeping the oppressed always
looking backwards  and at  blaming them for  their  exclusion.  On the other  hand,  she also
utilizes this induced aphasia as a locus for the re-emergence of a lost memory, in a way that
recalls Toni Morrison's concept of rememory: “an active revisioning of history and mythology
to parallel and counter the myths of Black inferiority” (Guttman 1996: 53).
The poem “Discourse on the Logic of Language” (Philip 1989: 30-33) exemplifies
how Philip interrogates and deconstructs the way the foreign experience of English settles
itself in the bodies of black people and transforms it into an historicized, both personal and
shared form of aphasia. “Discourse on the logic of language” is constituted by a juxtaposition
of  texts,  graphically  arranged  so  that  a  central  column  beginning  on  the  first  page  and
continuing on the third – the only column presenting first person pronouns, as well as the only
one properly in verses – is set side by side with other columns, mimicking the discourses of
law, science and psychoanalysis. This juxtaposition is resumed on the last page, where the
verticality of the columns takes instead the form of the horizontality of a multiple choice quiz,
in which all the above quoted discourses are re-staged to define the meaning of the word
“tongue”  from  the  intermingled  perspectives  of  biology,  history,  power,  and  Lacanian
psychoanalysis. Philip's poetry, which exploits the page-layout and makes use of different font
variants, is certainly influenced by the Sycorax Video Style developed by Edward Kamau
Brathwaite, i.e. the particular use Brathwaite makes of different typographic fonts within his
poems, which may be read as an attempt to translate into the visual the rhythm that pertains to
the oral performance. In Philip's work, this feature is more than a technique to create a visual
rhythm in the writing: it is appropriated to visualize the heterogeneity of these discourses. If
the central column about the individual experience of the speaker is also the most important
part of the poem, what the other texts perform is a rendition of how the experience of the
individual  speaker is  always-already embedded in a chain of enunciations,  entangled in a
series of machinic assemblages which sustain and give meaning to it.  
“English/  is  my mother  tongue”  is  the  apparently straightforward statement  which
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opens the central column. The sentence appears as a simple, informative statement, as if the
speaker were giving her particulars – an act usually performed when questioned about one's
identity. It is only the enjambement that separates the word “English” from the rest of the
strophe which reminds the reader  that  the sentence is  part  of a  poem, and that  creates  a
significant pause. This pause not only creates a suspension after the enunciation of the word
“English”,  but  also  separates  it  from its  nominal  predicate  “is  my  mother  tongue”.  The
suspension, the short moment of silence between the word “English” and the possibility of
claiming English as a mother-tongue, is precisely the issue at stake in the whole poem.
As Deleuze and Guattari argued, no statement is characterized only by a referential
function: if,  as the two French philosophers claim, the elementary unit  of language is the
order-word, the statement “English/ is my mother tongue” is characterized by ordering and
commanding as its co-extensive function: what is asserted is not that “English/ is my mother
tongue”,  but  that  English  should  be  the  speaker's  mother  tongue,  that  it  has  become  so
because the order of speaking English as been grafted onto a series of order-words. On the
right-hand side of the column, the discourse of the Law, in the form of two edicts issued to
rule the relationship between masters and slave, momentarily fills the blank created by the
enjambment. The edicts make explicit how English has become a mother tongue precisely as
a result of an enforcement: 
EDICT I EDICT II
Every owner of slaves Every slave caught speak- 
shall, whenever possible, ing his native language
ensure that his slaves shall be severely pun-
belong to as many ethno- ished. When necessary,
linguistic group as removal of the tongue is
possible. If they can- recommended. The of-
not speak to each other, ending organ, when re-
they cannot then foment moved, should be hung
rebellion and revolution on high in a central place,
so that all may see and
tremble (Philip 1989: 30-32)
Philip does not tell the reader the origins of her quotations. Her mimicking of the discourses
of the oppressor challenges the reader to recognize the irony of the colonial situation. The
mentioning of the separation of slaves from their communities, so that “if they cannot speak
to  each other,  they cannot  then  foment  rebellion  and revolution”  immediately recalls  the
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colonial policy of  divide et impera (“divide and rule”). In the second edict, meanwhile, the
annihilation and forceful forgetting of African languages is materialized in the mutilation of a
tongue, a scene of maiming and torture which recalls the many inhuman physical punishments
to which slaves were commonly subjected in the plantations, and which C. R. L. James so
vividly describes in The Black Jacobins. The reference to the second edict reminds the reader
that English began to speak the body of its African-Caribbean speakers precisely in the form
of maiming and threat. The image of the mutilation crosses back and forth between the regime
of the physical  and of the psychological:  these public  acts  of legalized violence not only
effected a physical mutilation of a person’s body. They were also meant to mutilate their very
soul projecting onto them the humiliation of being dispossessed of their bodies, and castrating
any sparkle of resistance that may still inhabit their spirit. 
The impersonality and assertiveness of the discourse of the Law is mirrored, in the
second page of the poem, by the discourse of science. While the discourse of the Law imposes
English onto the body of its speaker with an explicit act of enforcement, the discourse of
science imposes English – and with English, what Lamming called “speech and concept as a
way, a method, a necessary avenue towards area of the self which could not be reached in any
other way” (Lamming 1992: 109) – as an apparently neutral discourse to access the body as a
field  of  knowledge.  References  to  the  work  of  Broca  and Wernicke,  the  two nineteenth-
century scientists after whom the corresponding area of the brain were named, present speech
as a biological function located in the brain and apparently expurgated of its pragmatic and
social aspects. Yet, these pragmatics and social aspects emerge in the form of the repressed
which returns through the historical filter through which Philip quotes the work of these two
scientists: “Dr. Broca believed the size of the brain determined intelligence; he devoted much
of his time to 'proving' that white males of the Caucasian race had larger brains than, and were
therefore superior to, women, Blacks and other people of colour” (Philip 1989: 31). Broca's
studies on language as a biological function, as Guttman notes (1996: 58), were carried out on
the corpses of people who had been affected by some form of aphasia in their lives, and in
which the French scientist discovered serious damage to specific areas of the brain. Broca
studied  the  body with an apparently scientific,  “neutral”  purpose.  Yet,  the fact  that  these
studies were aimed at somehow demonstrating the inferiority of women and of non-Caucasian
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people undermines the idea of their supposed scientific neutrality.38 Philip presents Broca's
work  as  the  endeavour  of  an  amnesic  discourse,  which  not  only  engages  in  an  active
forgetting of history, but, as Guttman puts it, “manages to hide its own agenda from itself”
(1996: 57).
The text on the left-hand side of the central column is also a discourse on the body, but
a discourse of a very different kind. Language is presented in its connection with the body, not
merely as a biological function, but rather in the form of the desire which drives a child's
attempt to access her mother tongue: 
WHEN IT WAS BORN, THE MOTHER HELD HER NEWBORN CHILD CLOSE: SHE BEGAN
THEN TO LICK IT ALL OVER. THE CHILD WHIMPERED A LITTLE BUT AS THE MOTHER'S
TONGUE MOVED FASTER AND STRONGER OVER ITS BODY, HE GREW SILENT – THE
MOTHER TURNING IT THIS  WAY AND THAT UNDER HER TONGUE UNTIL SHE HAD
TONGUED IT CLEAN OF THE CREAMY WHITE SUBSTANCE COVERING ITS BODY
THE MOTHER THEN PUT HER FINGERS INTO HER CHILD'S MOUTH  – GENTLY FORCING
IT OPEN; SHE TOUCHES HER TONGUE TO THE CHILD'S TONGUE AND HOLDING THE
TINY MOUTH OPEN, SHE BLOWS INTO IT – HARD. SHE WAS BLOWING WORDS – HER
WORDS, HER MOTHER'S WORDS, THOSE OF HER MOTHER'S MOTHER, AND ALL THEIR
MOTHER'S BEFORE – INTO HER DAUGHTER'S MOUTH (Philip 1989: 30, 32)
Guttman acutely notes that this text is not simply juxtaposed with the central column, but that
it is written in the margin of the page and perpendicularly to the text of the other columns, so
that, in order to be able to read it, the reader must turn the text sideways. This page layout
spatializes and disrupts the discourses of science and the Law:  “It is as if this discourse is
standing with its back to the other discourses, as if it is calling into question the relevance of
the other  discourses;  indeed,  reading the other  discourses  from this perspective would be
impossible, which shows how important perspective is in reading, as in culture, and how one
culture's 'margin' is another culture's space in which to write” (Guttman 1996: 65-66). Indeed,
it is precisely in this margin that Philip will later construct her discourse of homecoming and
the search for a mother tongue in her novel Looking for Livingstone: An Odyssey of Silence. 
 As  Jean-Jacques  Lecercle  observes,  psychoanalysts  may  not  have  invented  the
expression “mother tongue”, but with their theories they have certainly imparted meaning to
38
To support her claims, Guttman refers particularly to Stephen Jay Gould's study “The Mismeasure of Man”
(1981). Gould describes Broca as “an excellent  scientist totally blinded by his own prejudice” (Guttman
1996: 97), which Guttman reads as a sign of a “fascinating story of the amnesiac discourse in action” (ibd.)
135
it, investigating how access to language is linked to the body as a site of cognitive, emotional,
and enunciative  operation  (Lecercle  2006:  178).  “Mother  tongue” is  an  expression  which
affirms the materiality of language, its connection to the body, or more specifically, to what
Lecercle  calls  the  erotic  body of  Freudian  and Lacanian  psychoanalysis.  To talk  about  a
“mother-tongue” implies the idea that the speaker is inhabited, is colonized by the language of
the  mother,  and  that  he  or  she  is  spoken  by  the  language  of  the  mother.  The  word
“territorialization” is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari draw from the theories of Lacan: for
Lacan territorialization is “the imprint of maternal nourishment and care-giving on the child's
libido,  a  process  which  creates  charged  erogenous  zones  and  objects  out  of  organs  and
orifices” (Holland 1991: 56). The two passages quoted above envisage the moment of the
child's access to language as a moment of territorialization, in which the mother eroticizes the
body of the daughter by licking it  with her tongue, and by forcing words into the child's
mouth, as if words were a source of nourishment. A scene told first in the past and then in a
narrative present, it suggests that the passage of words from the body of the mother (and of
“all their mother's before”) to the body of the daughter is a highly sexualized act, involving a
specific conception of femininity. The instability of the eroticization and sexualization of the
body of the daughter, nonetheless, is highlighted by the fact that this scene of territorialization
is, in fact, also a highly deterritorializing and re-terrritorializing scene: the mouth as an organ
for breathing is deterritorialized by its function and reterritorialized as an organ for eating,
then as a site for sexual pleasure, and finally as an organ for producing sounds and language.
The body of the mother makes rhizome with the body of the daughter: they don't become one,
but they evolve along parallel lines of flights. 
A similar process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization is presented in the quiz
that concludes and summarizes the poem. Four different questions replicate and restage the
discourses which the poem has juxtaposed: 
 A tapering, blunt-tipped, muscular, soft and fleshy organ describes
(a) the penis.
(b) the tongue
(c ) neither of the above
(d) both of the above
In the man the tongue is
(a) the principal organ of taste
(b) the principal organ of articulate speech 
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( c) the principal organ of oppression and exploitation
(d) all of the above.
The tongue
(a) is an interwoven bundle of striated muscle running in three planes.
(b) is fixed to the jawbones.
(c ) has an outer covering of mucous membrane covered with papillae.
(d) contains ten thousand taste buds, none of which is sensitive to the taste of foreign words.
Air is forced out of the lungs up the throat to the larynx where it causes the vocal cords to vibrate and
create sound. The metamorphosis from sound to intelligible words requires
(a) the lip, tongue and jaw all working together.
(b) a mother tongue. 
(c ) the overseer's whip.
(d) all of the above or none. (Philip 1989: 33)
What is remarkable in Philip's poetry is precisely its capacity to put these many different
discourses together and to let them contradict and deterritorialize one another. It is not just a
form of heteroglossia that allows for a multivocal reading of this text, but also the very fact
that  these  discourses  deconstruct  one  another,  showing  a  continuous  disinvestment  and
reinvestment of meaning and sense as well as of desire. In the first question, Philip displaces
and  corrodes  the  idea  of  the  “phallus”,  which  in  Lacanian  psychoanalysis  is  of  central
importance in describing the child's process of entering into the order of the symbolic, and
juxtaposes it with the “tongue”, an image which is used in the poem to suggest an exclusively
gendered/ feminine relationship to language. The tongue, which is central to Philip's image of
the child being inhabited by her mother tongue, emerges from these lines as the site of a pre-
symbolic form of language, as in Kristeva's chora – thus also recalling the idea of poetry as
controlled psychosis. Yet, the tongue is not totally excluded from the symbolic sphere either,
signalling not only the communion between the body of the mother and of the child, but also
prefiguring the symbolic separation that will be attained through the Nom du Père ( the tongue
is [..] “the principal organ of oppression and exploitation”). 
What is most significant in this poem is that even the  biological body or the  erotic
body on which the relation between the self and language is established is never reduced to
biological or individual  functions.  In  A Marxist  Philosophy of Language,  Lecercle speaks
similarly of a concept of a body as a labouring body. “Labouring” is a term that the French
Marxist utilizes to subsume both the Marxist concept of labour – thus to talk about the  body
itself as a material product of “institutions and apparatuses, in that they produce discourses
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and speech acts” (175) – and  labour as the function of giving birth – one of those bodily
functions that the sanitized, western bourgeois idealization of the body tend to repress and
forget, and that Deleuze and Guattari famously refer to in the incipit of the Anti-Oedipus. The
labouring body, like Deleuze and Guattari's “body without organs” (i.e. the body of desire), is
not just an individual entity, but is shaped and fashioned by social forces and relations, the
product as well as the agent of a social praxis. 
Talking about a labouring body with reference to Philip's poetry, in which images of
maternity and feminine bodily functions recur, make it possible to account for the way she
uses birth and the womb as a metaphor for describing the birth of speakers taking place – not
without  suffering,  not  in  the anesthetized form that  ideas of  language as  abstraction may
suggest – through language. Re-framing what Guttman describes as a discourse of aphasia in
the poetry of Marlene Philip within the paradigm of the labouring body allows for a different
perspective in the central  column of the poetry in the light of the discourses of language
performed in the other,  juxtaposed texts.  In  the column,  the  body of  the  speaker  is  both
transformed by and transformative of the discourses of Law, Science and Psychoanalysis. If
these discourses carried by English (with a capital E) simultaneously inhabit the body of the
speaker, the speaker, in turn, creates a torsion  in the  English: 
English 
is my mother tongue.
A mother tongue is not
not a foreign lan lan lang 
language 
l/anguish
anguish
 a foreign anguish.
[..]
but I have 
a dumb tongue 
tongue dumb
father tongue 
and english is 
my mother tongue 
is my father tongue 
is a foreign lan lan lang
language
l/anguish
  anguish
a foreign anguish
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is english -
another tongue 
my mother 
mammy
mummy
moder
mater 
macer
moder
tongue 
mother tongue 
tongue mother 
tongue me
mothertongue me
mother me
touch me 
with the tongue of your 
lan lan lang
language
l/anguish
  anguish
english 
is a foreign anguish (Philip 1.1-71)
Indeed, although the poem begins with an assertion that “a mother tongue is not/ a foreign lan
lan lang/  language” (l.3-5),  the conclusion to  the process of  fragmentation that  the poem
performs – which mimics precisely the way someone potentially affected by aphasia might
speak – is a request that english (with a small ‘e’) should become not just a father tongue but
also  a  mother  tongue.  Aphasia  becomes  an  induced  context  in  which  language  as  affect
traverses the body of the speaker and makes this body speak in a way that deconstructs it
phonetically,  transforms  it  into  sound  and  intensities,  makes  it  take  certain  unexpected
directions. Beneath the stammering “not a foreign lan lan lang/ language” (l.4-5) it is possible
to  read  the  territorial  separation  that  brought  English  and made  it  into  a  mother  tongue.
Indeed, the reader might be tempted to complete the series of “lan”s with a  ‘d’ rather than
with a ‘g’. Envisioning language as a foreign land is a way of positioning the self within the
language,  of  asserting  one's  foreignness  while  at  the  same time performing a  deeply de-
territorializing  gesture.  The  word  “l/anguish”,  broken  into  two  parts  by  a  slash  which
graphically reproduces the idea of cutting, suggests both the separation which causes English
to be a site of neurosis, and the idea of losing vitality, of being forced to live in an unpleasant
place. Yet the very fact that this separation is a “foreign l/anguish” also separates it from the
139
self, making it the site for a possible reterritorialization. Similarly, beneath the transformations
that the word “mother” assumes (“mammy/ mummy/ moder/ mater/ macer/ moder”, l.52-57),
it is also possible to see the transformation that English as a mother tongue performs upon
itself: from a childish “mammy” (l.52) to a fetishized “mummy”(l.53), to then be revitalized
into the vernacular word “moder”, reasserted twice in the poem. 
When Noemi Guttman introduces the word “aphasia” in her discussion of Marlene
NourbeSe Philip's “She Tries  Her  Tongue,  Her  Silence  Softly  Breaks”,  she  does  so  with
extreme carefulness. The word, she claims, seems particularly pertinent with reference to the
passage in the poem “Discourse on the Logic of Language” in which Philip mentions Broca
and Wernicke, whose scientific discoveries were based precisely in studies of patients unable
to understand or produce speech as a result of brain damage. Yet, Guttman feels that she has
to make a qualification about her use of a term that is usually connected to a rather disabling
illness to talk about the way African-Caribbean people access language. Her use of the word
“aphasia” may wrongly suggest that Caribbean demotic, a way of speaking English which is
characterized by a use of grammar and syntax that diverge from standard English, could be
interpreted as a sign of a “lack of fluency”, or worse, an “inferior conceptual ability in the
speaker of Caribbean demotic” (Guttman 1996: 57). What she fails to see is the way Philip
utilizes, in the end of the column, the word “english” with a small letter, to imply that aphasia
is not just an induced process taking place in the singular experience of the speaker, but that it
may become the very site of the deterritorialization that a minor language may perform on a
major language (cfr. Deleuze/Guattari 1986). 
In a short essay “The Absence of Writing or How I Almost became a Spy”, published
as  a  theoretical  epilogue  to  She  Tries  Her  Tongue,  Her  Silence  Softly  Breaks,  Marlene
NourbeSe Philips defines the role of the artist precisely in the light of his or her capacity to
intervene within language. Fundamental to any form of artistic creation, she claims, is the
possibility of creating new links between images, or rather, as Philip prefers to call it, i-mage,
and word:
Is this process is as it should be, then the autonomous i-mage maker serves the function of continually
enriching the language by enlarging the source of i-mages – in particular, metaphorical i-mages. If we
accept that living language continuously encapsulates, reflects and refines the entire experiential life
and world view of the tribe, the race and consequently of society at large; and if we accept that the
poet, the story-teller, the singer or balladeer (through their words), express this process in their work,
then  we  must  accept  that  this  process  becomes  one  way in  which  a  society  continually  accept,
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integrates and transcends its experiences, positive or negatives. For it is through those activities –
poetry, story-telling and writing – that the tribe's experiences are converted and transformed to i-mage
and to word almost simultaneously, and from word back to image again. So metaphorical life takes
place,  so  the  language  becomes  richer,  the  store  of  metaphor,  myth  and  fable  enlarged,  and  the
experience transcended not by exclusion and alienation, but by inclusion in the linguistic psyche, the
racial and generic memory of the group. (Philip 1989: 80)
The  passage  describes  indeed  a  circular  process  in  which  language  acts  as  a  site  of
subjectivation through interpellation (as Lecercle would put  it,  cf.  Lecercle  2006),  and in
which the artist, in turn, is called upon to counter-interpellate language by pushing it to its
limits,  by  enriching  it  with  new  experiences,  and  by  intervening  in  the  process  of
signification. With the Middle Passage, Philip claims, “[t]he bridge that language creates, the
crossover from i-mage to expression was destroyed, if only temporarily” (Philip 1989: 81).
When European languages replaced the African language that had been recently removed, and
when new, artistic attempts at establishing a relation between word/i-mage were started, “this
process would take place through a language that was not only experientially foreign, but also
etymologically hostile and expressive of the non-being of the African” (ibid.).39 Indeed, Philip
claims,  the  autonomous  production  of  i-mages  in  the  Caribbean  has  been  inhibited  for
centuries by the alienation of a language in which African could come into being as primitive,
inferior.  
For Caribbean artists, to be able to write and to recreate their historical experience and
their  myths  means  to  engage  in  a  struggle  over  language.  Here  the  word  “recreate”
emphasizes, not just a re-constitution of the memory of a past,  but the very possibility of
translating, modifying and constructing this memory in the light of the present experience of
the speaker.  In order to re-establish links between word and i-mage, Caribbean writers cannot
but first engage with and reflect the multiple structures of violence of which language has
been a vehicle: they have to reveal English as a language tainted by colonialism and slavery,
and at  the same time they have to explore exile as a linguistically creative force: “In the
vortex  of  New  World  slavery,  the  African  forged  new  and  different  words,  developed
strategies  to  impress  her  experience  on  the  language.  The  formal  standard  language  was
subverted, turned inside out, and even sometimes erased. Nouns became stranger to verbs and
vice versa; tonal accentuation took the place of several words at a time; rhythm held sway”
39  The aggression on language has been so powerful, Philip claims, that the only form of African art which
could survive the middle passage was music, precisely because of its non-verbal nature. 
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(Philip 1989: 83). This process, which Philip considers to be, in part, one in which the African
language has an influence on English,  is the signal of an active deterritorialization of the
language of the colonizer. While the experience of most Caribbean people remains dyglossic
– divided between a standard language and a dialect or patois in which the influence of old
African languages are more detectable – the best language for an artist to use to re-member
(or  re-memory,  to  use  Toni  Morrison's  expression)  the  mother  tongue  is,  paradoxically,
English. Dialects and patois are the sign of a parallel and closed experience, which remains
confined to the rather limited number of their speakers. English, instead, works as a shared
experience, whose internal dislocation and destruction – as the one that Philip performs in the
poem “Discourse on the Logic of Language” – makes it available for the creation of new i-
mages. 
The hyphen that Philip puts in the word i-mage may indeed be interpreted as both a
sign  for  the  separation  from the  mother  tongue  that  Philip  imputes  to  the  imposition  of
English, and as a possible, tentative means of reconnection. The decision to separate the ‘I’
from the rest of the word, nonetheless, is a direct reference to the Rastafarian linguistic habit
of pronouncing or rewriting word with a special emphasis on the “I” (as, for example, in the
expressions “I and I”, meaning “we”, or “I-dren”, meaning “brethren” ) in order to highlight
the creative force of the speakers, and their ability to command the self. The “I” in Rastafarian
culture has a performative function – it creates new identities and selves for the speaker –
which  may be  compared to  the  cohortative  mood of  Hebrew40 (cfr.  McFarlane  1998:  8).
Besides, for Rastafarian religion, 'I' is the symbol of God and of the number '1', and is also
homophone with the word 'eye'. This reference to Rastafarian religion configures i-mage both
as  a  the  site  for  the  creation  of  an  empowering image  of  the  self,  as  well  as  a  site  for
articulating 'vision', the newly acquired ability to see things differently through language. 
Secondly, the “I” accompanied by the hyphen may also refer, in a deeply ambiguous
way, to Chomsky's concept of the I-language, in which the letter “I” refers to three adjectives
that characterise it: internal, individual, intensional. I-language, according to Chomsky, is the
opposite of E-languages, or External languages, like English, or German  or Japanese, which
he dismisses as epiphenomena linked to specific social, political and cultural contexts. The I-
language,  instead,  is  an  expression  that  Chomsky  uses  to  locate  language  within  the
40 Indeed, Semitic influence on the linguistic use of Rastafarians may be explained by the special role that
Ethiopia plays in this Caribbean religion. (cfr. McFarlane 1998: 8)
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mind/brain, as an internal faculty which every individual of the human species possesses, and
which  makes  the  basic  structure,  as  well  as  “the  meaning  of  words  and  the  nature  of
sentences” (Chomsky 2001: 207) of all languages similar. It is, in Chomsky's view, precisely
because of this similarity that the learning of foreign languages is possible at all. The poem
“Universal Grammar” engages with precisely this presumed universal, biological quality of
language.  Like  “Discourse  on  the  Logic  of  Language”,  a  poem  constructed  by  the
juxtaposition  of  texts  reading  other  texts,  “Universal  Grammar”  re-quotes  and  rewrites
Chomsky in the light of the experience of the Black Caribbean Woman:  
MANY FACTORS  AFFECT  AND  DETERMINE  THE  ORDER  OF  WORDS  IN  A SPOKEN
SENTENCE: THE STATE OF MIND OF THE SPEAKER; THE GENDER OF THE SPEAKER; HIS
OR  HER  INTENTIONS;  THE  IMPRESSION  THE  SPEAKER  WISHES  TO  MAKE;  THE
BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN  SPEAKER AND LISTENER AND, NOT LEAST OF ALL,
THE CONSTRAINT OF UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
THE THEORY OF UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR SUGGESTS THE WAY WE LEARN LANGUAGE
IS  INNATE –  THAT THE CONSCIOUS  MIND IS  NOT AS  RESPONSIBLE  AS  WE MIGHT
BELIEVE  IN  THIS  PROCESS.  OUR  CHOICES  OF  GRAMMATICAL POSSIBILITIES  AND
EXPRESSION ARE, IN FACT, SEVERELY LIMITED; IT IS THIS VERY LIMITATION THAT
ENSURE WE LEARN LANGUAGE EASILY AND NATURALLY (Philip 1989: 37, 39)
The use Philip makes of Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, in particular the idea that
languages  are  learnt  easily  and naturally,  goes  hand in  hand,  in  an  ironic  way,  with  her
description of how language was forced onto African people in the form of what she describes
as a linguistic rape. Claiming that the learning of language is easy means deliberately ignoring
and forgetting that language is a weapon in a struggle in which identities and rapports de force
emerge. The term “Universal Grammar”, therefore, becomes the signifier of a constraint, not
coming  from  the  internal,  innate  faculty  of  language,  but  rather  from  a  history  of
dispossession. 
In “Universal Grammar”, Philip engages in a peculiar way with the concept of “deep
structure” that Chomsky elaborates in his theories of generative grammar. “Deep structures”
emerge  from the  poem not  as  a  theoretical  construct  that  seeks  to  unify  several  related
structures,  but  rather  as  the  possibility  of  re-membering  a  mother  tongue  that  has  been
forgotten:
Parsing – the exercise of telling the part of speech of each word in a sentence (Latin, pars, a part)
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The – distinguishing adjective, limiting the noun, cell. 
Smallest – adjective of quantity, superlative degree, qualifying the noun, cell (unsuccessfully)
cell – common noun, neuter gender, singular number, third person, nominative case governing the
intransitive verb, remembers. (Long-term memory improves cell growth in nerve cells.)
remembers – regular verb, transitive, active voice, indicative mood, present tense, singular member,
third person agreeing with its nominative, cell which remembers and so re-members.
O – sound of exclamation as in O God! Made by rounding the lips; first  syllable  of  word  name  of
African goddess of the river – O/shun (Philip 1989: 38)
The reference to body and cells is used not to assert the biological, interior nature of affect,
but rather the constitution of affect through language, through a shared, historical experience.
The “O” to which this exercise of parsing leads is not the sign of a pre-historical, primitive
exclamation  of  emotion  (an  expression of  bodily needs,  as  it  could be put),  but  rather  a
structure in constant variation, able to host the exclamation “O God” – with whatever affects
may be connected to it, and signalled by the context of enunciation as well as the intonation of
the speaker – and the re-membering of the African goddess O/shun. Written with a  slash
separating the O from the final part of the word, Oshun, is not a stable sign of an African
inheritance passed through the genes of African-Caribbean people, but rather the site for a
search that may lead the African-Caribbean Writer to re-create Oshun through her poetry in a
language in which O/shun is inevitably other. 
“I  will  open a  way to  the  interior  or  perish”.  Looking  for  the  self  in  the  silence  of  the
ancestors
Whereas “O” is the smallest linguistic sign which Philip explores in  She Tries Her Tongue,
Her Silence Softly Breaks, her search to re-member a mother tongue, the object of her novel
Looking for Livingstone:  An Odyssey of  Silence (1997)  is  the absolute  absence of  sound.
Silence as pure affect, as the dissolution of both language and exile, and as a form of perfect
communion between the self  and the body – silence as the relevant  moment of language
which nonetheless remains beyond the comprehension of any philosophy of language, as Jean
Jacques  Lecercle  puts  it  (Lecercle  2005:  3)  –  is  the  objective  that  an  imaginary  woman
Traveller looks for in an imaginary journey back home to her African ancestors. 
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The quest for silence is presented in the book as a quest for the truer, inner self, a self
which escapes language and representation; yet the discovery of this imaginary self is always-
already tainted with the presence of the other. Dr. Livingstone, the Scottish explorer who is
credited with having gone deeper into the interior of Africa than any other white person before
him, is the Other that the Traveller has to meet and face in order to discover the silence of the
ancestors:
THE FIRST AND LAST DAY OF THE MONTH OF THE NEW MOONS
(OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAST AND FIRST MONTH)
IN THE FIRST YEAR OF OUR WORD
0300
My own map was a primitive one, scratched on animal skin. Along the way, some people had
given me some of theirs – no less primitive – little pieces of bark with crude pictures of where they
thought I would find what I was searching for. I had some bones and various pieces of wood with
directions incised on them. And a mirror. Where was I going? I had forgotten where I had come from
– knew I had to go on. “I will open a way to the interior or perish.” Livingstone's own words – I took
them now as my own – my motto. David Livingstone, Dr. David Livingstone, 1813-73 – Scottish, not
English, and one of the first Europeans to cross the Kalahari – with the help of Bushmen; was shown
the Zambesi by the indigenous African and “discovered” it; was shown the falls of Mosioatunya – the
smoke that thunders – by the indigenous Africans, “discovered” it and renamed it. Victoria Falls. Then
he set  out  to  “discover”  the  source  of  the  Nile  and  was  himself  “discovered”  by Stanley -  “Dr.
Livingstone, I presume?” And History. Stanley and Livingstone – white fathers of the continent. Of
silence. (Philip 1997: 7)
Silence emerges from the first lines of the novel as a double sign: the sign of something that
goes beyond language, and the product of a silencing imposed from outside. Dr. Livingstone
is  described as  a  “white  father  of  the  continent.  Of  silence”  (ibid.)  to  remind us  that,  if
language is the agon of a struggle for power, so too is silence. Livingstone, as the quote that
Philip reports from The London Journal of 1856 illustrates, was celebrated in his times for
having transformed what had been a land of silence (of “burning solitudes, bleak and barren,
heated by poisonous winds, infested by snakes and only roamed over by a few scattered tribes
of untameable barbarians”, Philip 1997: 7) into “a high county, full of fruit trees, abounding in
shade, watered by a perfect network of rivers” (ibid.). The power of silence resides precisely
in its self-referential quality: the violence of silence is the violence of exclusion: if you cannot
name something, it means that it does not exist. Livingstone's cannibalization of the name of
Victoria Falls, his claim of having discovered them, performed the effect to annihilate and
exclude the indigenous African from History. 
145
The sentence “I will open a way to the interior or perish” and its double appropriation
by  Livingstone  and  by  the  Traveller  as  first-person  narrator  functions  as  a  key  motif
throughout  the text.  An entry originally taken from an  The London Journal of  1856, this
sentence uttered by the Traveller re-stages the colonial, sexist metaphorical representation of
Africa as a dark continent – a “Heart of Darkness”, to use Conrad's phrasing – as well as of
the images of the exotic, eroticized black woman that are often associated with it. Philip uses
the gender-specific terms of gender aggression to transform them into a space of resistance.
What the Traveller sets out to discover is her own interior, her own body, her own silence as
well as the forgotten silence of her ancestors, both in the form of their authenticity – as the
narrator implies by her insistent, controversial use of word “being” – as well as in the form of
their being produced by language. Yet, paradoxically, the very fact that her journey is already
founded on the utterance of somebody else's already undermines the possibility of coming
home without a detour through the space of the other, or through the external medium of
language. Silence is, to put it differently, already plurivocal. 
The distinction between interior and exterior is the unstable line that the Traveller has
to walk to undertake her Odyssey to re-possess her silence. Looking for Livingstone is a text
very much influenced by French feminism, and particularly by Luce Irigaray's  Speculum of
the  Other  Woman (1974).  Isabel  Hoving,  who  analyses  the  novel  in  the  light  of  its
psychoanalytical implications, remarks that Philip engages in the search for silence as a space
of irreducible difference, of the feminine Other which phallogocentrism excludes and which
returns  to  unsettle  representation.  The  Traveller's  accusation  that  Livingstone  brought
“phallused words” to Africa (1997: 27), the strongly sexually-connoted imaginary displayed,
and the insistence on maternity and on the womb may indeed suggest that Philip is engaging
with an exercise of  écriture feminine. Philip's novel seems to aim at enacting “the passage
beyond  the  phallic  mimicry of  the  monologic  propriety of  logos  to  the  possibility  of  an
affective language in and through to think difference without reducing it to the normative
fantasy of oneness” (Athanasiou/Tzelepis 2010: 3). The very decision to head each chapter
with a reference to a time going beyond the way western thought measures and conceives of
time, and rather referring to cycles of the moon, may be read as an attempt to perform alterity
in the form of an affect linked to the bodies of women. The Traveller's journey through the
desert  may  be  read  as  a  journey  through  the  “monstrous  liminality  and  indeterminate
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strangeness of teras (teras: both horrible and wonderful) that calls into question the closure of
intelligibility” (Athanasiou 2010: 3). 
Silence, as it emerges from Philip's novel, certainly has much in common with the
concept of the “feminine” as elaborated by Irigaray. In the economy of representation that
Irigaray outlines, the “feminine” emerges as that which is both created and excluded by the
binary  structure  of  language  and  thought.  The  feminine  is  the  unspeakable  condition  of
figuration, that which must remain outside representation, insomuch as it represent a field of
disruptive possibilities. It is, in Irigaray's view, this very exclusion that sustain and confirm “a
phallogocentric project of autogenesis” (Butler 1993: 36). Images of the feminine that may be
produced in the binarism of phallogocentric systems of representation are always the site of
the very erasure and disempowerment of the feminine. By the same token, silence – which is
always referred to as the field of the feminine, not only to the Traveller's feminine self, but
also to the women who help, house and teach her how to discover silence – is presented in
Philip's novel as the product of a colonial inscription, as an erasure and as a fetish, but also as
that which brings about a field of disruptive possibilities.  
In the encounter between Livingstone and the Traveller which concludes the novel, the
quality  of  Silence  is  the  object  of  a  series  of  interrogations  that  the  Traveller  subjects
Livingstone  to.  In  the  passage,  Livingstone  is  ironically  addressed  as  “Livingstone-I-
presume”,  a  naming  that  alienates  Livingstone  of  his  own  self  in  a  two-fold  way.  “Dr.
Livingstone,  I  presume”  is  the  sentence  that  Stanley  has  been  credited  with  having
pronounced upon his encounter with an ill, enfeebled Livingstone, thus robbing Livingstone
of  the  possibility of  introducing himself.  In  the  wording “I  presume” is  also inscribed a
history of assumed cognitive superiority, which Livingstone may himself endorse but which
the  narrator  nonetheless  ironically deprives  him of,  using “I  presume” as  an  empty label
which she attaches to Livingstone's name. The encounter functions as a sort of subversion of
roles, in which the Traveller takes the role of the subject in the position of knowing, while
Livingstone is the one who does not know how to answer her question:
“I have two riddles for you, Livingstone-I-presume – a riddle, a riddle, a riddle ma ree: what is both
noun and verb as well as sentence?”
“Noun, verb and sentence?” he repeated to himself under his breath.
Around us it  has now become quite dark – the fire lit  up his gaunt face,  leaving his thin,
raddled body in darkness. As he puzzled over the question his face seemed to float -
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“Give up?” I asked.
“Yes.”
“Silence.”
“Silence?”
“Yes, Silence.  Silence is a noun, yes?” He nodded. “To silence is a  verb, and silence is a
sentence.”
“How sentence?”
“As in punishment – Livingstone-I-presume – or sanction – you know, I silence you.”
He laughed, “Clever – very clever.”
“Another one?”
“Yes.”
“What kind of sentence can only be broken, not appealed?” The sound of crickets was now
loud around us – I put some more wood on the fire. 
“Well, I know now it has to do with silence … and you said that silence was a sentence – one
breaks silence, doesn't one?
“One? I, me, Livingstone-I-presume, I break my silence – the sentence of my silence.” 
(Philip 1997: 71)
Silence,  like Irigaray's  feminine,  is  something that,  once framed in representation,  is  also
broken.  Yet,  the  passage  envisages  the  possibility  of  reversing  Silence,  of  using  it  in  a
performative way against the very person who imposed it onto the body of the Traveller and
on her ancestors. When the Traveller explains to Livingstone that the word “Silence” is a
sentence and uses an explanation that refers to punishment, what she performs is an act of
symbolic castration. Livingstone is deprived of his power to claim possession of Silence.
Looking for Livingstone certainly works through and re-stages the very contradiction
that lays at the foundation of Irigaray's  concept of the feminine.  Irigaray,  as Butler notes,
“tend[s] to mime the grandiosity of the philosophical errors that she underscores. The miming
is, of course, tactical, and her re-enactment of the philosophical error requires that we learn
how to read for the difference that her reading performs” (Butler 1993: 36). The Traveller
also, in her own way, mimics Livingstone, claiming that her journey is of a different nature,
and  inviting  the  reader  to  reflect  upon  the  difference  between  her  own  endeavour  and
Livingstone's  –  the  paternal  figure,  the  Nom du  Père.  The  character  of  Livingstone  is  a
constant presence in the narration, and indeed the Traveller declares that she wants to follow
in his footsteps and discover him again precisely because he might have discovered Silence
before her.  The questions that arise as to whether this mimicking of Livingstone is really
successful are the same that Judith Butler asks with regard to the work of Luce Irigaray: 
Does the voice of the philosophical father echo in her, or has she occupied that voice,  insinuated
herself into the voice of the father? If she is “in” that voice for either reason, is she also at the same
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time “outside” it? How do we understand the being “between,” the two possibilities as something
other than a spatialized entre that leaves the phallogocentric binary opposition intact? How does the
difference from the philosophical father resound in the mime which appears to replicate his strategy so
faithfully? This is, clearly, no place between “his” language and “hers”, but a disruptive  movement
which unsettles the topographical claim. This is a taking of his place, not to assume it, but to show that
it is  occupiable, to raise the cost and movement of that assumption. Where and how is the critical
departure from that patrilineage performed in the course of the recitation of his term? (Butler 1997:
36)
By the  same  token,  Looking  for  Livingstone does  not  really  challenge  the  dichotomous
thinking that underlies what is denounced as phallogocentrism. On the contrary, it chooses to
restate and to endorse it. Although in Looking for Livingstone the body emerges as marked by
psychical,  social  and  interpersonal  meaning, Philip  cannot  avoid  falling  into  the  trap  of
essentialism that she had brilliantly avoided in her collection  She Tries Her Tongue,  Her
Silence Softly Breaks. In the novel, Philip also engages with the issue of constituting word/ i-
mages equations,  but  these  equation  do  not  act  upon  language,  upon  the  very  site  of
subjectivation. The language that she uses in the novel, even in the poetic section, is much
less complex and plurivocal than that in her 1989 poetry collection.  Reading  Looking for
Livingstone does not challenge the reader to assume different perspectives with regard to the
text.  On the contrary,  Philip  often uses  the word “Silence” to  claim her  possession of it,
without  questioning  it  in  any possible  way.  “It  is  the  only  thing  that  I  have  that  is  not
contaminated, My Silence – my very own Silence”, the Traveller-narrator assert in the last
encounter with Livingstone, which concludes the novel (Philip 1997: 65).
In both She Tries Her Tongue, Her Silence Softly Breaks and Looking for Livingstone,
Philip engages with a homecoming whose object is the issue of the retrieval of a mother
tongue which is forever lost. Yet, while in the former she is able to look for the mother tongue
in the place where this mother tongue cannot be – for example in the space of the classic myth
of Philomela, or of Ceres and Proserpine – and to transform the language of the other into a
mother tongue by radicalizing her own exile in it, in Looking for Livingstone the search for a
mother  tongue  becomes  a  much  more  undeviating  affair.  Silence,  the  feminine  and  the
imaginary  ancestors  are  the  ground  on  which  Philip  constructs  her  mother  tongue.  With
reference to Looking for Livingstone, Isabel Hoving has written: “She writes as if she is the
first historian of silence, its very first mythographer” (2001: 271). Yet the myths of silence
that she explores in her work are neither new, nor re-vivified. The tribes that the Traveller
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visits  in  her  Odyssey introduce  her  to  representations  and  myths  of  Silence  which  are
described in the form of primordial, a-historical rituals of initiation, but which in fact restate
and reaffirm a rather essentialist conception of identity.
The most telling episode which illustrates how the novel fails to envisage homecoming
as a transformative process, but rather locates it in an  i-mage which has lost its disruptive
power in favour of a constitutive, assertive function, is the episode in which the Traveller
visits an imaginary Museum of Silence. The museum displays a series of silences belonging
to the tribes that the Traveller has visited in her Odyssey: 
“Return  them,”  I  demanded  of  the  proprietors.  “You  must  return  these  silences  to  their  owners.
Without their silences, these people are less than whole.” They smiled and said nothing. It had been
theft originally, I continued, now it was nothing but “intimidation! - plain and simple – extortion to
continue to hold the entire store of our silence ransom, demand we pay for it, and give assurances we
could care for it”, as they had. 
It was mine – ours – I challenged, to do with as we pleased – so destroy if we so wanted. They
told me the silences were best kept there where they could be labelled, annotated, dated, catalogued -
“in such and such a year, this piece of silence was taken from the _____.” You could fill in any name
you wanted – when and how – it was all the same. It was all there in carefully regulated, climate
controlled rooms.
[..]   my silence – our silence – carefully guarded and cherished by them! My silence was now a
structure, an edifice I could walk around, touch, feel, lick even – and I did – it was cold, cold to the
tongue. I could if I wanted, even pee on it, though that would be difficult, contained as it was behind
plexiglass.
“Remove a thing – a person – from its source,” I said, “from where it belongs naturally, and it
will lose meaning.” These were my final arguments to the curators. “At the very least,” I continued,
“we should  own our  silence.”  It  was  ours  after  all,  I  told  them,  and  upon it  their  speech,  their
language, solid as the punning Petros upon which the early church, harbinger of silence, had been
erected. Ours to do with as we pleased, I repeated, to nourish, care for, or neglect; to let rot, or wither
away to dust, chewed upon by vermin. “Ours! Ours! Ours!” I screamed, to do with as we choose,” I
dropped my voice, “to break, banish, destroy – to negotiate with - “ they laughed – how they laughed,
and said nothing, which was not the same as silence. They said nothing and laughed. (Philip 1997: 57)
Indeed, this passage shows how Philip falls back on a fetishization of silence which arrives at
the point of denying the creative potential of hybridization (“‘Remove a thing – a person –
from its source,’ - I said, ‘from where it belongs naturally, and it will lose meaning – our
silence has lost all meaning’”). The Traveller insists on the idea of possessing silence, without
questioning the very issue of claiming possession over silence or over language. Of course,
the reader is aware that the silence she is talking about is a construction of, and in, her writing,
and that the journey is a figuration of this process of construction of a silence which is the
sign of something forever lost. Yet, if this construction is not accompanied by a movement of
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deterritorialization, the result may be a reassertion of what Deleuze and Guattari call “the
root-thought” (2004: 6 ff.) – the thought of the one that may become two, but is never able to
think as a multiplicity. 
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Chapter 6
Crossing  the  sea  and  circling  the  island  with  writing.  Post-Colonial  re-
appropriations of history in Derek Walcott's Caribbean epic of return Omeros
In “The Sea is History”, a poem first published in the collection  The Star-Apple Kingdom
(1979), Derek Walcott imagined an exchange between two interlocutors, each embodying two
conflicting yet interdependent positions about the nature and scope of historical discourse in
the  Caribbean.  The first  interlocutor  opens the poem with a  series  of  pressing questions:
“Where are your monuments, your battles, martyrs?/ Where is your tribal memory?”(l.1-2).
Addressed  in  the  plural  by  its  opponent,  this  interlocutor  is  a  collective  voice  whose
questions,  far  from  being  innocent,  resonate  with  a  hate  speech41 already  notoriously
performed against the British Caribbean: 
Nothing  was  created  in  the  British  West  Indies,  no  civilization  as  in  Spanish  America,  no  great
revolution as  in  Haiti  or  the American colonies.  There were only plantations,  prosperity,  decline,
neglect: the size of the islands called for nothing else. How can the history of West Indian futility be
written? What tone shall the historian adopt? The history of the islands can never be satisfactorily told.
Brutality isn’t the only difficulty. History is built around achievement and creation; and nothing was
created in the West Indies (Naipaul 1982 [1962]: 27)
The formulation of questions about the possibility of telling a history of the Caribbean –
questions which have already been answered in the negative by V. S. Naipaul following in the
41
The term “hate speech” designates an abusive communication that  is aimed at offending and belittling a
person or a group, for example on the basis of their ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, nationality,
etc. Butler's Excitable Speech (1997) deals precisely with the threatening performativity words and with the
kind of agency which endows language with the power to produce political effects and injuries. Besides,
Butler investigates how hate speech, outside a normative, sovereign view of language (a view in which the
words we speak are construed as unequivocal forms of conduct) can become the site of possible redefinition
of power and action. 
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footsteps of a long tradition of colonial denigration inaugurated by James Anthony Froude
with  The  English  in  the  West  Indies  or  the  Bow  of  Ulysses  (1888)  –  puts  the  second
interlocutor in a situation of potential linguistic vulnerability. An insult such as “nothing was
created in the West Indies” (Naipaul 1982 [1962]: 27) is all the more harmful insofar as the
capacity of language to injure is strictly connected to its interpellative power. Particularly
injurious is the implicit statement that not being able to produce the names of “monuments”,
“battles”, or “martyrs” (l.1), nor to account for a “tribal memory” (l.2), equals not having a
history. It directly affects the way the colonial subject who is addressed comes into being
through language as a subaltern subject, submitted to the cultural hegemony of those who can
claim to have a history. 
The  impasse  is  overcome  by  the  second  interlocutor  with  an  answer  which,  by
displacing the questions, refuses to yield to their implicit violence: “Sirs,/ in that grey vault.
The sea. The sea/ has locked them up. The sea is history” (l.2-4). The second voice disrupts
the hate speech not by denying the absence that the first voice was looking for – “the ocean
kept turning blank pages”, the poem goes on to say (l.24) – but by resemanticizing this very
absence. The fact that “monuments”, “battles” and “martyrs” (l.1) cannot be named because
they have  not  been  institutionalized  in  historical  discourses  makes  them the  site  for  the
emergence of a different form of existence. The Renaissance, instead of being perceived as a
past  epoch whose memory rests  in  the vestiges of ancient glory,  is  a submarine presence
whose remnants are inhabited with sea-life. The bones of drowned people resting in the sea
are united with coral (“bone soldered by coral to bone”, l.13) and become part of living, ever
growing  “mosaics/  mantled  by  the  benediction  of  the  shark's  shadows”  (l.14-15).  The
wreckage of submerged “men'o'war” (l.36) are ornate with “colonnades of coral// past the
gothic windows of sea fans/ to where the crusty grouper, onyx eyed,/ blinks, weighted by its
jewels, like a bald queen” (l.39-42).
Finding a way of inhabiting history by disrupting the hate speech performed against
the Caribbean is also the theme of Omeros (1990; O), Derek Walcott's most ambitious poem
about homecoming. A rewriting of the Iliad and the Odyssey in a contemporary post-colonial
setting,  Omeros restages the topic of Ulysses' journey, transforming the hero's voyage home
into a series of journeys into language, undertaken by several different characters in search of
a way to reconnect with their own pasts. The questions “Where are your monuments, your
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battles,  martyrs?/  Where  is  your  tribal  memory?”  (Walcott  1979,  l.1-2)  are  asked  and
answered by all of these characters in different ways. In  Omeros, the dialogue between the
two conflicting voices staged in “The Sea is History” is expanded and diffracted to encompass
a  variety  of  voices.  Hate  speeches  aimed  at  denying  the  existence  of  Caribbean  history,
culture or identity are appropriated in order to produce and perform different discourses of
hybridization. 
Being hybrid subjects, but in very different relations with race, power, and language,
all the homecoming characters in Omeros are obsessed with the irretrievability of their origins
and with a confrontation with their parental figures. Achille, a fisherman of African origins,
hit by sunstroke, travels back through time and space to seventeenth-century Africa to meet
his  ancestor  Apholabe.  Major  Plunkett,  a  retired  soldier  who  dreams  of  undertaking  an
odyssey through the Empire, decides to give the island of Saint Lucia its right place in history,
and embarks on a project of research. A poet, who is also the first person narrator, comes
home to his dying mother after undertaking a “voyage in” (Said 1994: 295) to Europe and
America. The stories of these three characters'  homecomings intertwine and complete one
another, constituting three of the main sub-plots of an almost eight-thousand lines long poem.
In “The Sea is History” the act of resistance performed by the first voice is both a
statement in language and about language. The poem may be read both as a performance of
the appropriation of the language of the oppressor and as a meta-textual meditation on this
very appropriation. Judith Butler claims that “[t]he failure of language to rid itself of its own
instrumentality or, indeed, rhetoricity, is precisely the inability of language to annul itself in
the telling of a tale, in the reference to what exists or in the volatile scenes of interlocution”
(1997: 8). Similarly Omeros writes the history of the Caribbean by highlighting its concerns
about writing: writing as a confrontation with previous writing, writing as the site of linguistic
renegotiations, writing as a performative act.  
The encounter with Homer and the negotiation of the poet's  ‘I’
The last of the seven books constituting Omeros begins with an encounter which may be read
as a mise en abyme of the poem as a whole. This scene stages an encounter between the poet/
narrator  and Homer.  As  Maria  Cristina  Fumagalli  notes,  this  scene  is  reminiscent  of  the
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encounter between Dante and Virgil in the “selva oscura” (Inferno I,  l.2) preceding Dante's
entrance into the world of the dead (Fumagalli 2001: 200). Just as Virgil guided Dante in his
journey across Hell and Purgatory, Homer will guide the poet in his journey to La Soufrière,
the place where the souls of those who have betrayed Saint Lucia are condemned for eternity,
but also the “healing place” (O LVII I, l.52) in which the poet will be able to purify himself.
In the Comedia, as Ernst Robert Curtius famously claimed, Virgil represented the world of the
Classics, the wisdom which is necessary to ascend to the first two realms of the dead but is
not enough to ascend to Paradise and to God's glory (cf. Curtius 1993 [1948]). Virgil was, in
other  words,  the  master  whose teachings  had to  be learnt  by the disciple,  but  whom the
disciple  had to  exceed in  order  to sing God's  glory and to  create  his  Christian epic.  The
Comedia both praises and appropriates the work of the classic and transcends it to lay the
foundation of an Italian, vernacular literature equally respectable as the literature in Latin. By
the same token, Homer acts as a guide to the younger poet, who is still struggling to find a
way of chanting his island in his vernacular, a language wilfully opposed to the standard or
major usage of English. 
Nonetheless, the scene is also a parody of Dante's relationship to Virgil. Even though,
as  Walcott  declared,  Homer is  an important  model  and reference in  his  poetry,  the poem
carnivalizes42 the figure of the Greek poet, and makes it a mixture of high and low, solemnity
and ridiculousness. Homer has two faces. In the seventh book, the blind African-Caribbean
fisherman Seven Seas, who has embodied him throughout the whole poem, metamorphoses
into a white bust. A figure with no arms and no legs, deprived of colours because they have
faded with time, the bust may also become an awkward presence. In the boat that brings him
and the poet to Saint Soufrière he is described as a “marble freight” (O LVII, I l.6), who has to
42 The Bachtinian concept of “carnivalization” traverses, in interesting ways, the whole work of Derek Walcott
but it is in Omeros that it finds its most prominent application. Carnivalized literature reflects the vivifying
and transformative force that characterizes that particular form of syncretic performance which is known as
Carnival. Carnival is a complex and polymorphous phenomenon which appears in different civilization and
in different ages, and which, in the Caribbean finds some of its most remarkable expressions (Cf. Arnold
1997 and Benítez-Rojo 1997). Carnival may be described as a continuous form of becoming linked to the
awareness of the relativity of all order and regimes: in the carnival, social hierarchies of everyday life – their
solemnities and pieties and etiquettes, as well as all ready-made truths – are profaned and overturned by
normally suppressed voices and energies. Thus, fools become wise, kings become beggars; opposites are
mingled (fact and fantasy, heaven and hell). The language of carnival is double and parodic, and does not
need too much explanation to cause a liberatory explosion of laugher, a mixture of indignation and hilarity. In
Omeros carnivalization is used also to avoid falling in the rigid rethoric of epics, and to construct a discourse
of history that is able to display irony and self-criticism. 
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sit right in the middle in order for the boat to go on in a quick and light way. Omeros exposes
ironically the risks of fetishizing the literary models to which it aspires, and by way of this
ironical exposition it also exorcises this unwelcome possibility. 
Right before the two poets undertake their journey to La Soufrière, Homer addresses
the  narrator  with  a  highly  meta-reflexive  speech  revealing  the  meaning  of  the  latter's
homecoming as well as of his poetic enterprise. Homer's complex speech, although expressed
in the form of a revelation, leaves more questions open than it actually answers:  
Your wanderer is a phantom from the boy's shore.
Mark you, he does not go; he sends his narrator;
he plays tricks with time because there are two journeys
in every odyssey, one on worried water,
the other crouched and motionless, without noise.
For both, the “I” is a mast; a desk is a raft
for one, foaming with paper, and dipping the beak
of a pen in its foam, while an actual craft
carries the other to cities where people speak
a different language, or look at him differently,
while the sun rises from the other direction
with its unsettling shadows, but the right journey
is motionless; as the sea moves around an island
that appears to be moving, love moves round the heart –
with encircling salt, and the slowly travelling hand 
knows its return to the port from which it must start.
Therefore, this is what this island has meant to you,
why my bust spoke, why the sea-swift was sent to you:
to circle yourself and your island with this art. (O LVIII, II l.15-33)
The passage develops an extended metaphor connecting the semantic field of sailing with the
idea of writing, a topos which Walcott has employed abundantly since his earliest collections
of poems. Composing as setting the sails, the poet as a sailor, the work of art as a ship are
images already recurrent among the poets of ancient Rome and, as Maria Cristina Fumagalli
explains, they are particularly important in Dante (2001: 41). Walcott does not limit himself to
reintroducing these images, but he endows them with new meanings related to his Caribbean
context. 
The sea, the space that all the characters have to traverse in order to come home, is the
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same space of oblivion and resemanticization which Walcott  conceived of in “The Sea is
History”. It is a place of death but also a place where life can develop again in forms that are
waiting to be semanticized. The crossing of the ocean entails the dissolution of the boundaries
between things and between categories, creating favourable conditions for re-formulating and
re-conceptualizing them. The sea conflates past and present in a way that allows each of them
to exist simultaneously. Achille’s hallucinatory journey, for example, takes him back three
centuries, and within a very short time he finds himself on the opposite shore of the Atlantic.
Yet while he is in Africa other hallucinations allow him to establish intermittent contact with
his  Caribbean  present.  Similarly,  Major  Plunkett,  while  being  engaged  in  his  historical
account of the battle of the Saints fought off Saint Lucia between the French and the British
army  in the late eighteenth century, finds out that a midshipman with the same name as him
had been run over and killed by a sea wave. The distance in time is annulled, and Plunkett
decides to accept this unlucky young man as the son he never had. The poet narrator, like
Achille, also travels to the other side of the Atlantic, but while he is in Europe he is able to see
his island beyond the barrier of water.
In Seven Seas/ Homer's speech, writing and navigating are the same but they are also
disconnected actions, accomplished by two different ‘I’s. “[T]here are two journeys in every
Odyssey,  one  on  worried  water,/  the  other  crouched and motionless,  without  noise”  says
Seven  Seas  (O  LVIII,  II  l.17).  The  “wanderer”  (l.15)  paradoxically  stands  still,  while  the
narrator is the one endowed with movement. Both the written and the actual journey by sea
have an ‘I’ as a mast which makes the ‘I’ the very protagonist of the poem. The ‘I’ is able to
travel and to move across time and space, to traverse different cultures and tradition. The ‘I’
derives its shape from the experiences of the wanderer who is carried to “cities where people
speak/ a different language” (l.22-23), but it is articulated in language through the work of the
wanderer who stands still and writes. 
The motionless ‘I’ is “foaming with paper/ and dipping the beak/ of a pen in its foam”
(l.21), an image which suggests two mutually exclusive associations. It is not made explicit
whether  the  paper  is  empty  or  already  filled  with  words,  but  the  image  entails  both
possibilities. In “The Sea is History”, Walcott had envisaged the sea as a place of oblivion and
annihilation, but at the same time as a place of sedimentation and accumulation. The fact that
the journey may take place on already written-on paper is a clear reference to the massive
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inter-textual apparatus on which Omeros is built. “Foaming” (l. 21) is a verb that suggests the
possibility of unsettling and disturbing the constant flux in which water and writing move. 
An epic of cognitive mapping. 
Walcott’s recurrent metaphor of the sea pertains to the crisis of representation connected with
the age of postindustrial society and multinational capitalism discussed by Fredric Jameson in
his famous study of Postmodernism (cf. Jameson 1991). Jameson describes this crisis in terms
of the subject's growing difficulties in mapping his or her position within a historical moment
that  has  seen  the  disappearance  of  traditional  systems  of  production  and  social  classes.
Jameson asserts that it is not possible to know the world and its totality in some objective and
real  way  –  that  there  is  a  necessary  rift  between  existential  experience  and  scientific
knowledge.  Yet  the  subject  does  need  to  situate  himself/herself  within  that  vaster
unrepresentable  totality  which  is  the  ensemble  of  society's  structure  as  a  whole.  This
positioning and cognitive mapping, which corresponds to the work of what Louis Althusser
designated as “ideology” (cfr Althusser 1970),  is  an essential  precondition of all  kinds of
social action. For this reason, Jameson asserts that the political form of postmodern art and
literature aims at the enabling of situational representations on a social, individual, and spatial
scale. 
The need for what Jameson calls an aesthetics of “cognitive mapping” – that is “a
pedagogical  political  culture  which  seeks  to  endow  the  individual  subject  with  some
heightened sense of its place in the global system” (Jameson 1991: 94) – is felt in a special
way by post-colonial writers. For them, the feeling of spatial and social confusion connected
with global capitalism is exacerbated by the fact that the forces of cultural representation, and
consequently of  economic  and political  power,  are  constantly taken away by a  dominant
center  that,  through  the  circulation  of  its  cultural  models,  attempts  to  give  a  hegemonic
normality  to  the  uneven  development  and  the  differential  histories  of  nations,  races,
communities, people. The recovery of a sense of place as individual and collective subjects is
the first  step to regaining a capacity to act and to struggle.  The deploying of the literary
imagination  as  a  positive  force  for  renegotiating  alternative  modes  of  being  and  being
conscious in the world is a crucial aspect in the process of producing any effective “culture of
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survival” (Bhabha 1994: 247).
The  passage  above,  which  declares  that  the  aim of  the  poem is  precisely that  of
“encircling” the island of Saint Lucia and the self with “art” (O LVIII, II  l.17), illustrates the
poem's preoccupation with Jameson's cognitive mapping. The fact that Omeros is a poem, and
that its mapping is achieved in a form which is extremely classical – all its eight-thousand
lines are written in Dante's Terza Rima – have led many scholars to discuss the poem as an
epic. Omeros is an epic in the way it chants for the first time the burdensome history of an
oppressed nation, as well as in the way in which it envisages the possibility of a return home
to an island whose main experience has been dispossession. Also, the poem is an epic in the
way it  configures  the  possibility  of  a  homing gesture  within  the  hybrid  condition  of  the
inhabitants of the Caribbean island of Saint Lucia – people who feel that their roots are to be
found elsewhere: in the remote landscapes of Africa, whence slaves were brutally uprooted at
the  time  of  the  Diaspora,  but  also  in  Europe,  the  continent  from which  the  settlers  and
colonisers embarked and whose culture left an indelible signature on the island’s people.
In fact, to call Omeros “an epic” requires a redefinition of the limits of a genre which
Michail  Bakthin  considered  as  usually  rooted  in  stable  conceptions  of  identity  and
nationhood, a genre which inevitably clashes with postcolonial narratives of identity, nation
and  history  usually  involving  displacement,  uprootedness,  and  the  loss  of  tradition  and
language (cf. Pesch 1998). In the essay “Epic and the Novel”, Michail Bakhtin suggested that
the subject of an epic is a national epic past. Indeed, “I sang our wide country, the Caribbean
Sea”, says Derek Walcott in the seventh and last book of  Omeros (LXIV, I  l.10). Yet, this
declaration implies a very fluid conception of nationhood and belonging. The Caribbean that
emerges in  Omeros is not a neatly delimited place, or an established historical and cultural
entity. It is, like Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome, rather a consciousness of space, a spatial
logic of connections and interconnections (Hitchcock 2003). It is a space that extends itself
well beyond its borders – if ever it is possible to talk about borders in an Archipelago located
in the midst of the Atlantic. To sing the Caribbeans, as Homer/ Seven Seas's speech above
quoted suggests, is to find ways of crossing the Caribbean. The accent in Omeros is not on the
national but on the transnational, and on the asymmetries and inequalities that the crossing of
borders and cultural identities necessarily implies. 
Secondly, Bakhtin asserted that a “national tradition (not the personal experience and
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